

THE WISEMAN REVIEW

Founded by Cardinal Nicholas Wiseman and others in 1836 as

THE DUBLIN REVIEW



'MATER ET MAGISTRA'

A Commentary on Pope John XXIII's Encyclical
By J. R. Kirwan

THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF CATHOLICS IN MODERN SPAIN

By J. L. Illanes

LACORDAIRE

The Centenary of his Death

By Nigel J. Abercrombie

CARL JUNG, PSYCHOLOGY & CATHOLICISM

I. Jung and Psychology

By John McLeish

LONDON

AUTUMN 1961

THE POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF CATHOLICS IN MODERN SPAIN

By J. L. ILLANES

THE Spanish political situation which emerged in 1939, with Franco's victory over the Communist regime, marked the dénouement of that political, social and religious tragedy which the Second Republic, begun in 1931, had represented for the country. It is therefore imperative to refer, however briefly, to the role played by Catholics during the years immediately prior to the civil war, if we are to gain a proper understanding of their activity in the public life of the country during the past twenty years.

¹ IV, 3: *A.A.S.* p. 456.

² IV, 2: *A.A.S.* p. 455.

³ IV, 3: *A.A.S.* p. 460.

THE SECOND REPUBLIC

If we can say that Spain has always been a Catholic country, this is not because its governments since the fifteenth century, when national independence was achieved, have declared it so, nor because its official life abounds in public manifestations of Catholicism. However important these factors may be, they are none the less secondary. The simple reason for Spain's Catholicism is that the immense majority of the population (99·5 per cent) is Catholic and that Catholicism is deeply rooted in the social structure of the country. To this is due the impossibility of the survival in Spain of any form of government that fails to take into account the Catholic make-up of the nation. This was understood in 1931 by the republican leaders themselves. The first President of the Republic, Niceto Alcalá Zamora, went so far as to hope for 'a republic with the participation of the Bishops, which would number the great Spanish saints among its national glories'.

From the start, the Hierarchy of the Church in Spain showed itself ready to recognize and accept the legality of the Republic established on 14 April 1931. And many active Catholics (except for such groups as the Carlists, or the monarchists of the *Acción Española*) were prepared to accept the new regime without reserve. A large part of these Catholics were gathered together in the C.E.D.A. (Spanish Confederation of Autonomous Rightists), whose leader was Gil Robles. For the most part they were men who had been formed within Catholic associations such as *Acción Católica* and the A.C.N.P. (National Association of Catholic Propagandists).¹ Their attitude, besides being a logical consequence of the circumstances, also had its roots in the movement, developed within the A.C.N.P. during the latter period of the Monarchy, in defence of the indifferent or accidental nature of specific forms of government.

¹ The National Association of Catholic Propagandists was founded in 1909 by Fr Angel Ayala, s.j., with the aim of intensifying the spread of Catholic doctrine. Its first President was Angel Herrera Oria who in his twenty-six years in office constantly and intelligently encouraged and directed the development of the Association.

Angel Herrera, who is the present President of the *Editorial Católica*, was ordained to the priesthood in 1940, and in 1947 named Bishop of Malaga. In 1949 he was elected National Counsellor of the A.C.N.P., but was obliged to leave his post in 1955 because of ill-health. Since then, Mgr Laureano Castán, Auxiliary Bishop of Tarragona, has been Counsellor of the A.C.N.P.

Very soon, however, the political evolution of the Republic brought about a complete change in this situation. The new government proved itself incapable of maintaining public order (disturbed by anarchist and communist outrages) and of creating a democratic atmosphere of freedom and concord. Referring to the violence of the Republic, Salvador de Madariaga writes: 'Thus was that peace destroyed without which Spain can never hope to build for herself as strong a State as so strong a nation must possess.'¹

The government's inability to guarantee civil liberties precipitated a series of legislative measures as drastic as they were ineffective. The 'Law for the defence of the Republic', passed six months after its inauguration, and the 'Law for public order', made of the government the first violator of constitutional rights, and merited their rejection by the more responsible sectors of public opinion. Speaking of the 'dictatorial powers' granted by the first of these two laws, *The Times* (8 December 1931) commented that it 'would never have been tolerated under the Monarchy', and that 'its existence shows that the Cortes have failed in the task of finding a common ground on which all Spaniards might meet'.

THE ROAD TO CIVIL WAR

The ineffectiveness of these measures and the increase in social unrest (there were 15,000 strikes in the five years of the Republic) paved the way for a series of real persecutions which reached their climax on the eve of the civil war in the assassination by government police agents of the opposition leader, José Calvo Sotelo. Such measures aroused the indignation even of the republican Miguel de Unamuno. In a speech delivered on 28 November 1932, at the Madrid *Ateneo*, he protested: 'Even the Inquisition was limited by certain legal guarantees. But now we have something worse: a police force which is grounded only on a general sense of panic and on the invention of non-existent dangers to cover up this over-stepping of the law.'

The Press was particularly hard hit, since the 'Law for the defence of the Republic' authorized the government to restrict any source of information which, in its judgement, 'might disturb

¹ Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain* (Jonathan Cape, 1946), p. 304.

public order and peace'. *El Debate*, *ABC*, *Informaciones*, *El Correo Catalán*, etc., had their issues confiscated on innumerable occasions; and a complete list of censored, fined, or suppressed publications would fill several pages.¹

This unconstitutional limitation of civil liberties was coupled with a relentless religious persecution which had recourse to violence long before the outbreak of the civil war. The very arrival of the Republic was 'hailed' in Madrid and other cities with the burning of churches and liturgical objects. One of the first legislative measures of the socialist government was the secularization of education and the suppression of private schools. As an immediate result, 350,000 school-children were left without any possibility of receiving instruction since they had previously been attending private schools, all of which were Catholic.

