

Modernization and Administrative Reform during the later Franquist Régime (1957-1973)

Opus Dei professionalism and Spanish European integration

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Foreword

This work started out as a part of an interdisciplinary Master of Arts programme, ESST (Education in Society, Science and Technology in Europe). In connection with this, I spent six unforgettable months of 1996 in the beautiful city of San Sebastián, situated in the Basque province of Guipúzcoa at the Western end of the Pyrenees. This stay has stuck with me and been a great inspiration when I in the past year and a half have elaborated on this study to become a dissertation in history at the University of Oslo.

Numerous people are to be acknowledged for supporting both my study and myself during this process. First of all I want to thank my supervisor at the *Forum for Universitetshistorie*, John Peter Collett, for sparing so much of both his time and scholarly capacity in giving me advice and encouragement. Furthermore, I have had very good use of critical and constructive comments and suggestions made by Torleif Hamre, Bjørn Olav Listog, Sissel Myklebust, Jeffrey Herf, Fredrik Thue, Bernt Hagtvett, Olav Wicken and Joseba Agirreazkuenaga Zigorraga who have all read parts of of my thesis with great attention. In addition I would like to express a general gratitude to the *Forum for Universitetshistorie* at the University of Oslo, not only for funding my second research journey to Spain in the spring of 1997, but also for providing an inspiring intellectual environment and great company. I also wish to thank my friend, Ingar Lund, for his interest in my work. His spiritual mind has made creativity out of many small hours.

During my time in Spain my love for the country has grown even deeper. Through an amiable and helping attitude towards a Norwegian student with a grammar problem, the following people have contributed to this: Nicanor Ursua, of the Dept. of Philosophy and Educational Sciences at the University of the Basque Country; Luis Sanz Menéndez, of the Institute for Advanced Social Studies at the Higher Council for Scientific Research; Martha Peach, of the Institute *Juan March* of Studies and Investigations; Fernando de Meer, of the Dept. of History at the University of Navarra; Mercedes Rubio Pascual, of the National Institute of Public Administration at the Ministry of Public Administration, and last, but not least, Miguel Beltrán Villava, of the Dept. of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Autonomous University of Madrid. He

has provided me with both books, articles and indispensable information both as a scholar and a former civil servant.

Finally, every student writing a dissertation is in serious danger of developing a permanent 'thousand mile stare'. I want to thank Cecilie for reminding me of what life is *really* all about.

Oslo, 12th of January, 1998.

Kim Helsvig

List of abbreviations

BOE - Boletín Oficial del Estado. (The State's Official Bulletin)

C.S.I.C. - Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. (The Spanish Higher Council for Scientific Research)

CEDA - Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas. One of the Spanish right-wing party's during the II Republic (1931-1936).

DA - Documentación Administrativa. Journal created in 1958 in relation with the administrative reform.

ENA - Ecole Nationale d'Administration. (The French Public Administration School)

F.E.T y de las J.O.N.S. - La Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista. The franquist regime's only legal political party. Renamed *Movimiento Nacional* in 1958.

MAP - Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas. (Ministry of Public Administration)

OCYPE - Oficina de Coordinación y Programación Económica. (Office for Economic Co-ordination and Planning) Created in 1957 as a part of the administrative reform.

PJC - Patronato de Investigación y Técnica 'Juan de la Cierva'. Research foundation within the Spanish Higher Council for Scientific Research, dealing with technological research.

R&D - Research and Development.

SHOT - Society for the History of Technology, established in the United States, 1957.

STS - Studies of Science-Technology-Society interrelations.

T&C - Technology and Culture, SHOT's journal.

TMV - Senter for Teknologi og Menneskelige Verdier, Universitetet i Oslo. (Centre for Technology and Culture, University of Oslo)

"We welcome the goods of industrial society, but we do not want the society which created them."

José Ortega y Gasset¹

CHAPTER 1. Introduction

Field of study

During the past four decades Spain has experienced fundamental transformations in most aspects of both social and political life. From being a predominantly agrarian society under an authoritarian dictatorship in the late 1950's, the country is today an industrial, or what some will call a post-industrial, democratic society striving with the almost all-European challenges of integration within the European Union. Thus, it is not surprising that Spanish modernization and transition to democracy have been the subject of a number of historical and social scientific studies. Most of these have dealt with the period of actual transition and the subsequent consolidation of democracy after the death of General Franco in 1975. Nevertheless, I think that some of the most influential contributions to later economic, social and cultural development of Spain can be traced back to important shifts in both ways of making policy and to changes in politics itself from the late 1950's. As Víctor Pérez Díaz says:

"by the time we get to the mid 70's the economic, social and cultural institutions of Spain were already quite close to those of western Europe, and the cultural beliefs, normative orientation and attitudes that go with the workings of these institutions were also close to European ones. This is one of the reasons why the political change to democracy worked so swiftly."²

¹ Cited from Sejersted, Francis (1991) "Er det mulig å styre utviklingen?" in *Teknologi og kultur*, Sejersted, Francis (ed) TMV forlag, Oslo, p.34. (my transl.) Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955) is in addition to have been the most prominent Spanish philosopher of the first half of this century, the first professional philosopher to address the question of technology in modern societies. (Mitcham, Carl (1993), *Thinking through Technology; The Path between Engineering and Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp.45-49)

² Cited from Linz, Juan J./Stepan, Alfred (1996) *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, p.112.

Thus, my approach to the study of the recent historical development of Spain is rather to try to understand some of the development within Spanish political and social life *during* the dictatorship. More precisely, this thesis will deal with what is usually labelled *the Spanish technocracy* (1957-73) and its growth, work and impact on Spanish society in general. I find this period fascinating because, at least on the surface, it contains so many contradictions. One is that the dictator, who presumably would claim the primacy of will over knowledge, in this period, surrounded himself with 'apolitical' experts, or technocrats, to whom he delegated most of the decision making power. Another is that the so called technocrats, who were perceived as strongly Catholic conservatives because many of them were connected to the Catholic lay-organization Opus Dei³, induced changes which reformed the Spanish society more fundamentally than any interregnum of liberal politics during the preceding two centuries by far can equal. In the essence of these changes lay a very ambitious administrative reform which was to influence on later both political and social development of the country. In the words of Alejandro Nieto:

"By the end of the 50's a state of political evolution manifested itself which was to influence considerably on the image of the administration and on the position of the bureaucracy. In those days, one could say, the initial energy which had guided the State since 1939 was lost, and the regime [...] experienced a break that was to give it new energies and inspirations for the coming years. The most important factor of this new line was precisely the bureaucracy. [...] [During the 1960's] one accelerated and culminated the process of bureaucratic expansion, that is, the bureaucracy was no longer limited to defend itself against political intrusion (as in the 1920's and 1930's) and neither was it satisfied with occupying the areas which were abandoned by the political power (as in the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's), but rather invaded the most characteristic zones of political power in an offensive manner. In other words: an authentic bureaucracy, or government by the bureaucrats, was introduced in Spain."⁴

³ 'Opus Dei' means 'The work of God'. Opus Dei is a Catholic lay-organization established in the late 1920's by the young priest and student of civil law, Josémaría Escrivá de Balaguer. To simplify somewhat one can say that Opus Dei was established with an aim to work against a general secularization of society by inspiring the intellectual elite with the moral conservative ethic of the order. Opus Dei and its position within Spanish society and especially its professional ethic and concept of science and technology, will be analyzed in chapter 5. Regarding the different categories of membership within Opus Dei, see appendix.

⁴ Nieto, Alejandro (1976) "De la República a la Democracia: la Administración española del franquismo" in *Civitas. Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo*, n.11, oct-dec 1976, pp.573-574. (my transl.)

Thus, the central element in my story of the Spanish technocracy will be the so called technocratic administrative reform starting in 1957 and its intentions, institutionalizations and effects. In the continuance of this I will investigate the "new energies and inspirations" underlying the new line within Spanish politics during the later part of the franquist dictatorship, when the bureaucracy "invaded the most characteristic zones of political power". Such a change influences directly on social and political development and calls for historical analysis. Hence, I believe that a study of the Spanish public administration during the later franquist regime is essential in order to understand why;

"Democratic crafters and supporters inherited a civil society already robust and reasonably differentiated, an economic society that needed restructuring but was already institutionalized, a state apparatus tainted with authoritarianism, but usable (*and certainly so by the first democratically elected government, which came from its ranks*), and a reasonably strong recent tradition of rule by the law."⁵

Thus, this thesis is about Spanish modernization in general and administrative reform in particular during the later part of the franquist regime. By studying this, I hope to contribute to an illumination of the historical background of what Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan calls "the paradigmatic case for the study of pacted democratic transition and rapid democratic consolidation".⁶

⁵ Linz/Stepan, op.cit., p.113 (my italics)

⁶ Linz/Stepan, op.cit., p. 87. Regarding the Spanish transition to and consolidation of democracy, see also Giner, S./ Sevilla, E. (1984) "Spain: From corporatism to corporatism" in Williams, Allan M. (ed) *Southern Europe transformed: political and economic change in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain*, London: Harper & Row, Gunther, Richard/ Nikiforous Diamandouros, P./ Puhle, Hans Jürgen (eds.) (1995) *The politics of democratic consolidation: Southern Europe in comparative perspective*, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press and Maravall, José María/ Santamaría, Julián (1986) *Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy* in O'Donnell, Guillermo/ Scmitter, Philippe C./ Whitehead, Laurence, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for democracy*, Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press

Formulation of hypothesis

I believe it is important to present the hypothesis which will guide my investigations from the very outset of the study. In order to do this I have to expose the 'state of the art' in a few words. Having said this, I will review the literature on the technocracy in a much more detailed manner in chapter three.

All of the literature dealing with this period is in agreement that it is reasonable to talk about a change in the economic policy of the franquist regime in the late 1950's. There is no question that the former autarkic model guiding the economy, in this period was gradually giving way to a neo-liberal capitalist economic model. There is also a strong degree of agreement that it is reasonable to talk of the so called technocrats as a political force within Spanish political life and state administration between 1957 and 1973. Nevertheless, disagreement arises when one is to evaluate their contribution to the economic, cultural and political evolution of late franquist society. Without making the technocrats the only agents for Spanish development of the late franquist era, I nevertheless think it is a great mistake to ignore their influence, for better or for worse, on both the economic, political and cultural development of the period.

Some of the studies which advocate the decisive impact of the technocrats limit the analysis to the technical aspects of their work. Other, in my judgement, more sophisticated interpretations highlight the importance of the technocrats by paying attention to the central role played by the Catholic lay organization Opus Dei within the technocracy, and as such identifying this group as the carriers of modernity in a broader, weberian sense.⁷ In these studies the members of Opus Dei are considered as the bearers of 'the spirit of capitalism' in a mid-20th century Spanish historical context. Nevertheless, these interpretations do all have in common that they treat science and technology as neutral phenomena which are put into political and ethical projects which in themselves are controversial. To my judgement the most salient characteristic of the influence of Opus Dei on Spanish society was the way in which this spirit of capitalism was operationalized, that is, through the instrumental use of science and technology for the sole purpose of creating economic growth. I believe that science and technology in general must be considered more than neutral instruments, as this seemingly neutral science and

⁷ The study which argue most directly for such an interpretation is José Casanova's, *The Opus Dei ethic and the modernization of Spain*. This study has been a great inspiration for my investigations.

technology can be seen as the building blocks of very opposing political projects within modern societies. As a research group from the Centre for Technology and Culture in Oslo (TMV) says : "From Stalin's five year plans to the Marshall program, from 'New Deal' to the discourse of third world development, the great political projects of the twentieth century were structured around notions of technology and science"⁸ If these notions are treated as neutral political instruments, the historical and contextual aspect of science and technology are lost. If so, one of the most central and dynamic forces of change in modern societies escapes historical analysis. In order to understand the differences and similarities of the development of 20th century societies I thus believe that it is essential to open the "black box of science and technology."⁹ Then only will it be possible to historicize notions of science and technology and investigate their interrelation with economy, politics and culture. An opening of this black box gives us the opportunity to consider science and technology not merely as instruments to be put into political struggle, but as social and cultural phenomena which both derive meaning *from* and give meaning *to* the economy, policy, culture and ethic under which they operate. Science and technology must as such be seen as variables in themselves in order to understand the development of the societies which they both influence and are influenced by. Science and technology may be thought of as pure instruments within a political project, but will inevitably have an impact on that particular political project. Likewise, these phenomena will be affected by the political project of which they form a part.

Thus, my approach to the study of the Spanish technocracy will be to focus on the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei. If this is treated as a social construction, both affected by and affecting the Opus Dei ethic and the rest of Spanish society as Opus Dei technocrats reached influential positions during the period I am studying, many of the seeming paradoxes of historical development of late franquist Spain can be illuminated. In this study I will focus on how this concept of science and technology can facilitate the interpretation of both the intentions, institutionalizations and effects of the so called technocratic administrative reform from 1957 on. Not only was this reform the initial political project of the technocrats, but it was also a reform which was to influence heavily

⁸ Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjølme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel (forthcoming) "Engineering Cultures: The European Appropriation of Americanism" in Hård, Mikael/Jamison, Andrew, *Appropriating Technology: Discourses of Modernity, 1900-1939*, MIT Press, p.2.

⁹ Latour, Bruno (1987) *Science in action*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, pp.1-3.

on both the economic and educational spheres of society. By this I do not suggest that the Opus Dei concept of science and technology and the administrative reform can explain all the complexity of the Spanish development during the late franquism, but I do believe it can illuminate one of the aspects one has to take into consideration when one is to understand the re-emergence of democracy in Spain during the late 1970's. Thus, the hypothesis to be investigated in this work is that the Opus Dei concept of science and technology gave direction to the so called technocratic administrative reform and this reform, through its successes and failures, facilitated the dissolution of the franquist regime and the subsequent transition to democracy in Spain.

Methodology

In order to do an historical investigation of this hypothesis my empirical task is twofold: First I must seek to qualify the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei, and second, I have to investigate the intentions, institutionalizations and effects of the administrative reform. Further I have to make an historical interpretation in two stages: First, I must analyse in what way the empirical findings can illuminate the relation between the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei and the administrative reform, and second, I must analyse in what way this reform affected the development of late franquist politics and culture.

To comply to the first part of this twofold empirical mission, I have read several secondary sources about Opus Dei as well as done my own empirical investigation. I have studied the indispensable manual for all Opus Dei members, *The Way* (Camino), composed of 999 rules of life or *maxims*, with an explicit focus on the concept and role of science and technology within the Opus Dei ethic. I have further studied national plans regarding science and technology, a conference in the Spanish Higher Council for Scientific Research concerning research and industry and the works and sayings of Opus Dei members in high official positions, all during the technocratic period. In addition I have interviewed perhaps the most central actor within the Spanish technocracy and the single most influential advocate of the administrative reform, Laureano López Rodó, of whom one commentator has said: "His personal policy preferences profoundly affected the direction of state investment expenditures [...] - over a period of twelve years."¹⁰ It is

¹⁰ Gunther, Richard (1980), *Public Policy in a No-Party State. Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era*, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London:University of California, p.214.

furthermore important to note that within the framework of this thesis I will not be preoccupied with the epistemological content of scientific knowledge, or the establishment of this *per se*. Thus, this will not be a story of Opus Dei members as scientists. I will rather try to evaluate the social construction of the perception of science as an institution, i.e. its role as an establisher of norms and agent for change in society. I do of course recognise the strong interrelation between these two spheres. One could say that the evaluation of the epistemological content to a certain degree determines the perception of science as an institution within a given society. This may sound banal, but could be problematized considerably due to the heterogeneity of 'statuses' of scientific knowledge within a society. In this context my point is that I will not enter *scientific discourse* but concentrate my investigations on concepts of science and technology and their political and cultural impact.

In order to investigate the administrative reform I have concentrated most of my empirical work on the Public Administration school which was created in 1958 as one of the first and most essential institutionalizations of the reform. Previously to this work there have been done no explicit studies of this school, apart from it being mentioned in general works regarding the history and sociology of the Spanish Public Administration. It has *not* been my intention to write a detailed history of the day to day development of the school, and thus I have not used sources such as letters and a systematical sampling of oral statements which could have given adequate information regarding a more internalistic angle to the study. My intention by studying this school has rather been to capture the spirit of the overall project of administrative reform, as can be read out of both laws, course programmes, annual reports and debates concerning the schools activities in the journal *Documentación Administrativa*. I regard these sources as highly relevant for my purpose of investigating the relation between the Opus Dei concept of science and technology and the direction and development of the administrative reform as time went by. As such, I believe my sources to be adequate for a contextual analysis of the activities of the school seen both in relation to the Opus Dei ethic and the general political struggle within the franquist regime. In this part of my study I have also had great use of a conversation and correspondence with Miguel Beltrán, sociologist and historian of the Spanish Public Administration and a former student at the Public Administration school. Regarding the effects of the reform I have investigated both a survey which was conducted among the higher civil servants in

1967 and subsequent studies based on the same survey. This survey must be considered as a part of the over all process of administrative reform, and both the survey as well as its conclusions do I consider to be in need of historic interpretation.