A balance sheet of this abnormal situation can be drawn from figures given by Gil Robles during a speech delivered to the Parliament on 16 June 1936, in which he accused the government of condoning the acts of violence which the Socialists, Anarchists and Communists were committing throughout Spain: 160 churches destroyed, 251 burned or profaned; 269 persons assassinated and 1287 wounded; and 69 locales of centre and rightist political organizations pillaged and destroyed.

For an adequate understanding of this policy of violence one must consider the evolution of the Socialist Party around which the whole political scene of the Spanish Republic revolved. One of its main leaders, Largo Caballero, wrote in *El Socialista* on 1 February 1936: 'I am a Marxist Socialist. Communism is the natural evolution of Socialism, its last and definitive stage.'

The crucial moment of this evolution was marked by the revolution of October 1934. The preceding elections (11 November 1933) had witnessed a victory for the parties of the Right. The Right won 207 seats in the Parliament, the Centre 167, the Left 99.

¹ Although incomplete, the following list gives some idea of the extent of these measures. It covers the period May 1931 to August 1932, during which time the publication of the following newspapers was suspended: in Madrid, *ABC*, *El Debate*, *Informaciones*, *Diario Universal*, *El Siglo Futuro* and *La Nación*; in Alava, *Heraldo Alavés*; in Albacete, *El Diario de Albacete*; in Alicante, *El día*, *La Gaceta de Levante*, *Patria*, *El Pueblo Obrero* and *La Voz del Pueblo*; in Almería, *La Independencia*, *Diario de Almería* and *Heraldo de Almería*; in Avila, *El Diario de Avila*; in the Balearic Islands, *El Luchador*; in Barcelona, *El Correo Catalán*; in Burgos, *El Castellano* and *ABC*; in Cáceres, *Extremadura* and *El Faro de Extremadura*; in Cadiz, *Nuestro Tiempo*, *Diario de Jerez*, *Claridad*, *La Información* and *Regeneración*. The list could be extended indefinitely by the inclusion of other cities where newspapers and magazines also had their publication suspended: Ciudad Real, Cordova, Granada, La Coruña, León, Murcia, Oviedo, Saragossa, Segovia, Seville, Valencia, Valladolid and Zamora.

The political scene indeed seemed radically changed. The C.E.D.A. had become the strongest minority, the Socialists having lost one half of their parliamentary seats. Public opinion had voted a clear No to Communism.

Salvador de Madariaga comments that 'it was obvious from previous statements made by Señor Gil Robles in his most emphatic style that he meant to ask for the lion's share of any new government, as indeed, under a dispassionate parliamentary system, he had every right to do'. But after the governmental crisis of 1 October 1934, the united efforts of the President of the Republic and of Alejandro Lerroux (the masonic leader of the Radical Party) 'succeeded in buying him off with three portfolios (Agriculture, Justice and Labour), important in themselves yet by no means dangerous from the point of view of those who, from the Left, professed to believe that the C.E.D.A. leader was preparing an imminent attack on the Republican regime'.¹ Thus Gil Robles consented to the formation of a Coalition Cabinet controlled by those radicals who had first allied themselves to the Social-Communists in 1931. The weakness of his stand was to favour the Left greatly. In fact, as Madariaga points out, no sooner was this news made public than the Left launched its plan for revolt and the Largo Caballero socialists opted for the way of violence which was to culminate in the October 1934 revolution, and which in Asturias took on all the appearance of a real civil war. By this revolution, which was in violation of democratic principles and of the recently expressed popular vote, the Socialist Party destroyed the legal basis to the Republic. This is the opinion of very many Spaniards, not only of those who later supported Franco, but also of many Republicans. Salvador de Madariaga, for example, goes so far as to assert that 'with the rebellion of 1934, the Left lost every shred of moral authority to condemn the rebellion of 1936'.²

During the troubled months that followed up to the national uprising, Largo Caballero did not in any way modify his political course, but rather progressively expedited the massive penetration of Communism: of a brutally subversive Communism moreover, and one which made a proud show of declaring itself the irreconcilable enemy of democratic law and order, of the State and the Church.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 331.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 333.

After the victory of the Popular Front in the elections of February 1936 (a victory won by none too scrupulous means), the Largo Caballero faction violently opposed the other members of the party who leaned towards a more moderate policy, and in July 1936 it prevented the formation of a conciliatory government presided over by Martínez Barrios, the Grand Master of the Spanish Great Orient.¹ And finally Largo Caballero himself was nominated Prime Minister. Anarchy reigned supreme.

It is scarcely necessary to say that during this period, and above all during the three war years, anti-Catholic violence increased beyond all measure, eventually reaching fantastic proportions. Besides the burning and profanation of churches and cemeteries, and the pillage of rectories, monasteries and convents, 12 bishops, 1 apostolic administrator, 4266 secular priests, 2489 religious, 283 nuns and 249 seminarians, as well as several thousand youths of *Acción Católica*, were murdered between April 1931 and April 1939. Eighty per cent of the clergy disappeared in nine dioceses, and in the diocese of Malaga the figure reached was 90 per cent.²

THE REACTION OF THE CATHOLICS

The violence was henceforward uncontrollable. A reaction was necessary to stem the disorder and anarchy which now reigned throughout the nation. And, given the revolutionary and anti-democratic attitude adopted by the Social-Communists, this reaction could not be other than violent. From now on it was a question of a solution *in extremis*, since the problem presented by the Communist onslaught was one not of coexistence, but of existence. On 18 July 1936 the troops garrisoned in Morocco rose. The civil war was under way.

At the beginning of the Republic, as we have indicated, a large part of the Spanish Catholics had accepted the new situation and had shown their readiness to collaborate with the new regime in

¹ Cf. Arrarás, J., *Historia de la Segunda República Española* (Ed. Nacional, Madrid 1956), Vol. I, p. 35.

² The martyrdom of so many thousands of persons remained a matter of ignorance not only to world opinion but also to many Catholics in other countries, just as today people are unaware of or so easily forget the martyrdom of so many priests and faithful in the Communist countries. What is saddest and most regrettable of all is that there have even been and still are Catholics who regard the sacrifice of these children of the Church out of love for their Catholic faith as something in the nature of a political movement.

the fulfilment of their political and social duties. But the anti-democratic political developments which we have briefly described and the progressive intensification of the religious persecution could result only in a radical change in the attitude of the Catholics. After having tolerated every sort of transgression, the Hierarchy (which in 1931 had recognized the legality of the Republic and advised Catholics to co-operate) realized the need for taking a public stand in favour of the Spain headed by General Franco. By the Collective Letter of July 1937, signed by all but two of the Spanish bishops, the Catholic Hierarchy declared itself in favour of Nationalist Spain and against the Communist tyranny that had undermined the institutions of the Republic.

With the Letter of the Hierarchy, the allegiance of the Catholics to the new legal forces of government emerging with the advance of Franco's army became well-nigh universal. In fact only a handful of active Catholics stood by the Republic (with the exception naturally of the Basques who constitute a separate problem, geographically limited to three of the fifty Spanish provinces). Angel Ossorio y Gallardo, José María Semprún, José Bergamín (at present living in Spain) and Alfredo Mendizábal (of the so-called 'Third Spain') were among the few Catholics who remained faithful to red-Communist Spain, and who later accompanied it into exile in the moment of defeat.

THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN THE FRANCO REGIME

The victory of Nationalist Spain meant the setting up of a new regime under General Franco. The civil war had involved not only a defence, but also a new understanding, of all that the Spanish people hold most dear: their religious faith, their national traditions and liberties, their Western and Christian culture, their dignity as citizens.

The regime that followed on victory has in many ways failed to realize the aspirations incarnated in the war. But this frequently occurs in the story of human events. Original intentions and first impulses are always higher than subsequent realities. Nevertheless, as the new political order emerged, the Catholics were in their great majority solidly behind the new regime. The intolerant and anti-religious policies of the Republic had not made any other attitude possible. However, in the first post-war fervour the Army

and the Falange showed hostility and distrust towards those Catholics who had accepted the republican regime. This explains how, at the start, no ministerial posts were held by Catholics belonging to those organizations which had provided personnel for the C.E.D.A., or to the other political organizations which had actively collaborated with the Republic. The active Catholics who figure in the government are there either as Falangists, like Pedro Gamero del Castillo, a member of the A.C.N.P.; or as Carlists, like Count Rodezno and Esteban Bilbao. Among others, in charge of the Ministry of Finance we find José Larraz of the paper *El Debate* which had been suppressed under the Republic; and, at the Ministry of National Education, José Ibáñez Martín, of the A.C.N.P. From the first moment in which the new State begins to take shape, however, many active Catholics of every tendency, especially from the A.C.N.P., are to be found on the lower levels of the Administration: as Subsecretaries, Directors General, Civil Governors, Mayors, etc. Already in 1939 one could list Enrique Calabria (Subsecretary of Finance), Máximo Cuervo (Director General of Prisons), Giménez Arnau (Director General of the Press), Mariano Puigdollers (Director General of Ecclesiastical Affairs), etc.

The years subsequent to 1939 are marked, on the one hand, by a certain opposition to the regime on the part of Catholics belonging to the Carlist movement, and of some liberal monarchical groups, each discontent not to see the State evolve politically towards its respective position. On the other hand, the changes in the international situation in 1945 induced General Franco to seek a broader basis for his government by including Catholics who had collaborated with the Republic. Moreover, the hostility of the Army leaders and of the Falange in their regard, and in regard to the organizations with which they were connected, had greatly diminished by 1945.

No better measure could have been chosen, to procure this broader collaboration in the government, than the nomination as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Alberto Martín Artajo, at that time President of the *Acción Católica* of Spain. Men formed in the A.C.N.P. who, as we have seen, were already working in the Ministry of National Education and in other Ministries, now saw new posts open to them in Embassies and other branches of the government. These included such prominent Catholic personalities as Fernández Ladreda (Ministry of Public Works), Ortiz

Muñoz (Subsecretary of Popular Education), Tomás Cerro and Pedro Rocamora in the General Directions of Propaganda and the Press, etc.