This final remark leads me to some considerations on the method of my study and its relation to social scientific approaches. A political science study of a Public Administration will predominantly try to understand the institutional power of the bureaucracy as an element in a general historical-political context. The central questions will tend to be; what is the political power of the bureaucracy as an institution, and what is its position and role within the totality of political processes? A more sociological angle to the study of the Public Administration will in contrast try to define the predominant norm(s) and culture(s) within the bureaucracy, and analyse it as a social system. The central questions guiding such a sociological analysis will thus tend to be; What is the normative orientation of the bureaucracy and which social group(s) dominate this orientation? In the continuance of this it will be important to try to expose the consequences of such a normative orientation. These social scientific approaches, and the implicit overriding questions, will be considered in this study. In addition, the hypothesis of my work must be understood within a Political science framework, dealing with the question of democratic transition and consolidation. My intention is nevertheless not primarily the social scientific evaluation of the relative importance of various variables in such a political process. It is rather to investigate the historical process of change which made the development of the late franquist public administration a factor of great importance in order to understand the Spanish transition. Having said this, I believe that social scientific approaches to the study of social and historical phenomena can be very useful when investigating the fundamental historical questions which guide this study; how and why is the bureaucracy an essential factor in order to understand political struggle in late franquist Spain?; how and why is the bureaucracy influenced by a specific culture at this time?, and most essentially ; *how can these aspects illuminate the dynamics of an overall historical process of change?* Thus, the methodology of this work will most of all reflect an attempt to qualitatively describe and interpret the administrative reform as a phenomenon, as well as evaluate its impact on general historical development.

As stated above I consider science in general to be a part of and thus affected by the society in which it takes place. This also applies to this piece of scientific work, and I believe no writing of history can pretend to be objective and neutral without being

whiggish and naïve. The very choice of topic is theory-laden and both directs and limits the final work, and historical interpretations which pretend to be synthetic and establish coherence may well be criticised for committing "[...]the undignified folly of speaking for others [...]"¹¹ Nevertheless, I believe that one of the most important missions of writing history is to expand our understanding of the past and a mere description of events will not serve this purpose. I think we are only able to understand what we can construct. Ottar Dahl says that; "The core of explanation and understanding is new insight in *coherence*" and that "establishment or expansion of coherence can be conceived as the essential part of the process of explanation."¹² To some degree this construction is a very subjective process even though it is in accordance with the revealed facts as we know them. I think it is essential to recognise this in order to properly evaluate history as a science. As Karl Popper has said, "Although history has no meaning, we can give it a meaning[...]"¹³ But this creation of meaning must be fundamentally criticizeable. Hence I will try to be as accurate and precise as possible both in my formulations and in my arguments. In this way I hope to be able to create coherence and understanding of some aspects of the field I am studying. In accordance with previous statements I consider the result of this work to be no 'final solution' to this topic, but as an elaborated hypothesis as open as possible for general criticism. During my work I will as far as possible use arguments that are refutable in order to maintain a high level of rationality throughout the thesis. I will use a contextual approach to the area of investigation and apply symmetry when studying 'the making of history', i.e. I will explicitly be open for the other possible developments of events.

¹¹ Philp, Mark (1991) "Michael Foucault" in Skinner, Quentin(ed) *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences*, Cambridge University Press, p.68. Philp describes in this way Foucaults' view on intentions of acting as a grand theorist in the human sciences.

¹² Cited from Sejersted, Francis (1989) *En kritikk av den metodologiske individualisme*, TMV Working Paper n.7, Oslo, p.1-2. (my transl.)

¹³ Op.cit., p.13. (my transl.)

Development of the thesis

This study consists of two parts. The first, comprising the chapters two to five, are concerned with building the necessary framework for a study of the administrative reform and the role of Opus Dei within this. In the chapters six to nine I will use this framework to investigate the intentions and institutionalizations of the administrative reform as well as its impact on general historical development.

In chapter two, I will present a short and general history of the franquist regime until the coming of the technocrats in the late 1950's as well as the conflicts and problems which motivated what turned out to be a decisive change in the regime's orientation. The third chapter will present the most salient characteristics of the development of Spanish society during the so called technocratic period and discuss the relative importance of the technocrats for this development. Thus, it contains a review of previous works on the technocracy, and the most important purpose of this chapter is to situate the present study within this context. In the fourth chapter I will give an historical and theoretical account of the term *technocracy* as well as discuss the distinction between science and technology and its position within technocratic thought. This will serve both as a theoretical framework to facilitate the evaluation of the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei, as well as to increase the historical sensibility regarding the technocratic project and its political implications. In the fifth chapter I will discuss the position of Opus Dei within Spanish society and try to extract the essence of what might be considered their concept of science and technology. Chapter six will deal with the history of the Spanish administration and the intentions and viability of the proposed reforms. In chapter seven I will investigate the institutionalization of the reform, focusing upon the activities of the new Public Administration school. In the following chapter I will evaluate the effects of the reform. This chapter is primarily based on previous critique and I will try to formulate an historical reinterpretation and modification of this. In the ninth chapter I will then return to the outset of the investigation and discuss to which degree the findings of the study can illuminate the peaceful transition and consolidation of democracy in Spain. In addition to some final considerations, the concluding chapter will contain a summary of the thesis.

CHAPTER 2.

Historical background.

Introduction

In this chapter I will try to give a brief and general overview of the historical events which I consider to be of great relevance for the study of science, technology and technocracy within the franquist regime during the years 1957-1973. It will be argued that the cabinet reshuffle of 1957 in many ways marks the division of the franquist regime into two distinct periods. This will serve as a guide and introduction to the main topic of my thesis and establish the necessary framework for understanding the historical context of the period in question.

Characteristics of the franquist regime

Although it has been common to characterize the franquist regime as a military dictatorship or as a fascist/falangist state it is important to have in mind its multifaceted support base. This will enable us to look at the regime in a more nuanced way and make it easier to track down changes. Even though the *Movimiento*, the one and only party of the franquist regime, often is associated with the falangists (The FET y de las JONS, i.e. La Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista) it is important to have in mind that the falangists were never more than a part of the *Movimiento*. From the beginning the regime surely rested upon a fascist organic structure where citizen participation was meant to take place through the family, the municipality and the syndicate. Nevertheless, apart from being a militaristic and falangist state, the franquist regime was from the outset quite as much a conservative, Catholic, traditional and monarchic state. In the words of Richard Gunther:

"The Nationalist side consisted of a motley assortment of social groups, united only by their common opposition to the Popular Front Government of the Republic: the Nationalist rebellion was supported by monarchists [...], practising Catholics, Spanish nationalists, political conservatives and social-revolutionary Falangists; by the army, the Church, the banks, landowners [...], [some] professionals, high ranking civil servants, intellectuals and rentiers.¹"

¹ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.5

A more adequate understanding of the regime must take this into account and be aware of the often incompatible interests of these various groups. Gunther continues:

"Franco acknowledged the coalitional nature of his support, and recognized that his supporters would inevitably hold conflicting interests. As a means of maintaining the continued support of most or all groups in the original Nationalist coalition, the Caudillo usually recruited his Councils of Ministers from a pool of 'ministrables' representing each faction of the coalition."²

Hence, I believe that one of the most profound characteristics of the regime was the dictator's remarkable cunning in keeping the expectations of each group alive, while fulfilling none of them. As José Casanova says:

"The characteristic trait of Franco as a ruler which are frequently emphasized by most sources are his 'masterly inertia', his 'inmobilismo', his amazing ability to postpone decisions and to let time solve all problems, his ideological eclecticism and his great skill in playing off different political groups against each other in order to keep himself in power."³

One of Franco's biographers, Brian Crozier, goes as far as to say that "certainly no modern dictator has been less ideological."⁴ Even though Franco can not be said to have been an ideological dictator, the regime was extremely personalistic. Gunther says: "Political authority under the Franquist regime was highly concentrated in the hands of one individual - the Chief of State, General Franco."⁵ Regarding the actual use of this political authority, the dictator claimed absolute control within four 'reserved policy areas' concerning 1) public order, 2) church/state relations, 3) the army and 4) the regimes basic institutions, i.e. matters dealing with the succession and the possible creation of political parties.⁶ The franquist regime was nevertheless no totalitarian regime and "did not attempt to drastically remodel Spanish society and remake its citizens; it merely wished to remain in power by stifling its opponents and preventing them from organizing."⁷ Thus, matters which resided outside these four reserved policy

² Op.cit., p.33.

³ Casanova, José V. (1983) *The Opus Dei Ethic and the Modernization of Spain*, Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, p.110.

⁴ Cited from Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.23.

⁵ Op.cit., p.35.

⁶ Op.cit., pp. 163-164.

⁷ Op.cit., p.41.

areas were perceived of as being within the 'zone of policy indifference'⁸, and as such open for debate. Hence, the regime did not try to prevent the work of organizations pursuing 'nonpolitical' ends such as "religious, intellectual, artistic, professional, economic, sports, games and pleasure[...]"⁹ In the context of this work it is important to note that one were perfectly free to discuss techniques within intellectual and economic matters as long as this was not conceived of as touching upon the 'reserved policy areas' described above.

This 'masterly inertia' of Franco is truly present in the struggle within the regime which led to a major change of direction which almost divides the dictatorship into two distinct periods, a change of politics which came to have profound implications for the development of the Spanish society from the late 1950's.

The intended autarky, and its crises

The official economical doctrine of post-Civil War Spain was that of autarky. Resembling the economic philosophy of both Nazi-Germany and fascist Italy, it was intended that Spain should be economically independent from the outer world in order to assure political self-determination. Biescas describes the continuance of this economic policy after the end of the Second World War as an autoexclusion of the Marshall-Plan, decided by general Franco who was not willing to pay the price of a homogenization of general politics with the other western countries.¹⁰

Although complete autarky was never achieved due to the necessity of importing essential goods and materials, it is fair to characterize the Spanish economy of this first period of the Franco-era to be extremely introvert. In this period Spain remained an almost protoindustrial country and the economic policy were predominantly directed toward the agricultural sector. Its aims are reflected in the governmental publication of 1937, *The new agricultural Spain* (La nueva España agraria): "[...]to transform Spain into a country of small farmers."¹¹ The national industry was to be built up through the *National*

⁸ Op.cit., p.73 and 280.

⁹ Op.cit., p.32.

¹⁰ Biescas, José Antonio/Tuñón de Lara, Manuel (1980), *España bajo la dictadura franquista (1939-1975)*, Barcelona, p.24.

¹¹ Op.cit., p.28. (my transl.)

Industrial Institute (Instituto Nacional de Industria, INI) created in 1941, with the aim of controlling that industrial investments were in accordance with national interests. The INI was a stateowned holding company, restricting foreign investments, established to build up the Spanish industry in accordance with the vision of autarky. The means by which this was to be achieved was not through intensive investment in science and technology, as in Nazi-Germany, but through investment in selected industries. In retrospect this might be seen as much of the cause of the perpetual inflationary spiral.

Although increased awareness within the regime, especially from the beginning of the 1950's, of the need to expand the industrial sector, the Spanish industry experienced severe problems throughout the whole period. Perhaps the most significant effect of the industrial policy of the early 1950's on the society in general, was that the primary sector's share of GNP decreased from 40,7% in 1951 to 25,25% in 1957.¹² Despite the autarkic intentions, Spain was very much dependent on importing materials and goods which the domestic industry could not substitute, most importantly, petroleum. The very limited Spanish exports could not pay for these necessities and the country built up a severe negative balance of payments. Eventually this led to a crisis in 1959 which almost put Spain in international payment suspension.¹³ The 1950's can generally be characterized as a period of social unrest due to increasing costs of living as a result of the severe inflation. There were also a number of boycotts of statal services, strikes and manifestations at the universities which were all harshly suppressed by the regime. The state reacted by increasing wages but, as Ros Hombravella has put it, in the classical spiral of increasing prices and wages, the prices always won.¹⁴

In this situation of internal turmoil the international political situation came the franquist regime to some aid, from the beginning of the 1950's only as a tendency, but as time went by the foreign impact on Spanish economy would be very strong. In the climate of the Cold War the franquist position of immensely strong anti-communism was highly compatible with sentiments of influential powers within the western world, and of course especially with the Americans.

¹² Op.cit., p.45.

¹³ Op.cit., p.50.

¹⁴ Op.cit., p.49.

The international influence

Just after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Spain was granted a credit of 62,5 mill. US\$ from the United States. This was only the timid beginning of a process which soon was to integrate Spain among the western allies. In 1953, a deal was signed which established US air-bases on Spanish turf with a vague commitment of mutual defence in case of aggression. In fact the deal meant that Franco sold away Spanish sovereignty in return for a major personal political victory. The Spanish government signed, paradoxically as it might seem, a general strategic plan which committed them to 'the defence of the free world'. What was not made public at the time was that Spanish soil might be used by the United States without consulting the Spanish government in the event of grave international tension, a fact which reduced Spain to a kind of a US protectorate in military affairs.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the American economic aid was restricted to the building up of military related infrastructure and was far from reaching the level of the Marshall- aid given to other Western European countries. More significant is the fact that Spain was granted admission to the United Nations in 1955, an event which must be understood in the context of the Cold War.

Even though this period represented a process of international integration and timid economic liberalization, the regime persisted, although somewhat indecisively, with its overriding autarkic ideal, and the economic crisis evolved throughout the 1950's. In this atmosphere of widespread dissatisfaction and uncertainty, different groups within the Movimiento started to elaborate their own plans for solutions.

Conflict between falangists and the monarchists

During 1955-56 the conflict between falangists and monarchists within the Movimiento became acute. A part of the falange was growing very impatient with respect to their 'pending revolution' and proposed a more totalitarian one-party structure, fundamentally rejecting the capitalist economy. Throughout 1956 falangist indiscipline grew and represented a serious opposition striving for radical social reforms. In response Franco called upon José Luis de Arrese y Magra to tidy up as the new Minister-Secretary of the Movimiento. In short time Arrese came up with a scheme for a constitutional reform which bore clear

¹⁵ Op.cit., p.282. See also Preston,Paul (1993), *Franco*, London,p.623-624.

resemblance with the Third Reich model. This caused serious distraction among traditionalists, monarchists and Catholics who perceived this as an attempt "to block any future liberalization under a restored monarchy and perpetuate the falangist domination of the regime"¹⁶

In brief the monarchists wanted a restoration of the monarchy under the regency of the exiled Don Juan de Bourbonne, the legitimate heir to the Spanish crown, and now they wanted the restoration to happen as soon as possible in order to obstruct Arrese. Their secret plan, which were to be known as the *Ruiseñada plan*, after Don Juan's representative, Conde de Ruiseñada, was supported by many generals of the armed forces.¹⁷ Although Franco was well aware of the monarchist sentiments within influential parts of the elite, he went far in supporting Arrese and the falangists whom he perceived as dependent on him for their very existence, and as such could be regarded as being most loyal.

Nevertheless, the dictator's enthusiasm cooled immediately when he allegedly got a hint of the Ruiseñada Plan.¹⁸ It is possible that Franco began to understand that beneath the conflict on the surface between falangists and monarchists were fundamental problems of how to cope with grave social problems and high inflation. These were problems which affected the public order, one of the dictators principal concerns. None of the proposed alternatives seemed very attractive. A transition to a more totalitarian falangism was not an option compatible with Spain being integrated as one of the western allies in the Cold War. As exposed above, these proposals also caused distraction among the monarchists that could provoke an early restoration of the monarchy which could, and most likely would have, put Franco out of the day-to-day running of the government.¹⁹ In his biography of Franco, Paul Preston stresses that the Caudillo more than anything was a military man who wanted to secure what had been gained in the Civil War.

This can help us understand why he was more than willing to listen when a third option was presented from within the Movimiento. "This consisted of an attempt to create the legislative framework for an authoritarian monarchy to guarantee the continuity of franquism after the death of the Caudillo".²⁰ The

¹⁶ Preston, op.cit., p.652.

¹⁷ Op.cit., p.654.

¹⁸ Op.cit., p.657.

¹⁹ Op.cit., p.655.

²⁰ Op.cit., p.662-663.

architect behind this proposal was Laureano López Rodó, a Catalan monarchist and professor of administrative law and member of the Opus Dei. As a sub-secretary of the *Presidencia* (the office of the President of the ministry council) he was given the task to prepare a major administrative reform and induced a process which soon paved the way for a cabinet reshuffle on the 25th of February 1957.

This change of cabinet is of great importance in the context of this work because it introduced the so called technocrats on the Spanish political scene. With them efficiency, technology, administrative rationalization. GNP etc. become paramount concepts within important sectors of the Spanish government and the public administration. We are dealing with a highly interesting phenomenon of which the consequences were hard to anticipate: The dictator, who in essence could be expected to claim the primacy of politics over knowledge, calls upon 'apolitical' experts, or technocrats to solve a difficult political conflict within his own regime as well as to try to get the country out of a severe economic and social crisis.

The technocratic 'invasion'

The change of cabinet in 1957 is the starting point of a new era within the franquist regime. Tuñón de Lara has said that the long-term effect of this reshuffle was a change from a charismatic to a technocratic ideology within the regime.²¹ The implications of the change "[...]were to turn Franco and falangism into historical anachronisms."²² and gradually reduce Franco to a mere figurehead of the state. Key positions as ministers of Commerce, Finance, Work and Interior were occupied by people who had a vision of public administration which in many ways resembled the organizational principles of a private company. In a short time this meant the abandonment of the autarkic economic ideal and opened up Spain for heavy foreign investments.

Many of the new men were in some way associated with Opus Dei, and this led to speculation as to whether this might be a planned and co-ordinated Opus Dei infiltration in important positions of the state. Such theories tend to catch fire but it is probably more appropriate to explain the large number of Opus Dei

²¹ Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit.,p.499.

²² Preston, op.cit., p.666.

associated technocrats with reference to the fact that they, in accordance with the ethos of their order, were highly educated, hard working men. This is not to say that they simply earned their positions due to their expertise knowledge, but I think that a conspiracy theory fails to address the complex character of the technocrats influence on Spanish politics and culture. This complexity and its importance is suggested by Jose V. Casanova when he says:

"Many of López Rodó's endeavours were directed towards the transformation of the charismatic-traditional authority of Franco into a legal rational type of legitimate authority. Probably no other country in modern history can serve as well as Spain as a manifestation of both the difficulties involved in such a transformation and of the tenacity of the modern conviction."²³

The theme of this study is very much related to explore the complexity of the technocrats role in this process of transformation within late franquist society. The causes for the insurgence of the technocrats will in addition be further analysed in chapter six.