It was in this atmosphere of close collaboration of the Christian Democrats with the regime that the Congress of Pax Romana, the international organization of Catholic graduates and undergraduates, was held in Spain, in May and June of 1946. The President of this Congress, Joaquín Ruiz Jiménez, in that moment embarked on an impressive political career: President of the *Cultura Hispánica* Institute that same year; Spanish Ambassador to the Holy See in 1948; and Minister of National Education in 1951.

In February 1956 the agitation of liberals and monarchists with university connections, the dissatisfaction of the Falange and the reaction of the Army leaders, precipitated a governmental crisis. One result of this crisis was the dismissal of Ruiz Jiménez who was then considered to be leaning too closely to the Left and to the Catholic Progressivists. Just a year later another ministerial crisis was to take place, this time resulting in the dismissal of Alberto Martín Artajo.

In the new Cabinet, however, there were still to be found Catholics belonging to the same associations of which Ruiz Jiménez and Martín Artajo were members. Among the others was the present Minister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando María Castiella, until then Ambassador to the Holy See, in which post he was succeeded by Francisco Gómez de Llano, also a member of the A.C.N.P. and formerly Minister of Finance. The government also included some men formed in other Catholic organizations; as economic expert, for instance, Alberto Ullastres, a Professor of the University of Madrid and a member of Opus Dei, who, together with Mariano Navarro, the Minister of Finance, is behind the present plan for stabilizing the Spanish economy.

SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Looking back on the different Administrations which have succeeded one another over the past twenty years, that is during the present Spanish regime, attention is immediately drawn to the fact that there has been active and constant collaboration with the regime on the part of Catholics, just as earlier there had been Catholics whose love for their country and for the Church, whose

rights had to be defended, led them to collaborate with the Second Republic.

These Catholics, who are or have been in the government or who hold other important public positions in Spain, come from the most varied Catholic organizations: *Acción Católica*, the National Association of Catholic Propagandists (whose constant mentor has been Bishop Herrera of Malaga), the Marian Congregations,¹ some Third Orders, Opus Dei,² etc.

It is logical that this should be so. We live in an age when Catholics, in response to the repeated exhortations of the popes, seek to take an active part in the public life of many countries. This is a duty of social charity, which is often burdensome and thankless (as is borne out by the present internal vicissitudes of Italian and French politics). It is a duty which cannot in conscience be neglected, particularly when the danger exists that abstention on the part of Catholics may favour the political manoeuvres of those whose aims are open to question.³

Apart from this danger, which really exists in Spain today, as it does in Italy, France, Germany and many other countries, one must remember that the great majority of the Spanish people are Catholic, and that a large number of the men professionally and morally most qualified for public responsibility belong to or have been formed in one of the Catholic organizations which we have mentioned. When one considers the excesses with which the Left or the Right have blighted the life of so many countries in our own time it is not difficult to imagine what might have happened in Spain if these active Catholics had withdrawn *en masse* from the public life of the country—out of fear either of compromising themselves and being immediately labelled ‘collaborators’, or simply of wasting their energy and prestige in unpropitious political circumstances. Such a withdrawal would have opened up the way to power for some extremist minority with an ideology scarcely or not at all reconcilable with the interests of the country and the Church.

¹ The pious activity and the apostolic and public work of these Congregations, which for the most part are directed by priests of the Society of Jesus, is especially noteworthy in Spain.

² Opus Dei, a Secular Institute founded in 1928 by Mgr José María Escrivá de Balaguer, received definitive approbation from the Holy See in 1950.

³ Fernando Martín-Sánchez Juliá, who succeeded Angel Herrera as President of the A.C.N.P., writes: ‘Abstention is admissible only on the condition of its being effective; and the main practical objection to it lies in the difficulty of determining its due measure’ (*Ideas claras* (Madrid 1959), p. 109).

It is for this reason that the active presence of these Catholics in the several governments which have so far served under General Franco's regime has always met with the approval of the Hierarchy. For example, when Martín Artajo left office as Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Primate, Cardinal Play y Deniel, made a point of stating publicly that the political conduct of the ex-President of *Acción Católica* had always had his full approval.¹

However, in order to avoid those misunderstandings or generalizations which so often hinder a complete grasp of the complex Spanish reality, let us note here that both the Hierarchy in Spain and the Associations of the Faithful to which these politicians belong have always asserted their absolute independence of the criteria and personal opinions held by these Catholics in the fulfilment of their public charges. This is not just a theoretical independence, proclaimed in virtue of doctrinal principles (the distinction between the religious and the profane spheres, between spiritual and temporal missions, etc.), but is also an independence in practice, i.e. when examined in the light of specific problems and facts. Thus, for example, it becomes clear how, during the International Catholic Press Congress in Rome in 1950, *Ecclesia*, the weekly organ of *Acción Católica*, should have published an editorial criticizing the censorship of the Press in Spain, precisely when the control of the Press was in the hands of an active Catholic and member of the A.C.N.P., Luis Ortiz Muñoz. Many other similar cases could be given, concerning educational questions, labour union problems, etc.²

¹ Cf. 'Letter of the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo to Alberto Martín Artajo', *Bulletin of the A.C.N.P.* (Madrid, 1-15 April 1957).