The change of political direction of the regime can be observed in the *Principal laws of the Movimiento* (Ley de Principios del Movimiento) from 1958 where all the 26 programmatic principles of the original Falange were ideologically diluted.²⁴ As we have seen, the falangists were never more than a part of the Movimiento, but with Franco's publication of this document on the 17th. of May 1958 it was written black on white for everyone to see. The document was vague and fragile and apart from high rhetoric stating that the political foundation within the principles of the Movimiento was "the traditional, Catholic social and representative monarchy" it contained little of political substance.²⁵ This can reflect on the one hand the marginalization of the falangists, and on the other the political uncertainty and underdetermination of the regime. It can be added that such a situation of uncertainty suited the ruling style of Franco perfectly well: None of the *familias* did feel in control of events, and in such a situation the General could most effectively execute his political play of 'divide and rule'.

The technocrats officially claimed to be apolitical, and gave both fresh blood and a new legitimacy base to a regime with severe problems, but it is hard to believe that they did not assume that the fundamental change in economic policy would

²³ Casanova, op.cit., p.284.

²⁴ Biescas/Tuñon de Lara (1980) Op.cit., p.304.

²⁵ Preston, op.cit., p.305.

transform the political sphere in general as well as time went by. Many of the representatives of the new order did consider that the changes would soon force the regime to modify, and hence they perceived franquism merely as a stage.²⁶ López Rodó told the Conde de Ruiseñada that;

"the only trick is making him [Franco] accept an administrative plan to decentralize the economy. He doesn't think of that as being directed against him personally. He will give us a free hand and, then, once inside the administration, we will see how far we can go with our political objectives, which have to be masked as far as possible."²⁷

Tuñon de Lara says that the technocrats served a state whose principles they did not discuss²⁸, but I think it is quite obvious that they had political objectives. These can be summarized as the restoration of a traditional Catholic monarchy. As López Rodó told me: "Evidently my access to the government from 1965 permitted me to conduct an intensive political activity to assure that the successor of Franco would be Don Juan Carlos."²⁹ One can say that although the technocrats used European means, their goals were strictly Spanish.

Conclusion

Several observers have characterized this change of direction of the regimes policy to be very decisive: "one of the great watersheds of Franco's political career. It marked the beginning of his transition from active politician to symbolic figurehead" (Preston, 1993, p.665), "a decisive turn in the Spanish economic evolution" (Biescas, 1980, p.55), "from a fascist-autarkic model to an authoritarian-technocratic model" (Tuñon de Lara, 1980, p.297), "the first modern industrial cycle in Spain" (Angel Rojo, cited from Biescas, 1980, p.71), "if there is a decade which one could identify as the *Spanish Industrial Revolution* it is this (the 60's)" (Tortella, 1994, p.281) and "it was not just a matter of change in economic policy, but a transformation of the very state." (Moya, 1972, p.166)

Fixing dates for grand changes of history may seem like something of an 'historian's disease'. Of course no changes in history occur abruptly from one day

²⁶ Biescas/Tuñon de Lara, op.cit., p.69.

²⁷ Preston, op.cit., p.671.

²⁸ Biescas/Tuñon de Lara, op.cit., p.301.

²⁹ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, 23 of July, 1996.

to another without previous traces, neither does the one described in this chapter. In the climate of the Cold War, and especially after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 which greatly increased the value of the franquist regime's anti-communism, the beginning of a change towards a more liberal economic policy is noticeable. On the other hand one also has to be aware that the falangists remained, although much deprived of their former strength, a powerful force within the Movimiento throughout the rest of the franquist period. Thus my focus on the change of cabinet on the 25th. of February 1957 might seem a bit over dimensioned. Nevertheless, I believe this cabinet reshuffle marks an important event, and especially so in the context of this work, because, as Tuñón de Lara has said: "From now on the technocratic invasion knew no limits."³⁰

CHAPTER 3.

The 'Spanish economic miracle' of the technocratic period

Introduction

In this chapter I will first give a brief summary of the changes within the Spanish society during the Spanish technocracy, which alludes to the years 1957-1973. Thereafter I will present the literature dealing with the technocracy in a more detailed manner. To simplify somewhat there are three categories of interpretations regarding the impact of the so called technocrats. First, there are studies that regard the development of the period to be little affected by the work of the technocrats. In these interpretations other forces, such as international capitalist development and/or democratically inspired social struggle, are seen as more important in order to understand the development of Spanish economy and society. Second, there is a number of studies which recognize the impact of the technocrats, but which limit the analysis to the technical aspects of their work. Third, there are studies which highlight the importance of the technocrats by paying attention to the central role played by the Catholic lay organization Opus Dei, and as such identifying this group as the carriers of modernity in a broader, weberian sense. The purpose of this chapter is to situate the present study within this context.

A period of radical transformations

With the cabinet reshuffle of 1957, Spain entered a period of thorough changes which both altered the power structure within the state and its legitimacy, as well as the composition of society in general. From being almost autarkic Spain opened its economic borders in such a way that one of the most prominent representatives of multinational companies in Spain could say that "the system can be considered among the most favourable for foreign investments"¹ From being in a state of deep economic crisis, Spain experienced an economic growth during the 1960's only to be beaten by Japan among the OECD countries, and one started to talk about "the Spanish economic miracle".² In the initial phase, from 1959 to 1963, per capita income grew at about 9% a year and industrial production

¹ Cited from Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit., p.66. (my transl.)

² Anderson, Charles W. (1970) *The political economy of modern Spain. Policy-making in an authoritarian system*, Madison (Wi): University of Wisconsin Press, p.xi and 202.

³⁰ Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit., p.301. (my transl.)

annually increased by 11.7%.⁴ Among the consequences of this 'miracle' were heavy urbanization⁵, increased standards of living, and raised expectations among important strata of the population, particularly among the growing urban middle class. In 1950 50% of the population was occupied within the agrarian sector. By 1968 this number had declined to 28%.⁶ Raymond Carr says that the structure of Spanish society changed more rapidly between 1957 and 1978 than during the past centuries.⁷

In sharp contrast to the autarkic economic policy until the late 50's the logic of the new economic policy can be summarized as: 1) The national wealth has to be increased through rapid economic development. 2) In a capitalist economy this is most adequately obtained by encouraging private-sector investment. 3) This requires a light burden of taxation, a stable currency and the use of fiscal policies which would not drain funds from the private capital market. 4) Then, in the long run, the growth of the economy would broaden the tax base and make possible a substantial increase in public expenditures and the provision of government services.⁸

So far so good, but in real life this led to concentrated investments in sectors and locations which were judged to offer the greatest socio-economic return in terms of time and investment. Ullastres, the minister of commerce, thus advocated an intentionally unbalanced growth applying strictly short-term economic criteria when selecting investment programs.⁹ To obtain this the new policy-makers broke with the traditional negotiation procedure for the organic state and fixed policy largely outside the syndical system. The selecting criteria remained throughout the period most of all a job for economists. The fruits of this policy, which in Spain by many is labelled by the pejorative *developmentalism* (*desarrollismo*), are today to be seen perhaps more clearly than elsewhere in the Basque Country: Sky-scraping apartment-blocks for the accommodation of workers in the selected areas were built in the middle of nowhere, both becoming a contrast to the beautiful landscape and completely altering the lives of the immense number of people who had to migrate due to the new economic policy.

⁴ Gunther, Richard (1980) op.cit., p.197.

⁵ 6600 out of 8600 townships lost population between 1960 and 1970. (Estruch, Joan (1995) *Saints and Schemers: Opus Dei and Its Paradoxes*, New York, Oxford University Press, p.228)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Carr, Raymond (1983) *España de la Restauración a la Democracia*, Ariel, Barcelona, p.219.

⁸ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.65-66.

⁹ Anderson, op.cit., p.187-188.

The heavy industrialization induced a rapid process of migration and urbanisation and changed the living conditions of a great number of Spaniards. People who were accustomed to live in small villages or in the countryside moved to the cities where industry offered work. Of course all changes in physical living conditions affect peoples lives, but I think that an increasingly technified and industrialized city tends to make a specially strong and sudden imprint. New ways of working and living does not only alter traditional ways of socializing, but in a technified city each individual, from day one so to speak, has to interact with a large number of commodities which to some extent determine your actions. One could say without being too much of a technological determinist, that all technology is a kind of legislation and within a complex industrialized society this kind of legislation is abundant. The 1960's is also the decade when Spain experienced its 'baby-boom' due to the increased standards of living, a phenomenon which in most other western countries is associated with the 1950's. Furthermore the changes in the economic structure likely contributed to create a new phenomenon in Spanish society: The rather well-off urban middle-class. This urban middle-class consisted both of skilled workers, public and private white-collar functionaries as well as shopkeepers and private business owners and became a salient feature of the composition of this 'new' Spanish society. In addition, the social mobility started to resemble that of other western countries of the time.¹⁰

The executives in the private sector and the technocrats in the public sector were presented as the heroes of the new time¹¹ and much effort was made to create an optimistic spirit among entrepreneurs: "[...] the evidence suggests that the policy-makers were on target in their design for stimulating enthusiasm, specially among the entrepreneurs, for the economic elites seemed much more optimistic about the course of economic policy than other groups in the population."¹² The choice of a neo-liberal economic strategy and the intentional creation of an optimistic spirit, emphasizing the similarity between the workings of private and public management, I think reflects the technocrats self-perceived mission to create a prosperous and homogeneous Catholic society in the lack of a sufficiently powerful national bourgeoisie and so to speak, guide Spain into modernity: As Carlos Moya says: [They wanted to] induce capitalist development of a country in which the rigid post-feudal social structure made impossible the

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Moya, Carlos (1972) *Burocracia y Sociedad Industrial*, Editorial Cuadernos para el Diálogo, Madrid, p.197-198.

¹² Anderson, op.cit., p.199.

classical model of capitalist industrial development protagonized by a national bourgeoisie."¹³

Until the late 50's Spain's educational system can be considered extremely elitistic and the number of analphabets was high. When speaking of education López Rodó told me that "within the idea of development the human factor is the prime and most dynamic factor and the *formation* of this factor, that is education, was one of the highest priority concerns of the development plans."¹⁴ This statement reflects actual policy because public expenditures on education were more than doubled over the first four-year planning-period(1964-1968).¹⁵ In the decade of the 60's the number of university students grew from roughly 60 000 to about 160 000, and a reform in the technical high-schools from 1964 opened up for a virtual invasion to these courses. In the planning process, technical and professional preparation was clearly accounted for amongst the factors of production as it is expressed by one of Richard Gunther's informants within the state administration: "[...] I was very much in favour of a higher level of national income. The educational sector was holding back economic growth and the increase of the national wealth. Educational reform was a means of increasing economic growth."¹⁶

Thus, one of the key objectives of the technocratic policy was to assure a general qualitative and quantitative elevation of education. In close connection with this, one of the slogans of late franquist policy was *equal opportunities* (igualdad de oportunidades) which was frequently used both by the technocrats as well as by Franco.¹⁷ During the dictatorship this was presented as being a sort of justification for the absence of political rights, because through studies and your personal merit you were said to be able to reach influential positions in society, or at least by own effort improve your living conditions. During this period it was created something of a "myth of progress", to use the words of von Wright¹⁸, which broke with traditional Spanish values and ways of thinking. Regarding changes in mentality Felix Ortega writes;

"[...] the cultural order of civil society obtained a different configuration than the one imprinted by the first franquism. The secularization of life went hand in hand with mass-consumption

and mass-culture. A certain hedonism, the youth-cult, a slow but inexorable dissolution of the relegated role of the woman [...], the replacement of family-life with more individualistic forms of life would be, among others, the foundations of a society which distanced itself from the traditional Spanish cultural order."¹⁹

The traditional legitimacy of the franquist regime can be evaluated as rather charismatic, and even though Franco never built a personal cultus ala Hitler or Mussolini, the ideal of the first two decades of the regime was that of living *in service of the state*.²⁰ During the last one and a half decades of the regime this situation changed decisively and the focus on *economic prosperity* as the main concern of both the state and the Spanish people represented an explicit intention to downplay ideologies and politics. Economic development became the states *raison d'être*. The basic concern however, remained the same: That the Spanish society functioned in an *organic* manner, i.e. that all of society should perceive itself as a whole and because of this all signs of diverging interests were downplayed or suppressed. Spain was presented as being in the midst of a new crusade, a crusade on poverty and for prosperity, and the weapons to be used were neoliberal economics and scientific management.

The technocrats; agents for change or just riding the tide?

The Spanish economist and historian, Ramon Tamames, may be said to be the one who have most explicitly advocated the view that the development of Spain during the 1960's happened *in spite of* the technocrats. His opinion is that the technocrats were not competent enough as experts to guide the development, and when they did influence the direction of events, they ignored what Tamames conceive of as necessary structural reforms within the economical system. In various studies he has elaborated the view that the technocrats were nothing more than the economic administrators of the dominant forces within franquist Spain, and that economic development resulted from forces outside the control of the technocrats.²¹ This view is supported by Jordí Sole-Tura who argues that the technocrats might be perceived as the political representation of powerful interests within the Spanish society and that their influence was

¹³ Moya, op.cit, p.196. (my transl.)

¹⁴ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July 1996.

¹⁵ Anderson, op.cit., p.207.

¹⁶ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.278.

¹⁷ López Rodó, Laureano (1990) *Memorias* (Vol.1), Barcelona, p.424.

¹⁸ von Wright, Georg Henrik (1994), *Myten om fremskrittet*, Cappelen, Oslo.

¹⁹ Ortega, Felix (1992) "Las ideologías de la reforma educativa de 1970" in *Revista de Educación. Número extraordinario; La ley General de Educación veinte años después*, Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación (MEC), Madrid, p.32-33. (my transl.)

²⁰ Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit., p.500.

²¹ Tamames, Ramon (1976) *Estructura Económica de España*, 3 Vols. Madrid: Guadiana de Publicaciones and (1986) *España Ante un Segundo Plan de Desarrollo*, Barcelona: Nova Terra.

merely a matter of it being their turn. He further claims that the opposition from within the regime did not question the basic assumptions of the technocrats, but that it was more a question of *who* should be making the decisions as well as complaints about their style of governance. I believe he by this suggests a strong degree of *tacit agreement* between influential groups which did not perceive themselves as outplayed by the technocrats.²² Nevertheless, I believe this critique lack explanatory force on important areas. Spain did not only experience profound economic and social changes during the technocratic period. In the same period the franquist political system and the way of making politics also changed decisively in some areas. By identifying the technocrat's interests too strongly with those of the overall franquist coalition, one fail to explain the dynamics in this change of powerstructure within the state.

As a modification of Tamames' argument some observers have also argued that the transformation of the Spanish society during this period would have occurred without the technocrats, and that the period to some degree best can be understood as a *normalization* of the Spanish economy, after the abnormal, autarkic period following the Civil War. In a recent study, Gabriel Tortella says that what really has to be explained is the period between 1935 and 1950.²³ He argues that modern Spanish history must be viewed in light of the social transformations brought about by western capitalist development, and that within the last two hundred years time-span the Spanish development resembles other countries in the southern European periphery. These have been delayed in their economic development due to both geographic and cultural causes:

"The geography did not permit the diffusion of the successful 'agrarian revolution' and the[...] culture - authoritarian, Catholic, opposed towards both philosophical speculation, scientific reasoning, popular education and technological innovation - was reluctant to the social changes required by the economical progress."²⁴

His point is that political development is extremely difficult without a parallel economic development and that a gradual integration of Spain in the western capitalist orbit can account for the course of resent Spanish history.²⁵ It is quite

²² Solé-Tura, Jordi (1972) "Los tecnócratas en la encrucijada" in *España Perspectiva 1972*, Madrid.

²³ Tortella, Gabriel (1994) *El desarrollo de la España contemporánea; Historia económica de los siglos XIX y XX*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, p.200.

²⁴ Op.cit. p.381. (my transl.)

²⁵ Op.cit., pp.379-383.

common to argue that the reason for the Spanish economic development is more to be found in the *triangle of help* (trípode de ayuda) i.e. foreign investments, tourism and labour emigration, rather than as a specific result of technocratic planning.²⁶

To a wide extent this is all correct, but I think it is important to note that these factors were allowed to work upon Spanish economy and society *as a result of the technocratic policy*. And they were not so only through removal of some obstacles to economic integration and liberalization but also through the explicit measures the technocrats chose for obtaining their political goal of economic growth. My point is not to decide whether this policy was successful or not, or whether the technocrats were competent or not, but to fail to recognize the impact of the technocrats, for better or for worse, will be to ignore the complexity of perhaps the most rapid and profound social and cultural transformation in modern Spanish history. It was by no means self-evident in the early fifties that neoliberal economy, advocating free trade and tourism as well as labour migration should be salient features of Spanish economic policy in the decade to come. Antonio Biescas says that; "[...] the resistencies against a substitution of the autarkic model were numerous and included important centres of power."²⁷ As Charles Anderson has noted there were several available *problem contexts* within the Spanish society of the late fifties: Should one, by incremental changes, reformulate the autarkic economic policy? Should one alter the fundamental structures of the economical system through a fundamental agricultural reform? Or should one open up for free trade?²⁸ There was also the question of whether one was to direct the economy towards Europe or the Latin American continent where the language would be a competitive advantage. Manuel-Jesus Gonzalez says that:

"The internal economic situation was grave but not sufficient in itself to make the change inevitable. In principle, there was the possibility of an involution, to reduce drastically the standard of living, to isolate the economy even more and to harden the political forces. Only a few persons tried to leap forward. Entering into a conflict with political and ideological tradition, they broke the resistance, enforcing a different, alternative economic policy."²⁹

²⁶ E.g. Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit., p.11.