² While on this subject, it may be of interest to note that the Counsellor of Opus Dei in Washington, in a letter to the *Nieman Reports* (19 October 1959), emphasized that no member of Opus Dei has ever occupied the office of censor in any of the organisations that control the Press in Spain. Two years previously, in July 1957, the Secretariat of Opus Dei in Spain affirmed the complete freedom which the members of the Institute enjoy in their social and political opinions and activities, and declared: 'In the past few weeks news items have appeared in several papers in different countries associating Opus Dei with a report on various groups or currents of opinion existing in Spain.'

'The Secretariat of the Counsellor of Opus Dei for Spain would like to make it quite clear that such suggestions, in so far as they refer to Opus Dei, are absolutely false and defamatory.'

'Opus Dei is a Secular Institute of the Catholic Church which is at present established in thirty different countries. Its activities are directly and exclusively apostolic and, in virtue of its very spirit, it lies outside the sphere of politics in any country.'

'Therefore, the allegations referred to are hereby explicitly and categorically denied. Furthermore, the following points should be made clear:

'1. Neither Opus Dei nor any of its members has spread or used any such report.

'2. Opus Dei repudiates both the procedure of those using such anonymous and

Once this independence has been established, however, the Hierarchy and the various Associations of the Faithful have always maintained that no reason has existed, nor now exists, to forbid Catholics to collaborate with the present regime. This is a line of action based on the traditional teaching, brought out by Leo XIII in the Encyclical *Libertas*, about the indifference of the forms of government and about the political action of Catholics; namely, that 'it is proper to take part in the administration of public affairs, so long as the particular conditions of the moment do not advise to the contrary. Indeed, the Church approves each person collaborating towards the common good, and working according to his capacity, for the defence and prosperity of the State.' Indeed, not long ago (30 August 1959) the *Osservatore Romano* recalled this very doctrine, precisely in reference to Spain. It was this doctrine which induced the Hierarchy in 1931 to advise the Catholics to collaborate with the Second Republic, and later made them discourage this collaboration when, as we have seen, the attitude of the Republican government showed that it was incapable of maintaining public order and respecting the rights of the people and the Church.

The many Catholics who have decided to accept public responsibility in the Franco regime have therefore done so freely and according to conscience, in the certainty that they have full right to do so and are acting morally. They know quite well that the regime has its defects, but they also feel convinced that their best contribution to the correction of these defects is to engage themselves personally in the task.

Besides, it cannot be denied, especially if one bears in mind the troubled years of the Second Republic, that the present State, and the work of Franco and of those elements that have supported him, have brought great benefits to Spain: the re-establishment of order and of the unity of the country, once faced with anarchy and dissolution; the consequent advantages of a long period of peace (Spain had not known twenty years of social peace for a

clandestine means, as well as the conduct of all who seek to create or make use of circumstances for the purpose of slandering institutions or persons.

'3. Opus Dei expressly disavows any group or individual using the name of the Institute for their political activities. In this field, as in their professional, financial or social activities, the members of Opus Dei, just as other Catholics, enjoy the fullest freedom, within the limits of Christian teaching which lays on them the obligation of always using clear and licit means in accordance with right conscience. Therefore they act always as private citizens, without the Institute being involved in any way in the merits or demerits of their personal activity.'

'Madrid, July 12, 1957.'

Vol. 235. No. 489.

century and a half); neutrality during the last world war, despite the manœuvres and pressures of which the country was made an object, especially by Hitler; and the rescue of Spain from the fate of becoming a 'guinea pig' state for Communism among the Western countries (as was the explicitly stated intention of Lenin and Stalin). To this one must add the respect for the freedom and rights of the Church—which undoubtedly has an important bearing on the political attitude of Catholics. This respect finds an expression, for instance, in the spirit and content of the 1953 Concordat, and in the flourishing of an intense Christian life throughout the nation.¹

¹ In this sense and in this light one can understand a recent declaration signed by the Superiors of various religious orders in Cuba and published on the occasion of demonstrations in Havana organized by elements hostile to the present Spanish regime. We reproduce the following extracts:

'We the undersigned, Superiors of Spanish religious orders resident in Cuba, anxious to do homage to the truth about Spain and about its government, believe it our duty to declare, as we hereby do, before the public opinion of the entire world and in particular before Catholics:

'We live for our ministry, far removed from active politics. But we are not indifferent to the truth or the errors regarding Spanish problems that centre on questions of human rights, the moral law and the Church.

'With the Republic of 1931, there was unleashed in Spain a violent religious persecution, denounced by the Spanish Hierarchy in two "Collective Declarations", of December 30, 1931 and May 25, 1933 respectively. These declarations were followed by an Encyclical "Dilectissima Nobis" of Pope Pius XI, about the criminal persecution of the Catholic Church in Spain. . . .

'We clearly affirm that during the marxist-republican regime in Spain even the most elementary rights were ignored. . . .

'We declare just as explicitly that during the years in power of that same regime true and genuine liberty was unknown in Spain.

'Freedom of the press no longer existed, since the repeated suppressions ordered by the regime had resulted in draining the vitality of the better national newspapers of larger circulations.

'It is well known that the marxist-republican regime had no respect for private property. One proof of this was the wholesale pillaging of the national religious treasure, and the colossal theft of the gold of the nation and of valuables belonging to private individuals, which were kept in the vaults of the National Bank.

'Confronted by these arbitrary actions and evident atrocities of the marxist-republican government, the Spanish people and the army rose against the barbarism which was destroying their country. The ensuing war, to which Pius XI gave the name of a "National Crusade", could truly be described as a war of religious liberty.