²⁷ Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit., p.57.

²⁸ Anderson, op.cit., p.99.

²⁹ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.72.

Furthermore, even when embarked on a neo-liberal capitalist model for economic development it would seem as if the business community was fairly well pleased with the existent political superstructure. In the words of Linz and Stepan:

"[...] there was no direct relationship between prolonged economic growth and the onset of the transition nor to the specific political process leading to democracy. Spain had reached a level of development that should have led to democratization quite a few years before Franco's death in 1975 [...] Business did not oppose democratization and might have even privately supported it, but business played no active role bringing about democracy."³⁰

In my opinion Tamames' and Tortella's interpretations of this period paints a picture of historical development as the inevitable and linear unfolding of rationality through time: Tamames interpretation firmly opposes the view that an authoritarian dictatorship could be conducive to economic growth and modernization of society. Thus, modernization is seen as having been fomented by the spheres of Spanish society opposed to the dictatorship, and substantial and modernizing reforms could only be implemented by the advent of democracy. As such, his story becomes a 'success-story' of the development of modernity through democratic forces. Tortella, in a similar way, rests his interpretation on the 'success-story' of the congruent development of neo-liberal capitalist economy and democracy. Although these interpretations must be taken into consideration, it is my firm belief that they fail to grasp the complexity of the development of the later franquist regime. The tendency to downplay the role of the technocrats during the franquist regime has, apart from an ideological function, a deep significance within contemporary Spanish society. José Casanova puts it this way:

"The Spanish people, who had never been taken seriously as a source of legitimisation either by Franco or the technocrats, consequently dismissed both Franco's legacy and that of the technocrats as a mere parenthesis, as an unfortunate interlude in Spanish history. Ironically, perhaps the period of the most significant and revolutionary transformation in Spanish history was now being summarily dismissed as an interval soon to be forgotten."³¹

In order to understand the Spanish modernization during the 1960's, I find it important to open this 'parenthesis'. Without neglecting the conservative character of the technocrats, it will then be possible to investigate how and why these people influenced on the over all process of modernization.

Literature on the technocracy in particular

There are relatively few writings on the work and impact of the Spanish technocracy in particular. In addition to a general tendency in Spain to consider the technocratic period of the dictatorship as an 'interval soon to be forgotten', the technocracy is strongly associated with Opus Dei, a catholic lay-organisation which even today is surrounded by a certain secrecy and mystique. We are dealing with a recent part of Spanish history which evokes many emotions and which still continues to have influence on Spanish society. There are nevertheless a number of studies which recognize the importance of the technocrats. Some of these consider that the technocratic influence predominantly occurred on a technical level.

Such approaches to be considered in this study are Charles W. Anderson's *The Political Economy of Modern Spain. Policy Making in an authoritarian System* (1970), Richard Gunther's *Public Policy in a No-Party State. Spanish Planning and Budgeting in the Twilight of the Franquist Era*(1980) and Carlos Moya's *Burocracia y Sociedad Industrial* (1972).

Charles Anderson seeks to evaluate the degree of rigidity which the political superstructure imposed upon economic policy-options during this period. In his opinion the insurgence of the technocrats, which he describes as a *new cadre of experts*, in central positions within the political system, might be explained by the fact that they were perceived by Franco as mere *technicians*. Within the franquist regime in general one was perfectly free to discuss *techniques* to obtain defined goals. Questioning these goals, was nevertheless taboo and was perceived as politics which by definition was regarded as a sure way to split society into antagonistic fractions.³² Anderson stresses the relatively great public interest in economic policy affairs and notes that several economists of the time were virtually best-sellers.³³ By presenting relevant techniques for dealing with problems within the regime the technocrats were able to more or less eliminate

³⁰ Linz/Stepan. op.cit., p112.

³¹ Casanova, op.cit., p.128.

³² Anderson, Op.cit., p.85.

³³ Op.cit., p.184.

the influence of the syndicates in the decision making process. He concludes that the Spanish Policy-makers (the technocrats) were almost as free and efficient in gathering information, evaluating measures and could select from as great a variety of tools within the field of economic policy as could policy-makers in most other western countries.

Gunther argues that Spanish policy-making, and especially public budgeting during the technocracy, is characterized by the fact that it occurred in a sort of political void. In accordance with Anderson he sees this enforced by the fact that the technocrats presented themselves as apolitical and neutral and to some degree outplayed politics which was seen as the very cause of tensions within the society. The traditional particularism of Spanish policy, he argues, gave the protagonists ample possibilities of personal influence.³⁴ Hence he finds the choice of a neoliberal development strategy to be explained by reference to the fact that central politicians and state administrators almost exclusively had upper- and upper-middle-class social background. They were, so to speak, socially biased toward a strategy that held that "the thesis and the pie must grow even more before it [can be] divided up."³⁵ Thus, seemingly in contrast to Anderson, who to a certain degree finds the political superstructure indifferent to the economic policy, he evaluates the political superstructure itself, i.e. *franquism* with its traditional particularism, to be essential for explaining politics in the twilight of the franquist era.

This view is then again somewhat contradicted by Carlos Moya who from a more sociological perspective analyses the bureaucratization and rationalization within the state administration as the most salient characteristic and consequence of the works of the technocrats. Even though he sees discrepancies between the ambitions of the reformers and real effects, Moya argues that the bureaucratization of the Spanish administration represented a fundamentally new course in Spanish history. In his view the approximation to a western style bureaucratic governance altered fundamental workings within society because the traditional clientelism and particularism which had characterized the relationship between the public and private sector, eventually was replaced by a more businesslike style where the contact between public and private sector was represented by state functionaries and *business-managers*³⁶. Whereas the 'old' system was characterized by *business owners* talking with their *patrones* or

³⁴ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.214.

³⁵ Op.cit., p.65-66.

³⁶ Moya, op.cit., pp.197-200.

friends within the INI which were strongly influenced by the military, the 'new' system was characterized by talks between public and private managers who held their positions due to a contract and not as a personal possession.

I think these studies are right in focusing on the actual impact of the work of the technocrats and their administrative and economic reforms. It is obvious that the definition of the problem context which was to dominate gave clear directions and limitations on future politics. Hence I think one must consider the technocrats as agents for change both in the working, mentality and legitimacy of the regime. Then, in retrospect, it is not unfair to say that *the technocracy of the franquist regime might be perceived as a part of a process of modernization, demythification and pluralisation within the regime and henceforth facilitating, both directly and indirectly, the transition to democracy after the death of the Caudillo*. If this is an adequate understanding, it might illuminate what Paul Preston describes as a surprising silence about the dictatorship after the death of Franco and that "By tacit national consent, the regime was relegated to oblivion."³⁷ In the words of Richard Gunther: "Thus by permitting substantial economic changes (to which it did not object) the Franquist elite inadvertently triggered a long-term sequence of the interdependent social changes which, ultimately, contributed to the quick and relatively painless demise of the regime shortly after its founders death."³⁸ Nevertheless, this is still a far too abstract hypothesis, because the social and cultural changes induced by the technocrats were somewhat unanticipated, even by the policy-makers themselves. As one observer has said: "The technocrats were successful, but virtually nothing turned out as they expected."³⁹

These works are all based on a considerable amount of empirical findings and I acknowledge my debt to them. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, these writings seem to evaluate the impact of the technocracy to occur primarily on the *technical* level. Richard Gunther presents the technocrats as "apolitical civil servants".⁴⁰ Carlos Moya says that the technocrats altered the state structure but that this was more of a technical than political reform.⁴¹ Charles Anderson also evaluates the changes within late Franquist economy to be more technical than political.⁴² I think it is important to evaluate the technocracy in general and the

³⁷ Preston, op.cit., p.781-782.

³⁸ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.280.

³⁹ Anderson, op.cit., p.237.

⁴⁰ Op.cit., p.43.

⁴¹ Moya, Carlos, op.cit., p.166.

⁴² Anderson, op.cit., p.6.

technical restructuring of the decision-making system to be highly political. I believe there are no 'pure' technical solutions in politics, and therefore I find it interesting to try to grasp the axiology of the Spanish technocratic project and their 'apolitical and neutral' science and technology. In order to do this it is important to investigate the religious organization which may be said to be the carriers of the technocratic ideology in Spain, the Opus Dei.

The study which argue most strongly for the decisive impact of the Opus Dei technocrats during the so called Spanish technocracy, and as such the one that is most similar to my own argument in this thesis, is José Casanova's *The Opus Dei Ethic and The Modernization of Spain*. In his work Casanova studies how the innerworldly asceticism of this Catholic lay organisation affected the mentality of people in important positions both within the public and private sphere of the country. His study is most of all a study within the sociology of religion which to a great extent applies Max Webers thesis about the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism on a Spanish mid 20th century context. In Casanova's opinion the story of Opus Dei and the Spanish modernisation is a story, like Webers, of unforeseen consequences. He analyses how a thoroughly moral conservative ethic could induce mentality changes that contributed to the most profound secular modernisation of Spanish history. To his judgement Opus Dei originated as a Catholic response to the problems concerning modernity which had created the 18th century phenomenon of freemasonry and the 19th century phenomena of liberalism, socialism, communism, all things highly threatening to a Catholic view on life. This response consisted in reinforcing the Catholic dogmas on the moral level but making it the apostolate of every Opus member to seek his way in the world to use whatever means appropriate to work for a great and integrated Catholic worldly reality. The unquestionable axiom of this project was that one needed to create wealth in order to obtain such a goal. Everyone should do service to God through ordinary work and contribute to the fulfilling of the Father's creation of a great and integrated Catholic world, to the work of God, or in Latin, Opus Dei. This implied that through work in this world one took part in the divine plan and sanctified not just oneself, but also others through work. Casanovas intention throughout his study is to show how this religiously motivated instrumental rationality legitimized a new way of thinking of work and the creation of wealth in Spain, which must account for much of the modernization of the country since the late 1950's.

Another study which applies the weberian notion of a religious ethic being the carrier and legitimizer of modernity, is Joan Estruch's *Saints and Schemers* -

Opus Dei and its paradoxes. This study deals most of all with placing Opus Dei within the history of Catholicism, and especially in relation to the Jesuits, but it is also a most valuable contribution as to understand the modernization of Spain during the 1960's. By analyzing the conduct and sayings of Opus Dei businessmen, managers and teachers, Estruch illuminates how a strongly conservative religious organization could be the advocate of liberal capitalism. In Estruch's opinion this paradox can be explained by a weberian division within Opus Dei between an ethic of conviction with regard to the personal sphere and an ethic of responsibility with regard to the public sphere. Estruch says that the Opus Dei ethic is characterized by: "Flexibility at the level of norms, and consequently of practical conduct, where solutions are valid when they are technically correct; but inflexibility and traditionalism at the level of values, and consequently also of the belief system, the legitimations on which those values rest."⁴³ In this way Opus Deists may be very pragmatic when choosing means to obtain their goals, but these goals are in themselves undebatable. As such Estruch's study is also a study of the relation between a religious ethic and the spirit of capitalism in a mid 20th. century Spanish context.

This studies relation to previous works

I have no major objections against these arguments. I am fully in agreement with Casanova and Estruch that one has to focus on the Opus Dei in order to understand the paradoxes of the Spanish modernization of the 1960's. Nevertheless, as an historian I am a bit uneasy by contentions about how the business and administrative mentality of important strata within a country radically changes as a result of religious ideas or beliefs as such. In my opinion the most salient feature of Opus Dei is their highly favourable attitude towards scholarship, science and technology. As these phenomena can be said to be the building blocks of modern societies, I believe an analyses of the connection between Opus Dei and the modernisation of Spain will be enriched by focusing on their concept of science and technology and how and why it was allowed to gain influence in Spanish history.

Talcott Parsons has sought to extract some variables to describe the ideal types of modern and traditional societies. He concentrates on five dimensions with polar alternatives on which the society in question can be evaluated. These dimensions are 1) degree of affectivity of social roles, 2) the determinants of these

⁴³ Estruch, op.cit.,p.262.

roles (class, sex, age, family etc. vs. merit), 3) the specificity of these roles, 4) particularism vs. universalism and 5) orientation towards private vs. collective interests. In Parsons ideal type of a traditional society roles tend to be affectively rewarding, that is they earn their gratification in the very performance of its activities and they are occupied by people by virtue of class, sex, family etc. Furthermore, these roles tend to be diffuse and cover a series of dimensions and to be particularistic i.e. they can not be transferred. In his ideal type of a modern society roles are affectively neutral, that is purely instrumental for an ulterior goal and they are occupied by people by virtue of merit. In these societies roles also tend to be specific and can be defined for a number of persons according to universalistic and objective criteria and as such be transferable.⁴⁴

This model may be said to rest upon a deterministic view of social development where a society is thought of as moving unilaterally and more or less continuously on a scale from traditionalism to modernity. This is in my opinion an ahistorical and too simplistic account of the radical transformation which many societies have lived through for at least the last two centuries, under very different historical circumstances. One can say that such a linear theory of modernization refuses to relativise, or historicise itself. With Ulrich Beck, we can say that such linear theories of modernization become "ideological relics of their own pretensions."⁴⁵ One must also emphasize that societies never develop in a congruent manner. Different spheres within a society will at all times have their distinct 'meanings' thus giving a rather confusing picture if one is to detect a certain 'degree of modernity'. Thus, I believe there is no single model for a 'road to modernity' for more traditional societies. Nevertheless, Parsons' model points at features which distinguishes practices in which the scientific view on life and technological innovations have become to dominate on behalf of particularistic and/or religious and defautistic beliefs and practices. As such, I think it is useful as an ideal model, or a tool for analysing historical development within a given society. In this way it becomes more easy to detect periods of radical change within important strata of a society, changes which are in need of historical interpretation.

I realize that by focusing upon these variables one might overlook changes equally important, but then again, this is every scientist's dilemma: One has to fix for an area of investigation in order to be able to make a rational interpretation of an event, or a set of events, with the neglect of different angles to the study as

⁴⁴ Larrain, Jorge (1989) *Theories of Development*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, pp.88-90.

⁴⁵ Beck, Ulrich (1997) *Risiko og frihet*, Fagbokforlaget, Bergen, pp.203-204.

an inevitable cost. Having said this, it is my firm belief that one of the most distinct characteristics of 'modern' societies of the 20th century is the enormous influence science and technology have had on them, and the degree to which science and technology almost exclusively have been viewed in its instrumental-rational aspects, at least when political decisions are to be made.

When focusing upon this aspect it becomes clear that Spain experienced very profound changes during the so called technocratic period. The Parsonian picture of a modern 20th century state certainly do not fit Spain before the technocratic reforms from 1957 on, but it is equally certain that important strata, such as the bureaucracy and the business community, within the state which during a tranquil and gradually process experienced a peaceful shift from dictatorship to democracy in the late 70's, during a short period of time had moved a long way in direction of a Parsonian 'modern society'. In the words of Carlos Moya from 1972:

"From 1957 on, when the new team joined the government [...] they gave momentum to the bureaucratic-managerial rationalization of the country's economic development, strongly coherent with the exigencies of the very bureaucratization of the Spanish capitalism.[...] With this growing bureaucratic organization of the Spanish economy, the social structure of the managerial function in our country is becoming similar to the contemporary western model. Peter F. Drucker's *efficient executive* is today a valid ideological model even for Spanish executives."⁴⁶

Several case studies conducted during the recent years have shown that the Spanish case of modern traits being implemented in society by conservative religious groups is not singular. In the afterword of his book about *Opus Dei, Saints and Schemers*, Joan Estruch tells how these studies show that new fundamentalist movements within Islam, Judaism, Protestantism, Roman Catholicism do not necessarily appear as countermodernizing movements. In his words:

"Seen from this more general perspective, then, Opus Dei would not be a unique case in the contemporary religious scene. Opus Dei members would rather be the carriers in the Roman Catholic Church of a more general and universal syndrome. This more general and universal syndrome is, precisely, the paradoxical combination of traditionalism and modernity."⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Moya, op.cit., pp.197-198. (my transl.)

⁴⁷ Estruch, op.cit., p.279.

This 'syndrome' certainly questions the connection which usually is made between modernization and decline of religiosity. The question how conservative religious groups can come to be the carriers of modern scientific and technological solutions in a society is intriguing and calls for detailed historical studies.

My approach to the study of Casanova's hypothesis can therefore be described as follows: Applying the Parsonian model it becomes clear that Spain underwent radical changes towards a modern society from 1957 on. My task as an historian is to ask what happened and why it did so. Following the Casanova hypothesis I think it becomes imperative to empirically investigate why and in what way Opus Dei, motivated by their religious ethic, became the bearer and receptor of foreign ideas and uses of science and technology. To do so, beside analyzing their world view and concept of the apostolate of work, I will concentrate on how concepts of science and technology were modelled into their ethic. The Opus ethic may well have contributed to a legitimisation of 'doing business' and 'making money', but I believe the crucial point here is *the way* this was to be done, namely through the instrumental use of 'effective administration for economic growth' in the clothes of modern administrative science and technology.

In order to be able to investigate this, I will identify the Spanish technocrats and evaluate the impact of Opus Dei on the overall technocratic project. Through their sayings, influences and actual work I will try to extract their view on science and technology. I do not suggest that politics in the later part of the franquist regime can be *explained* by conceptualizing the Opus Dei view on science and technology, but this might help establish some kind of coherence and perhaps increase the understanding of what actually happened. I agree with Casanova when he says that Opus Dei conceived of politics as the management of people and the administration of things.⁴⁸ Because of this it becomes essential to analyse how this political project was thought, institutionalized and what effects it had on Spanish society. In this way the hypothesis about the Opus Dei influence on Spanish modernization might be qualified. The so-called technocratic reforms commenced with a very ambitious administrative reform which was institutionalized both through laws, schools, conferences and journals. To make sense of the Opus Dei influence on Spanish modernization, I will in this work investigate these institutionalizations and the activities concerning them.

⁴⁸ Casanova, *op.cit.*, pp.302-303.

CHAPTER 4. Technocracy

Purpose of the chapter

This chapter will be a necessary interludium to the central history of this thesis as I judge it to be a prerequisite for the understanding of the totality of my argument. Even though technocratic beliefs and political projects have manifested themselves in various settings and disguises throughout history, there are nevertheless some core elements to be detected in all of them. I believe this precisely to be a particular notion of the role of science and technology within modern societies. In order to understand the historical role and particular character of the Spanish technocracy I find it necessary to establish both a historical and theoretical framework on technocracy. This will enable me to more precisely define the politics of the late franquist era in relationship to the, otherwise vague, concept of technocracy. I recognize that this focus draws upon the old Weberian notion of the confrontation between specialized knowledge and political practice, but I will not treat the functions of expertise and politics as strictly separated, because my main concern is the *relation*, or better the *interrelation*, between knowledge and political practice more than a mere *confrontation*. Key concerns in this chapter will be: What is technocracy? What is the role of science and technology within the concept of technocracy? In close relation with the last question I find it important to discuss the distinction and relation between science and technology.

Qualification of the term 'technocracy'

With 'technocracy' I understand the idea of governance through a decision-making process that holds science and technology to be the final and value-neutral arbiter to political questions. In the continuance of this view technocratic sentiments might be seen as containing an apolitical ideology aiming at bringing an end to politics which is seen as "the parochial interests of untutored value

preferences of politicians."¹ In a Foucaultian perspective and in the terms of Kjetil Jacobsen one can say that technocratic theory resides within an *industrialistic discourse* (industrialismediskurs). In such a discourse the process of modernization is seen as a consequence of an never ending scientific and technological rationalization. Jacobsen opposes such an industrialistic discourse to a *capitalistic discourse* (kapitalismediskurs). This discourse is founded on the Marxist notion that the relation between work and capital is the driving force of modern industrial development: Here the reason for technological development will be explained by reference to the capitalist system itself which must inevitably give input to new technology in order to sustain.² This theoretical distinction is useful as it illuminates how a technocratic ideology has a tendency to downplay the tensions upon which traditional politics resides. Thus, *technocracy rests on an ideology which sees science and technology as the driving forces of historical development, hence covering the potential conflict between work and capital within a capitalist economic system.* As José Casanova says:

"The ideological nature of technocracy resides in the fact that it attempts to transform practical-political decision-making into a technical-rational choice, thus hiding the historical nature of social processes in an attempt to attribute to them the objective or immanent necessity characteristic of natural processes."³

According to the classical model of politics, speech, discourse and communicative interaction are the stuff of which politics are made. But they are discarded by the technocrats as idle talk. Furthermore, for the technocrats, politics is not the art of stagecraft in the Machiavellian sense, nor the science of state-building in the Hobbesian sense. [...]the technocrat looks down upon the role of the professional politician. The roles of the liberal parliamentarian, the plebiscitarian politician and the professional political ruler, are all rejected."⁴

The development of complex industrial societies has put the expert, and his or her specialized knowledge in a core position when decisions are to be made, and this can bewilder us to believe that technocracy is everywhere in modern society. There are nevertheless important differences between the sciencebased expert or

technician and the technocrat. Following Casanova, I believe that this distinction resides in the fact that the former is a mere executor of political decisions made by politicians, while the technocrat will aggressively advocate that political decisions themselves must be scientifically or technologically made.⁵ This distinction is often unclear; the 'pure' technicians or experts may heavily influence the problem context of political decisionmaking. The important point is nevertheless that such influence is the explicit intention of the technocrat. Thus, it is my judgement that technocracy has to be defined on the basis of its political and ideological impulses. Even though it is difficult to define technocracy as a political movement, because of its various manifestations throughout history they seem to share some common beliefs:

"the idea that democracy is the root of political and social conflict; the belief that class struggle should be replaced with technical decision making; and the deep seated convictions that technological progress and material productivity are the defining characteristics of the good society. These themes[...]underlie their deep seated conviction that politicians should be replaced by scientific and technical elites. These ideas[...] occur again and again throughout technocratic writings. Only the historical circumstances change; the ideas themselves remain remarkably constant."⁶

Or in the words of Anthony Giddens; "Technocracy is not just the application of technical modes to the solution of defined problems, but a pervading ethos, a world-view which subsumes aesthetics, religion and customary thought to the rationalistic mode."⁷ I think that it is this belief in *technical rationality as the human rationality*, and a conception of the totality of society as the sum of each of its components, "abstracting the part from the whole"⁸, that most precisely both defines a technocratic ideology and gives it its strength. Deduced from these basic assumptions, society should be guided by those with the best available knowledge within each discipline or sphere of society, and without challenging this axiom technocratic management of society certainly has got the upper hand.

¹ Fischer, Frank (1990) *Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise*, Sage Publications, California, p.22

² Jacobsen, Kjetil (1993) "Etter oss kommer overfloden" - Teknokratisk moderniseringsideologi i norsk samfunnsdebatt 1917-1953, History Dissertation, University of Oslo, pp.31-35.

³ Casanova, op.cit., p. 63.

⁴ Op.cit., pp.302-303.

⁵ Op.cit., p.113.

⁶ Fischer, op.cit., p.74-75.

⁷ Cited from Fischer, op.cit., p.41.

⁸ Op.cit., p.43.

Finally, when speaking of technocratic beliefs that advocate the use of specialized knowledge, I can not help thinking of a sketch performed by Rowan Atkinson (also known as *Mr. Bean* or *The Black Adder*). In it he is the vicar holding a commemorative speech for three friends, Tom, Dick and Harry: Tom blind and deaf, Dick deaf and dumb and Harry blind and dumb. Normally they complemented each other quite well and "together they were in possession of all of God's senses", but as the sketch ends: "Dick *saw* the combine harvester... Harry *heard* the combine harvester, but neither could cry out. Tom who *could* have cried out, hadn't the faintest idea of what hit him..." There are obviously limits to specialized knowledge! But one can also add that both Tom, Dick and Harry, when still alive, would have been much worse off without it.

The historical origins of technocracy

Although the word technocracy was first used in 1919 by William Henry Smyth, its historical origins can at least be traced back to the last century. In fact it is not unjust to even judge, of course very anachronistically, some aspects of Plato's thoughts of rule by the expert elite with superior insight to the workings and needs of society to be a recommendation for technocratic rule. But in the context of modern societies one can consider August Comtes' plea for a 'positive science' also within the field of social sciences and the humanities, to contain the theoretical seeds of technocratic political projects of the past two centuries. The first political project within the context of an ever more industrialized and modern society which deserves to be labelled technocratic, is most likely the program of the French early-nineteenth century minister of finance, Saint-Simon, also called the *father of technocracy*. This program consisted of intentions to replace the old authority of priests and politicians with the authority of scientists and technicians. This ambitious project can be reflected in the suggestion that there should be established something which Saint-Simon called *sociocracy* as the "new religion of humanity". This new religion should give legitimacy to the "positive state" which should be governed by the laws of science and apply technical solutions to political problems.⁹ Although the sociocracy never became manifest and the very concept might seem a bit ridiculous today, many of the underlying assumptions of Saint-Simon have had a profound

⁹ Op.cit., p.71.

impact on the guidance of political decisions and social development in later times.

I think that it is this impact on the development of modern societies that has been described by several observers as essential to the very project of modernity. Ranging from Max Webers' concept of the iron cage of rationality through analyses by Jacques Ellul, Lewis Mumford, Ortega y Gasset, Herbert Marcuse, Adorno and Horkheimer just to mention some of the most important, to more recently Jürgen Habermas' thoughts of how technical rationality (system) colonizes the sphere of communicative rationality (lifeworld), do I all find to be speaking of the increased impact of a technical rationality on everyday life.

Technocratic thoughts are not inherently rightist or leftist. Throughout history, various political projects have extolled the position of the 'neutral' expert in order to promote their interests, or as a result of a firm belief in the immanent good of scientific and technological solutions to political problems. It has been used to defend the 'ordinary man' against the irrationalities of monopolistic capital in the late 19th century as well as to promote fascist organization in the inter-war period:

"[...] C.S. Maier tells us that American methods of production were embraced as the gospel of the future by those who were in need of revolution - the extreme right and left, the futurists and fascists of Italy and the Bolsheviks of Russia - but also, somewhat paradoxically, by people like Harriot in France and Rathenau in Germany, social reformers who were searching for a middle way beyond class warfare."¹⁰

Nevertheless, in order to understand technocratic thoughts and projects of the 20th century, one must consider the progressivism in the United States from the 1890's on, and the impact of Fredrick Taylor and his 'scientific management'. Kjetil Jacobsen says that progressivism originated in the US as a critique of justice on behalf of 'the ordinary man' against the exploitation from trade and railway monopolies.¹¹ Thus, progressivism was initially linked with a defence for the small units within the economy in a period of industrial development related to big industry, but as time went by the progressive critique was directed toward the

¹⁰ Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjørlme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel , op.cit., p.2.

¹¹ Jacobsen, op.cit., p.114.

practices of big industry itself. This shift in focus of the critique, from a critique of justice toward a critique of efficiency, can be dated to the so called *efficiency craze* in 1911. This year the progressives sued Eastern Railways, as the railway company, in a heated situation, had increased tariffs and as such became the very symbol of the damaging effects of the monopolistic tendencies of the era.¹² On of the salient progressivists, the lawyer Lois D. Brandeis, represented 'the people' and rested his arguments on the lack of efficiency in the railway company. In this work he came in contact with Taylor, and their campaign advocated 'higher efficiency in stead of higher prices'. As a slogan for their very successful campaign they chose *Scientific Management*.¹³ In the basis of this concept lies the notion that political problems originates in lack of efficiency and as such can get a purely technical solution. Talking about the organizational ideology and technique of scientific management, Mauro Guillen says:

"It proposed to study individuals and tasks from the perspective of engineering, industrial psychology, ergonomics and physiology in order to improve efficiency. As an ideology, scientific management assumed that all actors (workers, managers, entrepreneurs, owners) could behave rationally. Industrial conflict could be avoided because an increased surplus was supposed to benefit all groups involved, thus eliminating the need for labor unions. Management ought to tell workers exactly what to do and how to do it, and supervise them closely.[...] As an organizational technique, scientific management aimed at discovering the 'one best way' of managing workers and organizing tasks. The methodology consisted of various experimental job-analysis techniques, of which time-and-motion study was the most important. The stopwatch, the motion-picture camera, the slide rule and the psycho-physiological test formed its paraphernalia of field instruments. Efficiency was to be increased by maximising the advantages deriving from the separation of task conception from task execution, division of labor and specialization. Authority was to be centralized following the principle of unity of command. Supervisory autonomy needed to be reduced. The process of work was to be simplified, mechanized and, whenever possible, arranged in assembly-line-fashion. Workers were assumed to be motivated solely by monetary incentives [...]"¹⁴

¹² Op.cit., p.115.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Guillen, Mauro F. (1994) *Models of management: work, authority, and organization in a comparative perspective*, University of Chicago Press, pp.8-9.

In the wake of the *efficiency craze*, scientific management became the catchword of the day. This movement represented essentially an academic middle class critique against the monopolies and trusts, against the corrupt politicians as well as against the labour movements' narrow articulation of class interests. Kjetil Jacobsen says:

"Especially in the efficiency phase [from 1911 to 1920], progressivism was the way by which the new academic middle layers for the first time politically articulated itself with an independent program for social change. It transformed the American political scene by formulating an industrialistic discourse the American way. What unites the different reform movements, and make it reasonable to talk about *one* political phenomenon, was precisely the "apolitical", the case oriented and instrumental attitude and the scientific foundation of the reform programmes."¹⁵

The World War I made such an 'apolitical' project even more viable as a means to unite political forces within the belligerent countries. I believe this 'apolitical' and conciliating aspect of technocratic thoughts are important to consider when we are to understand its impact on 20th century society. In periods of war and economic crisis technocratic thoughts have been advocated as a means to build bridges between otherwise conflicting political projects. It is thus symptomatic that technocratic thoughts were put in the background in the United States in the immediate post World War I period of economical boom, only to regain influence in the aftermath of the economic crisis of the late 20's and throughout the 30's: One of the most clear cut recommendations for the crucial role of the technical expert in modern societies is to be found in Torstein Veblen, *The Engineers and the Price System* (1919). In his book, Veblen advocated the view that economic affairs had to be controlled by a "Soviet of technicians" which were the keeper of "the state of the industrial arts."¹⁶ The engineers was thought of as a potentially apolitical group who could use their expertise for the common good and make away with the inefficiency, the 'waste', of traditional liberal capitalism. This book became a best-seller, not in the 1920's, but in 1932, in the midst of the economic world crisis, when it was reissued in connection with the appearance of Howard Scott's organization of engineers in 1932, *Technocracy Inc.*¹⁷ In general

¹⁵ Jacobsen, op.cit., p.113. (my transl.)

¹⁶ Cited from Jacobsen, op.cit., p.117. (my transl.)

¹⁷ Ibid.

Veblen's book became an inspiration for technocratic reform processes in the inter-war period, and not only in the United States.

Science and society in the inter-war period - a change of relations

In general I believe technocratic thoughts must be viewed as perhaps the most pregnant political articulation of the new academic middle-layers during a period of crisis in the old liberal paradigm of traditional capitalism, starting with the outbreak of World War I. As such, technocracy was an important, but not the only, strategy in a period of a general transformation in the overall relationship between science and society during the first half of the 20th century. It is nevertheless important to note that technocratic thoughts could legitimate themselves with reference to a concept of science and technology as value-neutral phenomena. The coming analysis of the development of the relation between science and society in the inter-war period do not equalize the technocrat with the Weberian 'vocational scientist'. It is only meant to indicate how technocratic thoughts could draw support from traditional conceptions of the impartial character of scientific knowledge. As previously noted, the use of this 'neutral' science becomes more or less technocratic only to the extent that it makes political problems seem as if they are just technical. This was precisely what the Taylorist system aspired at; his system was meant to eliminate the ethical and political controversy between labour and capital within a traditional, liberal capitalist economy.¹⁸

Until the outbreak of World War I it is reasonable to say that the modern Western world, in spite of articulated opposition from increasingly organized labour-movements, conceived of modernization as a process grounded on free trade within a liberal legal framework. Within this framework the 'invisible hand' of the market should guarantee the effective use of resources and a piecemeal allocation of goods. Within this liberal paradigm the sciences played a central role as they were seen as both a basic element of the habitus¹⁹ of the social elite as well as the basis for technological innovations which induced material

¹⁸ Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjørlme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel, op.cit., p.17.

¹⁹ Pierre Bourdieu defines habitus as the embodiment of a person's position within a field of socio-cultural practice. It is thus my intention to focus on the fact that scientific literacy and understanding was an essential part of how the social elite perceived of itself, as well as a source of legitimation of this role.

improvement and economic growth. Hence, knowledge of man and nature were conceived of as a good in itself. Nevertheless, this gives a picture of a seemingly withdrawn, objective and apolitical science, seeking knowledge for its own sake, which should not and ought not to influence on society except by contributing to technological innovation. Classical economic theory, Darwinism, law and statistics should predominantly explain how things were and why they were so and not be instruments for the transformation of society itself.

After World War II this picture of the relationship between science and society was fundamentally altered. The sciences, and especially the natural and social sciences, were now core elements in processes of modernization characterized by effective production and organization for the common good related to the development of the welfare state. In this process, the sciences turn from being a source for *knowledge of nature and society* toward being the basis in programs for *change of nature and society*.

Traditionally, the prime objective of the sciences was to find *truths*. The character of these truths has changed throughout history, but Max Weber's, *Science and Politics - two speeches* from 1919, paints a picture of science as the carrier of a value-neutral norm outside the rest of society, as a means for *die Entzauberung der Welt*:

"As such, the increased intellectualization and rationalization does *not* mean an ever increasing general knowledge of the conditions of life under which one exists. But it means something else; the consciousness of or the belief in, that if one *would*, one *could* at any time gain such knowledge, that it in principle do not exist any secret and unpredictable forces which interfere, but that one - in principle - can *manage everything by calculation*. But then again, this implies: the world loses its magic."²⁰

As such, scientific activity is not without its axiology, but if one eventually comes to accept science as a vocation, it implied that one had the possibility to gain pure *factual* knowledge of the world. Thus, Weber's message was that one had to draw a clear line between science and politics, between fact and judgement, between means and ends. The point here is that science, interpreted this way, represents a value-neutral norm which gives us knowledge of facts. Nevertheless, this

²⁰ Weber, Max (1936) *Videnskap og Politikk - to taler*, Aschehoug, Oslo, p.39. (my transl.)

weberian ideal distinction between science and politics becomes very problematic during the inter-war period. To my judgement it is a paradox that the cause of this development to a strong degree can be found in the fact that the sciences during the inter-war period could present itself as a 'weberian' source for pure and impartial knowledge of facts.