'This Crusade was at the origin of the present Spanish State, which is governed by a man who is integrally Catholic, Generalissimo Francisco Franco Bahamonde.

'We must acknowledge with satisfaction the good relations established between the Catholic Church and the new Spanish State, and sanctioned in a Concordat signed in recent years.

'These declarations of ours have no controversial purpose. They are rather inspired by the simple desire to re-establish the full truth, to which violence has too often been done, about the origin and the present reality of the Spanish State, which, because it is declaredly Catholic, often finds itself unjustly attacked and slandered.

'In witness whereof, we sign our names to the above declarations, at Havana, on the 7th day of January of the year of Our Lord, 1960.'

The document is signed by: Fr Aristonica Ursa, Vice-Provincial of the Claretian Fathers; Fr José Mendizábal, Provincial Delegate of the Franciscan Fathers; Fr

The English writer Arnold Lunn, speaking of the Spanish civil war in one of his books, explains his own favourable attitude towards Nationalist Spain by saying that when someone is 70 per cent right (as he thought Franco to be), you can of course be in his favour, without this implying that you have abandoned all interest in correcting the defective 30 per cent.¹

Perhaps Lunn's attitude can serve as a final comment in this attempt to clarify the position of the Spanish Catholics who have supported the present regime.

OTHER ATTITUDES AMONG CATHOLICS

Up to this point we have been examining the criteria and the reasons behind the attitude of those Catholics who have seen fit to collaborate with the present Spanish regime. We will now consider the position of those who have adopted the contrary attitude.

Here also we find men of varying political backgrounds, as well as members of all the Catholic organizations of which we have spoken (*Acción Católica*, National Association of Catholic Propagandists, Marian Congregations, Opus Dei, etc.). One may again apply the general considerations which we have already made concerning the independence of the Hierarchy and of these several organizations with regard to the opinions and activity of these Catholics also, and concerning their personal responsibility for their acts; for in their decision not to support Franco's regime, they too are making use of the freedom which the teaching of the Church acknowledges as theirs.

Given the scope of the present article, it is not necessary to describe the various currents which make up this political opposition. It would in any case be extremely difficult to do so. Since the natural free play of political tendencies does not exist in

Ceferino Ruiz Rodríguez, Vice-Provincial of the Jesuit Fathers; Fr José Fomero, Vicar Provincial of the Dominican Fathers; Fr Antonio de Vegamián, Prior Provincial of the Carmelite Fathers; Fr Emiliano Guezuraga, Superior of the Trinitarian Fathers; Fr Rafael Mercader, Vicar of the Salesian Fathers; Fr Evaristo de Santa Gema, Vice-Provincial of the Passionist Fathers; Fr Gregorio Subiñas, Visitor of the Vincentian Fathers; Fr Antonio Parredón, Vicar Provincial of the Pious Schools; Brother Pablo de la Cruz, Provincial of the Marist Brothers; Fr Antonio Medina, Rector of the University of St Thomas of Villanueva, of the Augustinian Fathers; Brother Auspicio Ochoa, Superior of the Hospitallers of St John of God; Fr Antonio González, Superior of the Redemptorist Fathers.

¹ Sir Arnold Lunn, *And Yet So New* (Sheed & Ward, 1958), p. 117.

Spain, at least to any appreciable extent, such tendencies are enervated and devoid of real life. The result is that it becomes practically impossible to organize any of the groups around a central authority, the tendency being rather towards fragmentation into still smaller groups which in many cases have only a purely personal significance. To this factor must be added another which is of particular importance and which alone can give some idea of what extremely imprecise limits distinguish the Catholic attitudes of support, or of opposition, with regard to the Franco regime. The fact is that the majority of these groups or persons have changed their position on more than one occasion over the past twenty years, or have given varying expressions to their support or opposition towards the regime. These variations have been occasioned by the different changes since 1939 in the governmental structure, or in the international political scene. Some who at first collaborated actively with the regime have later preferred to adopt a position of indifference or of opposition. In others the process has been just the contrary. Only a few have consistently refused to give any measure of support to the regime.

This combination of factors makes it almost impossible to draw a clear picture of the opposition. It should suffice however to recall that in the ranks of the opposition are found Catholics (who, as we have stated, are members of the several Associations of the Faithful already listed) of all tendencies: from the liberal monarchists of the *Unión Española* to members of the old C.E.D.A. and certain intellectuals grouped around Gil Robles or Giménez Fernández; and from monarchical traditionalists to Falangists and conservative Republicans. Nevertheless, it may be helpful to examine the reasons which led these Catholics to oppose the Franco regime.

The first consideration, of course, is that this regime can be reduced in the last analysis to a form of personal power. The purpose of the civil war was not the establishment of a dictatorship, but of a regime that would permit the Spanish people to live together in peace—which had become impossible under the Second Republic. The concentration of power, no doubt necessary during the war and even in the immediate post-war period, has been excessively prolonged, with the result that Spain has seen herself deprived of well-grounded and lasting institutions, and left dependent on the life of one man as the only guarantee of peace and order. As if this first consequence of personal power—the lack

of basic institutions—were not enough to feed the prejudices of the opposition, it is joined by another and not less inevitable consequence: the restriction of political liberties.

The other criticisms which are directed against the regime all centre on the same basic defect: the lack of adequate freedom of the Press and of information, the political indifference of the country, the inconsistency which is held to exist between an advanced social legislation and its loose and ineffectual fulfilment, and so on.