The picture of a fundamental alteration of the relation between science and society during this period is of course somewhat simplified, and one should not close one's eye to diverging tendencies, which were very much present.²¹ Nevertheless, the described change in the relationship between science and the surrounding society is a fundamental trend in most western societies of the period. This trend is analysed by historians and social scientists alike as variants of what Carl Axel Gemzell calls 'the scientization of politics and the politization of science' (politikens förvetenskapligande och vetenskapens politisering). The more or less sciencebased welfare societies have, in spite of striking similarities, developed in a process of mutual influence between scientific development and the surrounding societies in historical contexts with distinct national characteristics. After a war that partially can be explained as a consequence of the capitalist development and a subsequent period of instability and crisis within the same economic system, most western countries experienced a period of radical breaks and reorientations. Within these breaks and reorientations the sciences and the new sciencebased professions were to play a central role.

During the years 1992-95 there was a research project at the Centre for Technology and Culture (TMV) in Oslo, informally known as the 'technocracy project'. The result of this project is now to be published in an article called *The European Appropriation of Americanism*. Essential to the rather vague concept of Americanism is its "science-and-technology generated affluence."²² The central theme of this article is the way in which the American progressivist and technocratic thoughts were received in different European countries, and how they became important factors in different political projects within different

²¹ E.g. Carl Axel Gemzell describes in part III of his *Om politikens förvetenskapligande och vetenskapens politisering* how the science-based professionalization within English universities already in the second half of the 19th. century was a part of an emancipatory project of previously marginalized groups within the middle classes. A part of this process saw the emergence of groups as the *Fabian Society* which worked for a socialist development of society. It is interesting to note that London School of Economics was created in 1895 by people associated with Fabian Society with the explicit intention to educate socialist economists. (Gemzell, op.cit., p.68, part III)

²² Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjørme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel, op.cit., p.2

cultural settings.²³ I stated above that I judged technocratic thoughts to be a political articulation of the interests of the new professional middle layers opposing traditional, liberal capitalism and culture. This is well in accordance with what is stated in the article of the TMV research group: "In England and Germany, Americanism threatened the hegemony of the ruling classes by devaluating their cultural capital, in France Americanism [was] to strengthen the dominance of the modernizing elites in Paris over Catholic and provincial France."²⁴ In France the American thoughts were received as a regeneration of the old saint-simonian dream of the 'sociocracy'. Referring to Zeldin, the TMV researchers conclude that:

"Technocracy in the interwar years, and under the Vichy government, was a major factor in French political and cultural life. Technocracy in France however, did not primarily mean the invisible rule of the corporate professionals envisaged by American thinkers. The technocracy feared or hoped for among French intellectuals was rather the visible rule of the powerful stately technocrats."²⁵

This American influence on French culture is important to note when we are to understand the creation of the social scientific *Ecole National d'Administration* in 1946 and its eventual rise to be the hegemonic centre for education of people in both business and the Civil Service.

In Germany the reception of Americanism was different. Here, as the humanities held a hegemonic position within the German elite, "Taylorism was dismissed as yet another example of rationalistic and alienating civilization."²⁶ Nevertheless, technology had a benign connotation in German culture as a means for the creation of artefacts in opposition to as a means for the management of society. As such, "[...] fascination for the technological aspects of Americanism was strong. Taylorism was to a certain extent imported as technology rather than as management theory."²⁷ This may illuminate Adolf Hitler's strong fascination for

²³ About productivism, technocracy and the different reception within European countries of these American concepts see also Nolan, Mary (1997) "Productivism and Technocracy in Historical Perspective", in Myklebust, Sissel(ed) *Technology and Democracy: Obstacles to democratization - Productivism and technocracy*, TMV Book Collection n.28, Oslo.

²⁴ Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjørme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel, op.cit., p.11.

²⁵ Op.cit., p.15.

²⁶ Op.cit., p.19.

²⁷ Ibid.

Henry Ford. Ford was one of Hitler's few expressed sources of inspiration for the economic policy of Nazi-Germany. He fundamentally shared Hitler's contempt for the scientific professional but praised the work of technicians and the practical organization of the factory or society as a totally self-sufficient *Gemeinwirtschaft* in German parlance.²⁸

In England, Americanism was fiercely opposed by the liberal Oxbridge culture which influenced so heavily on the higher echelons of society. Nevertheless, also in England technocratic thoughts made their impact on the course of history. Carl Axel Gemzell describes how the fundamentally technocratic *Social Relation of Science-movement*, centred around Bernal, made huge impact on cultural and political discourse in the 1930's, and how these thoughts were to give direction to politics in the post-war period.²⁹

Technocracy in the post-war period

Even though technocracy as a clearly expressed ideology and a political programme is most salient in the inter-war period, I nevertheless believe an historical evaluation of the impact of technocracy must focus on the western world in the period following World War II. To my judgement the period between the end of World War II and the oil-crisis in 1973 may well be considered as the highlight of technocracy in the western world. It is nevertheless important to note that I judge the impact to have occurred primarily through a discursive level. In accordance with my characterization of a technocrat as being guided by an ideology which rejects democratic politics as idle talk, much of the technocratic influence on post-World War II societies have been mediated by technicians or experts which can not be judged to share this technocratic characteristic. In contrast to the inter-war period when the impact of technocracy can clearly be detected as it was advocated as a loudly professed ideology or programme for political action, in the post-war period, the impact of technocratic thoughts must be said to have occurred more on a discursive level, as a highly influential tacit dimension within western societies. As noted by the TMV researchers:

²⁸ Op.cit., pp.19-24. About the peculiar mix of German traditionalism and fascination for modern technology within important parts of the German intellectual elite in the pre World War II period see also Herf, Jeffrey (1984) *Reactionary Modernism: technology, culture, and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich*, Cambridge University Press.

²⁹ Gemzell, op.cit., part II

"American society did in fact encompass new relationships between science, technology and culture, relationships which by the 1950's were to become close to being *the twentieth century's universal discourse on modernity*."³⁰ In such a discourse politics are close to being reduced to pure administration. During this period one spoke of the seemingly fundamental triumph of liberal corporate capitalism as the end of ideology³¹ as well as the end of history. In general this period can be regarded as extremely optimistic with regard to the steerability of modern societies. Things seemed to work out more or less the way the policy-experts or technocrats of the period anticipated, and living standards in the western world grew with unprecedented speed: "The industrial practices of Taylor and Ford functionally induced the modes of regulation typical of capitalism during the period of rapid economic growth in the 1950's and 1960's."³² Political scientists started to turn away from theories about democracy to direct their studies toward administrative theory³³, and Jürgen Habermas spoke of the ongoing *scientization of politics*.³⁴ He was far from being alone in criticizing the tendencies toward a society where instrumental rationality seemed to be omnipotent as well as omnipresent, but it is hard to say that such criticizing concerns were shared by the general western policy-maker of this period. In the context of this work it is important to note that the Spanish technocracy worked within the framework of the period following World War II when science and technology were core elements in what seemed to be a more or less universal discourse on modernity.

I think that this chapter so far has shown that technocratic thoughts have made their impact on European history, but in different ways in different countries in accordance with cultural and political differences. In this part I have deliberately omitted the influence of technocratic thoughts on Spanish society as it is the central theme of my investigation of Opus Dei and its role within the Spanish political and cultural context.

³⁰ Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjørlme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel, op.cit., p.2. (my italics)

³¹ Fischer, op.cit., p.94.

³² Jacobsen, Kjetil/ Gjørlme Andersen, Ketil/ Halvorsen, Tor/ Myklebust, Sissel, op.cit., p.8.

³³ Fischer, op.cit., p.51.

³⁴ Habermas, Jürgen (1984) *Ciencia y Tecnología como Ideología*, Madrid. About Habermas' understanding of the character of modern technological development see Feenberg, Andrew (1994) *Marcuse or Habermas: Two critiques of technology*, TMV Working paper n.83, Oslo.

Academic discourse on technocracy

Academic debates about technocracy have different roots. One is a concern about democracy in general, stating that technocracy and the rule of experts poses serious threats to a participatory conception of democracy. On a more fundamental level it also poses the question whether democracy can be compatible with the realities of a complex post-industrial society: has society become too complex for lay people or even politicians to make decisions? Another concern is whether the technocrats or experts have the ability to steer the development in an efficient and predictable manner. The oil crisis in 1973 and the following recession in the world economy seriously put into doubt the ability of the experts, and this angle to the debate of technocracy has become common.

Debates about technocracy have also had a tendency of not being very constructive, because they often divide people with fundamentally different views on science and technology in general. Either are decisions made on the base of scientific or technical rationality seen as the very cause of current problems or, on the contrary, as the only solution to them. Carl Mitcham has divided thinking about technology's role in, and impact on society into the *Humanities' philosophy of technology* and the *Engineering philosophy of technology*³⁵, and to simplify one could say that that humanist critiques of modernity have proposed the first view and technologists and engineers the other. I nevertheless believe it is important to maintain the notion that one does not have to be a technologist or engineer or to be an advocate of a 'scientized' society in order to appreciate the central role of scientific and technological expertise. Neither does one have to be reactionary or a spiritualist to see that human life has other expressions than technical rationality and other exigencies than material prosperity. A middle of the road view must avoid the pitfall of a glorification of the 'wonders of science and technology' as well as an utopian 'back to nature' approach. In more epistemological terms I think that one must reject a positivist or neo-positivist conception of science as the keeper of true, value-neutral and solid knowledge extracted from each historical context, without rejecting the validity of scientific knowledge as a system of thought, as for example a strong social-constructivist approach might be accused of doing.

³⁵ Mitcham, Carl (1993), *Thinking through Technology; The Path between Engineering and Philosophy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago

Of course scientific and technological knowledge should, at least idealistically, be in congruence with known facts and hence be criticizeable, but this does not deprive this type of knowledge of its axiology. Whatever the stringency of the logic or the epistemological content of a piece of scientific knowledge or the function of a technological innovation, it will always rest upon an axiology which can not be scientifically justified. Each form of human rationality contains a part which belongs to the sphere of values, norms, beliefs, goals etc., Whether it be the 14th. Century peasant who says his prayers in order to assure that his post-terrestrial existence will be as pleasant as possible, or the 20th. Century industrialist who adopts a technological innovation in order to increase efficiency and the rentability of his commerce.(Or the historian who studies science and technology to be able to increase the understanding of the society in which he lives, or more prosaically, to get his degree...) The very fact that our societies have a phenomenon such as science demonstrates its innate valueladedness because "there is no science without a social will to uphold this form of human activity" and "neither the existence of science, nor its axiology is guaranteed by any natural tendency."³⁶ Having said this does not imply that I predicate a scientific epistemological relativism. I fully agree with Bruno Latour who says that we have to be realists with regard to scientific theories when established. It is the historical context and the process of establishment of scientific knowledge which has to be studied in order to evaluate the innate values of scientific knowledge and activity.³⁷ Hence my assumption is that science and technology can never claim to be neutral with respect to the outside world, and therefore I find a conception of scientific and technological activity as autonomous and neutral, fundamentally erroneous. My point is that there *are* criteria to judge science and technology, but the contextuality of this activity implies that *the reason* for all kind of investigation or implementation of technology always can be submitted to discussions whose settlement can not be scientifically justified.

³⁶ Echeverría, Javier (1995) "El pluralismo axiológico de la ciencia", in *ISEGORÍA* (Madrid), n.12, october 1995, p.66-67. (my transl.) About the underdetermination of science as an institutionalized activity see also Ben-David, Joseph (1971/1982) *The Scientist's Role in Society: A Comparative Study*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:Prentice Hall (Foundation of Modern Sociology Series)

³⁷ Latour, op.cit., p.100.

Science and Technology within technocratic thought

In this work I will use a broad definition of technology proposed by Wiebe Bijker, and consider technology to include both physical *artefacts*, human *activities* and *knowledge*.³⁸ In this study of the technocratic administrative reform, the two last aspects of Bijker's definition of technology will predominate: Administrative technology as 1) human activity, the actual way of carrying out the administrative work and 2) knowledge of administrative techniques.

Traditionally the distinction between science and technology were relatively unproblematic. I think that the traditional conception of this relationship properly can be described as considering science as dealing with *knowledge about the world* and technology as dealing with *action in the world*. Through science and the growth of knowledge about the works of nature, one would attribute man's ability to gain control over nature to his benefit by using new technology. Technology is thus traditionally considered as the application of true, value-neutral and solid scientific knowledge in society, and the essence of this deterministic view is clearly expressed in the motto of the 1933 Chicago *Century of Progress* international exposition: "Science finds, Industry applies, Man conforms"³⁹

When talking about the applied-science model and the role of science and technology within technocratic thoughts, I also believe it is important to qualify *positivism* as a scientific concept, as positivism may be said to be the fundamental building block of all technocratic ideology. History has experienced different positivist programmes, ranging from Saint-Simon's and Comte's thoughts of the positive science about society in the past century to the logical positivism of the wiener-circle and their philosophy of language in the inter-war period. Nevertheless, the philosopher of science, Ian Hacking, has defined what he sees as at least five common traits of all positivistic programmes. They can be summarized as follows:

- 1) The emphasis on verification, one has to be able to distinguish true from false.
- 2) All scientific knowledge has to be based on what can be observed.

³⁸ Bijker, Wiebe (1995) "Sociohistorical Technology Studies" in Jasanoff et al.: *Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*, London: Sage Publ., p.231

³⁹ Staudenmaier, John M. (1989) *Technology's Storytellers. Reweaving the Human Fabric*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts- London, p.xv.

3) We have no possibility to know the reasons why things happen, we can only observe that they occur in a given sequence. As a consequence of this positivists will reject all forms of causal explanations.

4) Theories do not represent reality in itself, they are only tools to be used in the analysis of the reality.

5) Things which can not be observed has to be discarded if we are to gain knowledge of reality.⁴⁰

Hence, positivists will look for general relations between phenomena and necessary consequences based on observation. They will not deny that there exists hidden and unknown forces in the universe, but they will claim that to make assumptions regarding these are none of our business as we can never gain observable knowledge of them. Thus, it is fundamentally opposed to all kinds of metaphysical speculation.

This positivist and applied-science view has been threatened from various angles for at least the last thirty years. Both historical studies of the relation between science and technology, sociology of scientific knowledge studies, and debates within the philosophy of science community about the epistemological content of scientific knowledge *per se*, have posed serious questions concerning the adequacy of the applied-science model and the positivist conception of science.

One could say that Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* from 1962 started it all, or more precisely, without this being his intention, to some degree revitalized the old Marxist thought that the *ruling ideas* were the *rulers ideas*. In the aftermath of Kuhn's book these notions reappeared in the clothes of *Social Construction of Science theories*.⁴¹ In his book Kuhn argued that science develops through periods of *normal science* when scientists within a scientific community predominantly deal with *puzzle-solving* within a given *paradigm*. In periods of normal science, Kuhn says, the scientific activity will mainly consist of working with problems guided by a common set of rules, norms

⁴⁰ Ian Hacking, 1983, *Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, ch.3.

⁴¹ Regarding the social constructivist approach to studies of science and its relation with Marxist theory see: Restivo, Sal (1995) "The Theory Landscape in Science Studies: Sociological Traditions" in Jasanoff, S./Markle, G.E./Petersen, J.C./ Pinch, T. (eds) *Handbook of Science and Technology Studies*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications and Webster, Andrew (1991) *Science, Technology and Society: New Directions*. London Macmillan, pp.1-32.

and presumptions (the *paradigm*). Eventually this puzzle-solving activity leads to so many results or data which can not be explained by the ruling paradigm that one enters a *revolutionary* period when the old paradigm is replaced with a new one. Kuhns' point is that this change of paradigm can not be rationally argued. There are no criteria to evaluate paradigms directly against each other and this implies that science in general can not be seen as a cumulative process of better *conjectures* and bolder attempts of *refutations*, to use the terms of Karl Popper. If it is doubted that scientific development is the result of rational arguments only, one automatically doubts science itself as a system of knowledge with a legitimate claim for special authority. The most radical consequence of this view is perhaps expressed within a part of the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge community. Often originating in a Marxist approach, science and technology are seen merely as the outcome of pure struggle: The determinants of what is considered a scientific fact or what will be used as a technology are only the access to means by which each actor can support his own view. The intensity of the debate which followed Kuhn's book reflects what was at stake, and it is still going on. The point in this context is that it questions the neutrality of science and its 'application' i.e. technology, in keeping with the terms of the applied science-model.

Historical studies of the relation between science and technology has also put doubt into the applied science-model. One of the best known is perhaps the *Hindsight Project* which was published in 1966 and supported by the US defence department, aimed at evaluating the contribution of *basic science* to the country's twenty most important weapon-systems. It concluded that only 1% could be traced back to basic science, and that the numbers for technology and *applied science* respectively were 91% and 9%.⁴² Historical studies of the role of science and technology in the industrial revolutions have shown both that their relation differs throughout history and that a clear distinction is hard to establish.⁴³ The single most important forum for discussing this theme is perhaps *The Society for*

⁴² Myklebust, Sissel (1993) *Teknologi og vitenskap i "ekspertsamfunnet"*, TMV Working paper n.64, Oslo, p.4.