The consideration of these and other like defects in the present Spanish political system have led the Catholics to whom we refer to adopt a position which, in an adaptation of Arnold Lunn's idea, could be defined as that of those who hold that the presence of 30 per cent of unacceptable elements vitiates the whole and renders it advisable to deny it any support. Naturally this general attitude covers a whole range of expressions, from simple abstention to absolute opposition, passing through various stages of relative opposition or criticism towards one or several aspects of the governmental system.

FINAL OBSERVATIONS

From all that has been said thus far we can draw some general conclusions by way of summary. The first consideration that we should make concerns the peculiar characteristics of the Spanish political situation. These peculiarities, unfortunately, are not in general taken into due account, because of a lack of proper knowledge and evaluation of their historical precedents (above all, the collapse of democracy in the Second Republic), and because of the United Nations' political and economic blockade, agreed upon in 1945 at the instigation of Russia, which caused the isolation of the country from the rest of the Western world. Not to take these peculiarities into account, and to forget what was the social situation of the country before the present regime, involves the risk of passing faulty judgements about the true political situation in Spain. This risk is all the greater in that the Press—we refer here to the systematic campaigns of the radical and Communist Press—very often tends to disfigure the real picture of Spain by giving out tendentious reports which exaggerate the negative aspects and pass over the positive, or by spreading deliberate falsehoods. A

simple examination of the presentation, places of origin, terminology and political colouring of the publications involved will show that here there is question of a systematic campaign, which may be more or less well co-ordinated but always responds to precise directives which normally originate from the same propaganda source as inspires Radio Prague. It has not been hard to finance such a campaign with the money which the defeated Communist government took with it in 1939 to Russia, France and Mexico, and with the 7800 boxes of gold (at that time equivalent to £63,265,684), the gold reserves of the State, which Negrin, the Minister of Finance, had shipped from Cartagena to Odessa on 25 October 1936.¹ It is therefore greatly to be regretted that even some Catholics have at times naïvely taken up the echo of these Communist campaigns and have gone so far as to write, no doubt in the best of faith, that in Spain the Hierarchy, the clergy, *Acción Católica*, Opus Dei, etc., are engaging in politics, and moreover in politics of an 'anti-social', 'feudal' nature.

As we have already said, this complex of factors could lead, and at times has led, to judgements about the Spanish political situation which are absolutely groundless. Not infrequently, for example, one hears criticism expressed describing the Spanish regime and the Franco government as 'totalitarian and tyrannical'—which constitutes an obvious exaggeration. A more objective and detached judgement would say that it is an authoritarian regime, of a paternalistic type, which is undoubtedly marked by a massive concentration of power in the hands of a single man, but is not in any way based on terror nor on coercion of the individual conscience.

There does in fact exist in Spain great freedom of individual criticism, so much so that we may say that this exercise of criticism in the 'tertulias' (informal gatherings of individuals either in public places—bars, etc.—or in their homes, in order to converse and exchange views) constitutes a typical aspect of Spanish political life. According to the American magazine *Newsweek* (25 January 1960), Eisenhower, speaking of his visit to Spain, observed: 'I found no fear in Spain. Everybody talked freely to me.' His observation is exactly the opposite of the propaganda view that constantly presents the Spanish regime as a 'police tyranny', or a 'regime based on persecution'. Such expressions originate, or easily find their echo, in those who for their part

¹ Cf. Salvador de Madariaga, *op. cit.*, p. 392.

seem rather inclined to overlook the regimes that are really based on persecution, the savagely anti-democratic and anti-Catholic regimes of the Communist countries.

It is of course true that a regime based on personal power is particularly exposed to arbitrary decisions and to misgovernment, even if the honesty of the person in power be beyond all question. Arbitrariness and misgovernment have not been lacking in Franco's Spain. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that this has been commented upon by certain sectors of the Press in a somewhat exaggerated fashion, to say the least, especially if it is borne in mind that similar things have occurred and still occur in countries where the democratic and parliamentary tradition is of long standing. For example, when the Liberal Member of Parliament, Mr Jeremy Thorpe, recently organized a Press campaign in connection with the arrest of some Spaniards accused of subversive activities, an English reader wrote to the *Manchester Guardian* (28 January 1960):

It is right that we should object to any country which denies human rights to its citizens, but it seems that we must first put our own house in order. In Northern Ireland, 160 people are still interned after three years without trial. It appears that the Government of Northern Ireland dissociated itself in 1957 from the relevant section of the Declaration of Human Rights on the grounds that the situation called for special powers. Perhaps Mr Jeremy Thorpe would like to take a trip across the Irish Sea, instead of trying to enter Spain where at least there is the formality of trial before internment.

Without entering into the justice or injustice of the cases involved, which is not the point here, perhaps the same could be said of the numerous detentions of French citizens, also accused of subversive activities. In actual fact the proportion of detained persons in the whole of Spain is 51.49 per 100,000. Only two other European countries, Holland and Denmark, can show a lower figure.