⁴³ Roe Smith, Merrit / Marx Leo, *Does technology drive history*, MIT Press, 1993, contains several interesting articles about the impact of technology on historical development. In general the articles discuss the fertility of the notion of technological determinism for the understanding of social development. There are at least two versions of technological determinism, one holding that technology develops through predestined paths in accordance with scientific progress, and this may be said to be a rather crude version of the linear model exposed above. The more historical one, discussed in this book, deals with to what extent different technologies can be viewed as determinants of wider socio-cultural changes.

the History of Technology (SHOT) which was established in the United States in 1957, as a 'break-out' group of *The History of Science Society*. SHOT's magazine *Technology & Culture* can, with its multi- and interdisciplinary approach, well be judged as being the start of STS-studies (Science, Technology, Society) as we know them today. In his book *Technology's Storytellers* John M. Staudenmaier analyses the debate within T&C and concludes that the debate about the distinction between science and technology has not been very fruitful. Staudenmaier himself suggests that the distinction can best be understood by using the concepts *ambient* and *design*. Where a piece of scientific knowledge can be purely abstract and theoretical all kinds of technology has to be designed in order to work within its ambient. Beyond this there are no qualitative criteria to distinguish science and technology as cognitive activities.⁴⁴

Talking of the natural sciences, Ian Hacking presents an interesting argument about this relation. In his book *Representing and Intervening* he argues that the natural sciences do not only observe and make theories about 'God's book of nature' which are there, just waiting to be discovered. He states that the natural sciences foremost deal with *creation of phenomena* through experiments. The prime concern of science is to construct experiments that work and make the equipment function. In reality the scientists are not reproducing experiments but always trying to do *better* experiments. Hacking concludes that most phenomena, in a physical sense of the word, are made by humans and that the story of these creations is a long history of technology.⁴⁵ In my opinion Hacking by this almost completely dissolves the distinction between science and technology. It can further be argued that this view is applicable even for the social sciences: I think it is fair to say that the Popperian notion of *piecemeal social engineering*⁴⁶ has shown to become a paradigm for many social scientists in the post-war period. In keeping with Hacking's terms, then it is not unreasonable to say that even the history of social science, at least during the past fifty years, to some extent is a long history of social scientists *creating social phenomena* through experiments, and then trying to *improve* these experiments. I think this fact accounts for an aspect of the adequacy of Anthony Giddens notion of *reflexive modernization*.⁴⁷ Such a

⁴⁴ Staudenmaier, op.cit., ch.3.

⁴⁵ Hacking, op.cit., pp.220-232.

⁴⁶ Popper, Karl R. (1981) "Orakelfilosofien og opprøret mot fornuften" in *Fornuft og rimelighet som tenkemåte*, Dreyer, Oslo, p.270.

⁴⁷ Giddens, Anthony (1997) *Modernitetens konsekvenser*, Pax Forlag A/S, Oslo, p.33ff.

theory points to the fact that the process of modernization is characterized by constantly modernizing itself. As such, theories about reflexive modernization "are incarnated with the knowledge that the future can not be comprehended and remain in the conceptual framework of the past."⁴⁸

I believe it is fair to say that the traditional unproblematic distinction between science and technology certainly is blurred. Although the design/ambient aspect is mostly a technological problem it is very difficult, and I will suggest, to some degree pointless to try to decide where the *knowledge* ends and the *action* starts. Science and technology must be analysed as indispensable and interwoven parts of processes which can not be properly understood in terms of a model which holds these phenomena as strictly separated.

As previously noted, technocratic thoughts could originally legitimate themselves with the reference to a general conception of scientific knowledge as valueneutral and in some way residing beyond society. Despite the widespread and multi-disciplinary critique of both the applied-science model, the positivist concept of science and linear theories of modernization, it is not unfair to say that within technocratic thought these thoughts are influential even today. In theories of why the society should be guided by the experts with the best knowledge it is crucial to be able to define this best knowledge and distinguish between true and false. This gives technocratic thought a positivistic taint: All scientific knowledge is based on what can be observed, that which can not be observed and hence can not be properly tested is metaphysics, and must be discarded if we are to gain scientific knowledge of reality. As such, scientific positivism becomes a central concept within technocratic thoughts. Technocracy is most of all a pragmatic theory of how to run society. It can both be motivated as a means in a political struggle for power, as a means for bridging political gaps in periods of dispersion and crisis, or it can also, or simultaneously, be motivated by a solid faith in the advancement of mankind and history through scientific and technological development. Technocracy can thus be said to be interested in the

⁴⁸ Beck, op.cit., p.204. (my transl.) Beck argues further that reflexive modernization not only is a matter of 'selfreflected' modernization of the modern world in the meaning of conscious and intentional processes, but that it perhaps is even more a matter of the 'self-transformation' of industrial society through the unintended consequences related to side-effects of present individualization and globalization. In Beck's opinion this is the way industrial society has dissolved its own conceptual categories. (such as family, class, the nation state etc)(Op.cit., pp.205-206.)

instrumental aspects of science as far as it provides the objective knowledge base for technological utility. To summarize I think it is proper to evaluate the concept of technology within technocratic thought in general to be positivistic and in accordance with the applied science-model. Technology will then be both *artefacts* and *social practices* constructed on the basis of scientific knowledge and the *knowledge* of how to apply scientific knowledge in real life. Other artefacts, practices and knowledges thus have to subordinate to science in order to transcend its pre-rational character as a technology. It contains thus both a normative element; how things *ought* to be in order to work properly and a descriptive part of how modern technology *is* on the basis of a positivist conception of science and a linear understanding of modernization which can be submitted to planning.

CHAPTER 5.

The concept of science and technology within Opus Dei

Introduction

This chapter is as central to this thesis as it is ambitious. Hence I find it important to say something about what my intentions are and justify the organization of the chapter. It is no doubt whatsoever that a great number of people connected with Opus Dei played an important role in Spanish politics during the so called Spanish technocracy (1957-1973). As previously noted it is a great paradox that this strongly conservative Catholic lay organization became conducive to perhaps the most concentrated period of secularisation in modern Spanish history. I further think that the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei may illuminate how and why Opus Dei gained such influence in Spanish society during this period and why they were so receptive to foreign scientific and technological influence. All these matters are essential to have in mind in the following three chapters when I am to analyse the initial and fundamental project of the Spanish technocracy; the administrative reform.

In the first part of this chapter I will concretize the impact of Opus Dei on the technocratic period in general. By doing this I will qualify the relative importance of an investigation of this group's concept of science and technology. Further I will situate the Opus Dei within the Spanish historical context and clarify the origin and position of this lay-movement within Spanish Catholicism. In the continuance I will empirically analyse the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei. This analysis will rest upon studies of both the founding texts of the organization and sayings and works of the technocrats. None of the studies I have read deny the importance of central actors, and in particular they emphasize the central role played by Laureano López Rodó. When trying to capture the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei it also seems logical to evaluate how this was expressed within *The Higher Council for Scientific Research* (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, CSIC) which was strongly influenced by the Opus Dei, as well as to study views on science and technology as expressed in the appendix regarding these things in the *First Development Plan* (Primer Plan de Desarrollo) from 1964. I realize that one should be careful in judging both oral and written statements due to the censorship etc., but since science and technology surely were within Franco's 'zone of policy indifference' I think it is fair to judge statements on these subjects

as not being heavily affected by the fact that Spain was a dictatorship. (see pp.12-13) Having all this in mind when I selected the material for my investigations, I think I can claim to have gathered sufficiently relevant documents and testimonies regarding the subject I want to investigate. In the concluding part I will then try to extract what might be seen as the core elements of Opus Dei's concept of science and technology.

Opus Dei and the Spanish technocracy

The so called technocratic invasion in the government of 1957 alludes to the insurgence of persons affiliated to Opus Dei in key political positions both in government and in the development of the administrative reform the same year. In the new ministry there were two members of the Opus Dei; The *numerario* Alberto Ullastres in Commerce and the *supernumerario* Mariano Navarro Rubio in Treasury.¹ Furthermore the ministries of Industry, Public Works and Agriculture were held by Joaquin Planell, Cirilo Canovas and Jorge Vigón, all sympathisers with Opus Dei.² According to Ramon Tamames Opus Dei also had a director general in the Ministry of Information and under-secretaries and directors general in Public Works and Education in this first technocratic government.³ Last but not least, the architect behind the proposal which led to this change of government, the Technical Secretary General of the Governments Presidency, was Laureano López Rodó, a *numerario* of Opus Dei.

López Rodó elaborated the *law by decree* (decreto ley) of 25th of February 1957, which had as its prime objective to improve the co-ordination of the ministries by creating a new political level which he later was to preside over. The impact of this manoeuvre can be judged as drawing decision making power away from the political level within the ministries, towards the more 'technical' cadres of the public administration. He was also the man behind the law which initiated the administrative reform, *The State Administration's Jurisdictional law* (la Ley de régimen jurídico de la Administración del Estado) of 26 of July 1957. Hence he becomes *the* central person in the history of the administrative reform and as such, of this study. Joan Estruch says that; "[...] the quintessential technocrat was Laureano López Rodó, so much so that we in the end we do not know if it is because he is the one who best fits the definition or because the definition was

¹ Regarding the different categories of membership within Opus Dei see appendix.

² Artigues, Daniel (1971) *El Opus Dei en España*, Paris, p.185.

³ See Estruch, op.cit., p.223.

made in order to fit him."⁴ In the words of José Casanova; "No other person can be said to symbolize and represent the modernization of Spain [...] as well as López Rodó."⁵ He was later to become the Commissioner of the different (three in all) Development Plans between 1962 and 1973.

In the subsequent changes of government until 1973, Opus Dei were only to increase their influence.⁶ Ramon Tamames calls the government of 1969 "the monochromatic government" as he judges that eleven out of eighteen ministers were Opus Dei members. Although this number is contended by Hermet, who says it was 'only' seven out of eighteen, it is no doubt that Opus Dei made a strong impact on the governments during the so called technocratic period. In addition, Hermet says that the rest of the ministers were very close to Opus Dei.⁷ From 1957 on, Charles W. Anderson says, "The *Opus Dei* group of economic ministers[...] became the policy-makers or policy-initiators, the central actors, seizing the initiative for the design of measures."⁸ In the words of Richard Gunther: "[...] the Opus Dei technocrats [...] dominated the economic ministries of the Spanish government between 1958 and 1973."⁹ Finally it is interesting to note that *The Economist* referred to the political role of this group fairly often in the 1960's and 70's and insisted on calling its members *Opusdeistas* as if they constituted a political party.¹⁰

Several observers have judged Opus Dei to have been fairly successful in influencing the intellectual elite of Spanish society during the franquist era.¹¹ The single most important institution affecting science and technology during this period was the Higher Council for Scientific Research, CSIC, created in 1939 with the aim to organize the reconstruction of a potent scientific community in the country after the Civil War. The general secretary of CSIC, from its creation in 1939 to his death in 1966, was José María Albareda, an intimate friend of Escrivá de Balaguer, the founder of Opus Dei, and a prominent member of the organization. He is considered to have had an immense influence on the work and priorities within the council.¹² Casanova says that "[...] the CSIC soon became

⁴ Op.cit., p.227.

⁵ Casanova, op.cit., p.282.

⁶ Artigues, op.cit., p.216.

⁷ See Estruch, op.cit., pp.223-224.

⁸ Anderson, op.cit., p.113.

⁹ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.66.

¹⁰ Walsh, Michael (1989) *The secret world of Opus Dei*, Grafton Books, London-Glasgow-Toronto-Sydney-Auckland, p.11.

¹¹ E.g. Sanz Menéndez, Luis (1995) *La construcción institucional de la política científica y tecnológica en el franquismo*, Working Document 95-13, CSIC (IESA), Madrid and Artigues (1971), op.cit.

¹² Artigues, op.cit., p.47.

the main platform for the Opus Dei expansion. It served as an employment agency for Opus Dei members, a platform for what has been called 'the Opus Dei conquest of university positions [...]'.¹³ It has been estimated that Opus Dei by 1950 held anywhere from 20% to 25% of all the tenured university positions.¹⁴ Although it is evident that persons with different ideological and religious affiliations held important positions within CSIC, there seems to have been no other political-ideological group in Spain with an influence as strong on the CSIC as Opus Dei. A demonstration of this influence could be the fact that the official journal of CSIC, *Arbor*, originated in 1943 as an Opus Dei-edited journal on matters of culture and ideas as a counterweight to the falangist journal *Escorial* which originated two years earlier. After a short period of initial Opus Dei autonomy it soon became the bimonthly publication of CSIC, but the journal remained highly influenced by Opus Dei. *Arbor* is characterized by being occupied with a unifying concept of science based on Catholic values.¹⁵ Sanz Menéndez puts it this way:

" By the mid 60's the men associated with Opus Dei were in the most central positions regarding Spanish science and technology.[...] therefore one can suggest that the relations between the members of this organisation has to be in the centre of an explication of scientific policy during these years."¹⁶

For this study, the milieu around CSIC is very relevant, because as Michael Walsh puts it: "It was the group of Opus intellectuals round *Arbor*, round the CSIC in general, and around Rialp, the Opus publishing house founded in 1947 [...] which became prominent in Spanish politics."¹⁷

Nevertheless, it is important to note that I do not consider Opus Dei-members participation in late-franquist policy-making as a monolithic unity, nor do I equal the term technocracy with their presence. Opus Dei spokesmen have always tried to downplay the role of their organisation in Spain's political life, stating that *La Obra*¹⁸ is merely a matter of moral and religious conviction and has nothing to do with the political creeds or affiliations of its members.¹⁹ One can add that they were justified in defending themselves because the accusations have been

¹³ Casanova, op.cit., p.235. The expression is Artigues'.

¹⁴ Casanova, op.cit., pp.238-239.

¹⁵ Artigues, op.cit., p.51-52.

¹⁶ Sanz Menéndez, op.cit., p.19. (my transl.)

¹⁷ Walsh, op.cit., p.132.

¹⁸ Opus Dei in Spanish translation: "La obra de Dios".

¹⁹ Estruch, op.cit., pp.224-225.

frequent and harsh and often influenced by a *hermeneutics of suspicion* against which it is almost impossible to defend oneself. However, Opus Dei is, as noted in chapter three, surrounded by a certain secrecy and mystique (or 'discretion' in Opus Dei parlance) and there is no membership register available. As such, they are in some way themselves to blame for being accused of conspiracy etc. To prevent such accusations Opus Deists have frequently stressed the political disagreement between prominent members, although these discrepancies might seem somewhat exaggerated and not dealing with very fundamental issues.²⁰ Be that as it may, it is clear that a highly disproportional number of Opus Dei members or sympathisers have played key political roles in the period we are dealing with. I do agree with Casanova when he says: "It is my claim, however, that all Opus Dei ministers and their technocratic associates formed a coherent political group with an overall end in common, that of the rationalization of the Spanish economy through internal liberalization, the integration of the Spanish economy in the capitalist world economy, and the rationalization of the Spanish administration."²¹ In addition, when studying the founding texts of the organisation there are obvious signs of recommendations for the members duty in society, and in particular regarding their professional role. Furthermore, in 1977, when asked about the influence of Opus Dei on Spanish society, Escrivá de Balaguer said:

"Anything that sound as self-advertisement profoundly annoys me. But I think that to fail to acknowledge the real influence which the Opus Dei has upon Spanish society would be a sign not of humility but rather of blindness and ingratitude towards the Lord who so generously blesses our work."²²

Thus, one do not have to consider the Opus Dei as a 'monolithic unity' or a 'political party' in order to recognize the fact that its members played significant roles within Spanish political life during the period I am studying. Because of this Opus Dei deserves special attention.

Sole Tura wisely advises us in his article, *Los tecnócratas en la encrucijada*, that we must not use the term 'technocrat' uncritically. In the contemporary late-franquist Spanish society *technocracy* was a fashionable term used to label whatever tendency and whatever person who was judged to be a part of or

²⁰ Anderson, op.cit., p.109.

²¹ Casanova, op.cit., p.104.

²² Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.90.

advocate the "ongoing technological revolution".²³ López Rodó told me that the label *technocrat* was foremost used by the falangists of "whom *we* suppressed from political positions. They were the *políticos* and we were the technocrats. This is as simplistic as saying that science is organic chemistry and the rest is poetry".²⁴ López Rodó has characterized himself as a technocrat in the meaning "a politician who is in possession of a university degree or a professional qualification, and who is concerned with politics of *realities*."²⁵ It could be added that such a characterization would also apply to politicians of a far less technocratic orientation than López Rodó, as it misses out on qualifying politicians who advocate that political decisions themselves must be scientifically or technologically made. José Casanova says that;

"The technocrats were first and foremost López Rodó, Navarro Rubio, Ullastres and all their collaborators. Finally, all those holding administrative positions within the government who identified their ideal and material interests with the technocratic policies, that is, all those who wanted to build a modern technocratic administration."²⁶

As noted in the previous chapter I think that whether an administration is to be regarded as technocratic or not resides precisely in its political impulse. I believe there are no such thing as a *pure technocracy*, as a representation of a way of doing politics beyond, or outside politics. Technocracy is a way of making politics. Thus, in this work I will use the term *technocracy* and *technocrat* alluding to persons who represented a mentality clearly present in the policy-making of this period; a will to apply what was presented as purely technical solutions to political problems. In the essence of a technocratic notion of the relation between science/technology and politics lies the concept of science and technology as such. Because such a great number of the people who advocated a technocratic view were closely connected to *La Obra* it thus becomes imperative to investigate the Opus Dei concept of science and technology.

²³ Solé-Tura, op.cit., p.181.

²⁴ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July, 1996.

²⁵ López Rodó, Laureano (1971) *Política y Desarrollo*, Aguilar, Madrid, p.447. (my transl. and italics)

²⁶ Casanova, op.cit., p.299.