When Spaniards read articles about Spain published in certain foreign papers they are very often seized with the impression that they are reading about some country other than their own, some make-believe land described with great wealth of imaginative commonplaces. For instance, when one reads in a Roman magazine that Quico Sabater—a bandit with a long record of murders to his name—is considered by the Catalonian people as a legendary political hero, one is left with a sense of stupefaction only

comparable to what would be experienced by an Italian reading that Giuliano is regarded in Sicily as an heroic defender of the Bourbon monarchy, or that the 'banditi in tuta blu' of Milan were successors to the ideals of the Risorgimento.

What really is lacking in Spanish political life—which, we repeat, is not dominated by any 'terrorist' or 'police regime'—is freedom of criticism of the government exercised through the organs of public opinion. This is what makes the public opinion of the country anaemic and lifeless, and in general indifferent to the decisions of a State which does not inform itself as it should of the will and feelings of the people, and which sees an obstacle, and not a contribution, to the work of government in the critical reactions and comments of its citizens.

But, even more than in these defects, where the Spanish people find fault with the regime is in the fact that it has not faced up to the problem of succession and taken adequate steps for its solution. By this problem we mean the transition from personal power to more stable institutions which can ensure the permanence of the positive achievements of the regime and at the same time bring the two necessary principles of authority and freedom into harmony.

There is a widespread desire among the Spanish people to see the present regime evolve and the country progress towards institutions based on more democratic formulae. Taking their inspiration from native tradition, these formulae would undoubtedly show particular features distinguishing them from those of other countries, just as the Italian political institutions are different from the American, and the latter different from the German or the English. But they would have to be built up on that same basic concept and approach that generally go by the name of democracy.

While on this subject, it might not be out of place to refer to certain expressions which are in current use among Spaniards in one sense rather than in any other, and which consequently give rise to misunderstandings and apparent differences between Spanish Catholics and those of other countries. We are thinking precisely of the word 'democracy'. Because of the use and abuse that has been made of this word, to the extent of its being applied even to Communist regimes ('people's democracies') of which Spain has had sad experience, there are certain Catholics in Spain who are not too happy about a word which can have such an

ambiguous and elastic meaning. For they believe that the term 'democracy' has often been a cover for repressive and even tyrannical measures against the nation and the Church. This is why it may happen that a Spanish Catholic and an Italian Catholic, for example, may use different expressions and terminology, even though they mean the same thing: an institutional regime in which the State is subject to the rule of law, and in which the freedom of opinion of the citizens and their direct intervention in the responsibility of public affairs are respected.

The immense majority of Spanish Catholics are united in these common aims: to secure for the country the permanence of the positive achievements of the present regime, to correct its defects, and to bring about its evolution towards democratic institutions as the basis of government. But in practice there is wide divergence of opinion as to the way in which these common aims should be realized. Some feel they can best be achieved by maintaining an awkward attitude of opposition, others by the no less awkward approach of constructive criticism and collaboration with the regime.

The reader will no doubt find himself wondering, 'But does Franco realize the need for this evolution, and, if he does, does he want it?' Contrary to what one might expect, it is not easy to answer this question. Many Catholics, thinking of the good of the nation and of the Church, trust that the answer is affirmative. But their trust rests simply on one man's ability to look far enough ahead and on his unquestionable sincerity of purpose.

Meanwhile all Spanish Catholics, including those who count themselves among the opposition, are of one mind in excluding any recourse to violence, in hoping for a peaceful evolution of the regime, lest the country find itself swept again into the state of anarchy that gave rise to the civil war, a repetition of which would be both tragic and grotesque.

The advocates of violence are to be found in the exterior, in the radical opposition to the regime of those who left the country after the defeat of the Communist government. *C.N.T.*, for example, the organ of the Communists in exile, edited at Toulouse, wrote on 31 January 1960: 'It will again become necessary, as an urgent hygienic measure, to burn a few more convents and monasteries. From time to time, fire has been the only purifying element in the hands of the people.' As can be readily concluded, this is the extremist position, nourished by the most single-minded

and brutal Marxist revolutionary orthodoxy which would not hesitate to bring about the ruin of the nation as the first step in its ascent to power.

We feel that we have sufficiently described, at least in general terms, the nature and the implications of the several positions adopted by Catholics in Spain during the past twenty years.

In Spain also, just as in many other countries, an encouraging fact has emerged over this period: Catholics have become effectively conscious of their right and duty to take an active part in the solving of the problems of public life. Over and above any possible difference of opinions and attitudes, this development should encourage and unite all Catholics, whether Spanish or not. Because, as Leo XIII said in his Encyclical *Immortale Dei* (1885),

when discussion centres on purely political matters, on the best form of government, on this or that possible constitutional basis to the State, there can be an honest diversity of opinions. Therefore justice bears it ill that persons whose piety is acknowledged and who are ready to practise the teachings of the Holy See, should be taken to task, for a fault as it were, because they think in one way rather than another about the problems to which we have referred.

It is certain moreover that whatever the specific form of government that follows General Franco's regime, the Catholics, on the basis of these common aspirations and responsibilities, will exercise a decisive influence on the approach to and solution of the major problems of the nation.

Diversity of opinions, common responsibilities, and unity in the face of the essential problems: these, in our opinion, should be the constant characteristics of the future political action of Catholics in Spain. Variety of tendencies—just as there exists a variety of tendencies and currents among the several Catholic groups included in Italian democracy, but undivided unity in the face of doctrinal issues when the moment comes for taking a practical stand. Since the Church is not and never could be a party, this unity of Catholics does not presuppose, nor lay upon them, any obligation to give their active adhesion to any single movement or political party.