A Catholic answer to modernity

It is said that the greatest miracle about Opus Dei is that it originated in Spain.²⁷ Being the stronghold of Catholicism, following a different path than other western European countries from the middle-ages, it has been quite common to say that "Spain is different". This difference has manifested itself through the fact that Spain until quite recently might be considered to contain many of the characteristics of a feudal society, degrading the value of work and business and emphasising nobleness and honour as the most important virtues of life.²⁸

In order to properly understand the origin of Opus Dei we have to be aware of the historical context from which it arose. It was created in the late 1920's by the young priest and student of civil law, Josemaria Escrivá de Balaguer.²⁹ This was an age of great turmoil and uncertainty, and most western European countries were struggling with problems of how to direct politics in a world which was changing ever faster. Oswald Spengler to a strong degree caught the spirit of the day in his *Untergang des Abendlandes* where he analysed the era to be the end of the European cultural and economic domination of the world. The 19th century liberal paradigm had been discredited through a world war and a following recession in the world economy. More or less authoritative answers to these problems gave birth to both communism in Russia and fascism in Italy. As exposed in the previous chapter, in other European countries and the United States, science and technology became core elements in technocratically inspired programs for state control and intervention.

Historically, Catholicism had found no offensive answer to the problems related to the development of modern industrial society. The Catholic reaction tended rather to be defensive, to turn away from the modern world and label it heretic

²⁷ Opus Dei was from the outset in the late 1920's and throughout most of the 1930's almost a sectarian society, or what Casanova calls a "family enterprise" centred around the millieu at the University of Madrid. (Casanova, op.cit., pp. 146-160) Estruch divides the history of Opus Dei into three stages; the founding period (1928-1936), the stage of implementation of Opus Dei in Spain (1936/39-1946) and the phase of expansion after 1946. (Estruch, op.cit., p.8) Because no membership register is available it is very difficult to estimate the number of people associated with the organization. However, Opus Dei claimed to have 60 000 members worldwide in 1975 (Casanova, op.cit., p.208) and 70 000 in 1982. (Walsh, op.cit., p.15) In 1970, the Spanish newspaper *ABC*, suggested that it was 37 000 Opus Dei members in Spain. (Artigues, op.cit., p.215) Knowing that the great majority of the totality of the members are to be found in Spain, I think it is reasonable to suggest that the number presented *ABC* is fairly accurate. I thus think it is reasonable to say that by the end of the franquist era there were about 40 000 Opus Dei members in the country.

²⁸ Moya, op.cit., pp.100-102.

²⁹ In the official Opus Dei version, Escrivá de Balaguer is said to have experienced a revelation in 1928 at the age of 26, where God told him to create Opus Dei.

and things worse. As such, a great part of the strongly Catholic Spain had no other answer to the problems of the time but to long for the 'golden age' of the empire and as such expressing a fierce anti-modernism. Casanova says: "Throughout the 19th century, Catholic moralist and social thinkers had tried unsuccessfully to adapt medieval and corporatist principles to capitalist social relations."³⁰ The non-Catholic parts of Spain was proportionally offensive in their pro-modernizing attitude. Thus, at the beginning of the II republic from 1931, the president, Azaña, could proclaim that "Spain has ceased to be Catholic."³¹ Thus, as Casanova writes: "The republic for [most Catholics] was not merely a form of government; it was a model of the good society, which was antithetical to the Catholic model."³²

For the young Escrivá de Balaguer it was essential to find an active Catholic response to the problems of the modern age, in order to prevent the secularization of society. Still in the words of Casanova:

"Opus Dei saw in the 19th century primarily three related heresies - liberalism, laicism and godless secularism - and three movement organizations representing these heresies - Masonry, the I.L.E. (Institución Libre de Enseñansa) [i.e. The Institute for Free Education] and Socialism. [...] The Opus Dei realized, at least uncontentiously, that the religious-like character taken by these three secular heresies in Spain was in large part due to the extreme otherworldly character of Spanish Catholicism and its fanatical resistance to anything modern.³³ [...] In this sense, Opus Dei was formed as a militant religious order which would first oppose the laicism of the I.L.E and other 19th century heresies and which would, furthermore, offer a Catholic answer to the problems raised by these heretical movements. [...] Escrivá, like Luther, broke the walls of the monastery and the world itself became a monastery for ascetic virtuosi."³⁴

This is the context we have to have in mind when we are to understand the role of Opus Dei within Spanish society: It was from the very start fundamentally a

³⁰ Casanova, op.cit., p.377.

³¹ Op.cit., p.148.

³² Ibid. This has to be modified somewhat. As Casanova himself writes: "There were small but significant groups in favour of the republic, such as the group of intellectuals around the journal *Cruz y Raya*, politicians like Gabriel Maura and Alcala Zamora, President of the republic, the left wing of the C.E.D.A. led by Gimenez Fernandez and Catalan and Basque Catholics." (op.cit., p.212, footnote 26) It can be added that the Basque and Catalan Catholics most likely were in favour of the republic as it had conceded a great deal of autonomy to these regions, and this question has always been important for the Basque and Catalan clergy.

³³ Op.cit., pp.151-152.

³⁴ Op.cit., p.155.

movement which aimed at getting a Catholic upper hand in dealing with the problems of the inter-war period. In this project it was essential to find a fusion between religion and the world. After having read Max Weber and been in the United States, one of Escrivá's most influential inspirators and later Opus Dei member, Ramiro de Maeztu, wrote:

"The elements from which a saving synthesis of economy and religion could emerge, do already exist in Hispanic countries. Two Basques, Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the society of Jesus, and Peñaflores, the founder of the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, point toward a solution. While Loyola created the most formidable machinery to send souls to heaven, Peñaflores created the most efficient organization, at least of those invented in Spain, to improve the world. We should ask ourselves whether the fate of our century may not lie in searching for a way to fuse Loyola and Peñaflores, the ultra-mundane and the earth, religion and economy, until we come to think of worldly improvement as God's work and of the work of God as the improvement of the world."³⁵

According to Maeztu it was crucial that Spain could overcome its indifference with respect to prosperity and efficiency, and he suggested that there was nothing inherent in Catholicism that obstructed this. In this intellectual's opinion, the economic resurgence of the Latin countries had to pay the price of a reevaluation of the role of money and business.³⁶ In this reevaluation the notion of *professionalism* became the key concept. The ecclesiastic, Angel Sagaraminaga wrote in 1945 that "[...] because the specific aims of [Opus Dei's] apostology is the professional life, [...] this apostology will penetrate the intellectual sectors of all countries."³⁷ In his biography of Franco, Brian Crozier writes that; "Opus Dei teaches a philosophy of success which is not very Spanish, offering the alternative of hard work in place of the passive acceptance of the will of God."³⁸ The emphasis on professionalism within *La Obra* must be understood as an intent to accentuate the traditional Spanish catholic values by capturing the intellectual elite. This project became more viable as a great part of this elite was killed or went into exile during the Civil War. After the war, Spain was virtually confronted with the task of reconstructing an intellectual elite. For Opus Dei this was to be done by inspiring this elite with the moral values of the order, and the final objective would be that these values would guide the work of the

intellectual elite, or put in other words, that the scientific and technological community would work in the interest of a great and integrated catholic society. In 1941 López Rodó met Escrivá de Balaguer, the founder of Opus Dei, and he tells that ;

"He inspired me to live in fulfilment of Christian virtues, but in the world, without abandoning my habitual occupations; for the moment, through intensive studies which I offered to God; and later on through the conscious execution of the profession which I deliberately elected. He told me of Opus Dei[...] and the duty of the members to search for the union with God in their ordinary work."³⁹

It is nevertheless important to note that this work is not all that "ordinary"; To be a *numerario*, which is the highest category within the order, you have to be in possession of a university degree corresponding to a doctorate.⁴⁰ I further think that Antonio Fontan's description of how his friend, Pérez Embid, converted to Opus Dei can give us a fairly good idea of the position of Opus Dei within Spanish Catholicism and of the mission it was professing:

"Following his first conversation with Escrivá, Pérez Embid began to gather more information about the Opus Dei, as a result of which he gained a greater appreciation of the Institute. That same year, in 1943, he joined the Opus Dei and his personal relationship with the Founder served as an inspirational source for his Christian life, imbuing it with a spirit which could direct all his work. He had always been a good Christian, with a sound formation and firmly established convictions. He was a man of faith, who practised his religion without any sanctimoniousness. In the early 1940's, although most of our friends were practising Catholics, we would rarely discuss religious themes, and if we did, then it was from a merely historic-cultural or sociological perspective. *Our Christianity was taken for granted.* [...] But the commitment to Opus Dei was something very new and very different for him. *For the first time, his spiritual life, his professional work and social activities [...] all acquired an integrated coherence, nourished by a single common source - the deep conviction that all aspects of life are permeated and energized with the transcendental insight that human work is the way to absolute self-fulfilment, all along living the simple life of an ordinary Christian, as a son of God and as a loyal son of the Catholic Church.*"⁴¹

³⁵ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.440.

³⁶ Artigues, p.193.

³⁷ Op.cit., p.40. (my transl.)

³⁸ Cited from Estruch, op.cit., p.220.

³⁹ López Rodó (1990), op.cit., p. 23. (my transl.)

⁴⁰ Artigues, op.cit., p.77.

⁴¹ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., pp.177-178. (my italics)

It is important to note that Opus Dei's concept of work as a means to reach both personal fulfilment and 'the good society', did leave space for modern science and technology. Or better; it did not only leave space for it, but through the professional ethic of the order, it made it an essential element in their strategy for reaching this 'good society'. Thus, Casanova writes: "Opus Dei introduced for the first time in the history of Catholic Spain the typical Protestant notion of the sanctification of work in the world through the professional 'vocation'."⁴² For this reason I will now turn to an analysis of the professional ethic of Opus Dei and their concept of science and technology.

The professional ethic of Opus Dei

The two 'founding texts' of Opus Dei are *Consideraciones Espirituales* (Spiritual Considerations) from 1934 and *Camino* (The Way) from 1939. Both are written by Escrivá de Balaguer and contain respectively 500 and 999 maxims, or rules of life, which should guide the conduct of all members of Opus Dei. *The Way* comprises most of the maxims from *Spiritual Considerations* and can as such be seen as an indispensable manual for Opus Dei, not only in the initial stage of the inter-war and immediate post-war period, but even today. Apart from these texts there exists two Constitutions of the order, which are not made public. In my analysis of the professional ethic and concept of science and technology within Opus Dei I find it important to investigate how these things are expressed within these texts.

First of all it is important to note the elitist character of Opus Dei. From the very start *La obra* should work for a reorientation and capturing of the intellectual elite, so that the ethic of Opus Dei would guide the work of these intellectuals when reaching influential positions within society. In a letter from 1934 to the vicar of the Madrid Diocese, Francisco Moran, Escrivá characterized his activities as a 'sacerdotal apostolate among intellectuals'.⁴³ In the Opus Dei constitution of 1950 it is stated that the organization's activity should be directed toward "the intellectuals and the leadership part of society." Today the Statutes have changed this to "persons of every condition, and principally the so-called intellectuals."⁴⁴ The former Opus Dei member, Alberto Moncada says that Opus Dei always has

⁴² Op.cit., p.5.

⁴³ Casanova, op.cit., p.159.

⁴⁴ Estruch, op.cit., p.250.

had an explicit intention to form 'the aristocracy of the intelligentsia'.⁴⁵ In the words of Joan Estruch, referring to the Weberian notion of the *Virtuosethic* of the Puritans: "Especially in the early years of its development, the years of the gestation of its ideology, Opus Dei - then focused exclusively on the apostolate among intellectuals and academics - elaborated a *Virtuosethik*."⁴⁶ Escrivá de Balaguer often told that he had spent most of his life in and around universities,⁴⁷ and it has been suggested that he once considered calling the organisation *Society for Intellectual Co-operation* (Sociedad de Cooperacion Intelectual).⁴⁸ In the context of this study, which deals with the administrative reform from 1957 on, it is very important to pay attention to the content of §202 of the 1950 constitution: "Public offices, and especially those which involve management, are the institute's particular means of its apostolate."⁴⁹

The intellectuals of Opus Dei should work in the world for the improvement of material life, as this was seen as a prerequisite for the creation of a great, homogeneous and integrated Catholic society, and as such the most noble apostolate. Confronting this innerworldly notion of the apostolate within Opus Dei with the traditional Catholic apostolate of charity to the poor, Ramiro de Maeztu wrote:

"My ideal would be to increase the number, in the Spanish-speaking countries, of captains of industry, model agriculturists, great bankers, men of business [...] It is much more difficult to carry on a business that creates wealth than it is to distribute our fortune among the poor and go into a monastery. The latter requires nothing but abnegation, courage and charity. The former requires the same courage, because one risks one's fortune in business; it requires more abnegation, because business is not content to ask for the sacrifice of the moment, but requires the sacrifice of a whole life of work, and although it does not seem to require as much charity, in reality it gives much more, because the poor to whom one gives charity continue to be poor after they receive it, while the people occupied in business are ennobled by work, apart from finding a way to improve their position. [...] In the roots of economic life one always finds the moral. The economy is spirit. Money is spirit."⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.92.

⁴⁶ Estruch, op.cit., p.243.

⁴⁷ Walsh, op.cit., p.121.

⁴⁸ Op.cit., p.11.

⁴⁹ Op.cit., p.144.

⁵⁰ Estruch, op.cit., p.231.

The pragmatic and worldly characteristics of the Opus Dei ethic is illuminated by Estruch when saying: "[...] Opus Dei asceticism tends [...] to conceive of work as a collaboration in the establishment or the implementation of the Kingdom [of God] as a reality in this world - present not future."⁵¹ Just like the Calvinist ethic, the Opus Dei ethic of the value of work in this world, is strengthened by the fact that it makes a deed out of self-interest. With Bourdieu one could say that the conduct of the Opus Deists is decided by a 'dual decided ideology'.⁵² On the one hand you are improving the situation of other people guided by an altruistic ideology while you on the other hand can promote your own personal success. Within Opus Dei it is however clear that the official version emphasises the first aspect of this dual decision. Héctor Reynal, an Opus Dei priest, says: "That was one of the things that Msgr. Escrivá wanted to inoculate in the minds of many: that it is not good to give up the fight, that one has to try to stand out, excel, be successful. Not for selfish reasons, but because in this way one can spread the evangelical word further."⁵³

The notion that all members should be instruments for the expansion and impact of Opus Dei is a salient theme within *The Way*:

"[...]Your duty is to be an instrument." "[...] Be an instrument to find instruments!" "Proselitism. - Who will not perpetuate his apostolate?" "If you hold an official post, you have both rights originating in this position and some duties. You leave the apostolic road if [...] you leave unfulfilled the duties of the position. This is because you will loose the professional prestige, which is precisely your 'bait' to capture men." "Among your own - you apostolic spirit - you are like a rock thrown in the lake. - With your example and your word you cause the first circle... and this cause another one...and another...All the time wider and wider. Do you now understand the greatness of your mission?"⁵⁴

In the words of Joan Estruch:

"These 'select few', or 'virtuosi', are at the same time active individuals who have accepted a mission, who feel they have been called and that they must respond to this call [...]. They are instruments at the disposition of the divine, rather than

⁵¹ Op. cit., p.245.

⁵² From Gemzell, Carl Axel (1989) *Om politikens föroretenskapligande och vetenskapens politisering*, Copenhagen, part I, p.96.

⁵³ Cited from Estruch, op.cit.,p.240.

⁵⁴ Escrivá de Balaguer, Josemaria (1965)*Camino* (The Way), 23 ed., castellana, Madrid. Maximes 484,803, 809, 372 and 831. (my transl.)

receptacles of divine grace; that is to say, their religiosity has a much more ascetic than mystical orientation.[...] And when one has effectively managed to 'excel and stand out' one sees the success achieved as confirmation or proof - the *Bewährung* of Weber's Puritans - or the fact of having been chosen."⁵⁵

I believe it is important to focus on the notion of work in this world within the Opus Dei ethic. This gives the order a worldly character which radically brake with traditional Catholicism. Casanova says that:

"The Opus Dei God was a creator whose model of action was understood in terms of labour processes. He 'worked' and manifested himself in 'His works'. He never spoke, he had no other language but work, nor did he enter a process of interaction. He was not the biblical God who entered a contractual relation with His people. Nor was He the God who acts and intervenes in human history through miraculous events and heroic deeds. In the Opus Dei conception, man was created in the image of this God, or to paraphrase Feuerbach, one could say that the Opus Dei God was created in the image of the Opus Dei man. For the Opus Dei the essence of man was work, the ultimate reason for man's 'being in the world'.⁵⁶

Peter Berglar, himself an Opus Deist and the 'official' historian of Opus Dei, writes that Escrivá's message assumes 'the beginning of a new era in Christian Life'. Berglar explains this:

"Without being worldly, we are children of God in this world; we are to love the world as a *work of God* [Opus Dei], and to work in it as his collaborators, but without wanting to possess the fruits of this work, which we will offer to the Lord of the earth, to the *divine entrepreneur* (my italics)."⁵⁷

Escrivá himself says that: "To be holy means to sanctify work itself, to sanctify oneself in work, and to sanctify others with work."⁵⁸ To sum up this part I will stress the following points: 1) Opus Dei was from the very start directed toward the intellectual echelons of society, and as such very elitistic. 2) This elite should work for an improvement of material life in this world and regard 'money as spirit'. 3) Members of Opus Dei should consider themselves as God's instruments and collaborators, and should as such fulfil the Father's creation, the

⁵⁵ Estruch, op.cit., p.243.

⁵⁶ Casanova, op.cit., pp.455-456.

⁵⁷ Cited from Estruch, op.cit., p.256.

⁵⁸ Estruch, op.cit., p.245.

work of God, or in Latin *Opus Dei*. 4) At the essence of all this lies the conception of a sanctification of work itself, which becomes the means to do the proper apostolate. The perfection of the work of the *Opus Dei* intellectual elite requires study. This brings us to the concept of science and technology within *Opus Dei*.

Scientific and technological studies as apostolic instruments

In *The Way* there are numerous references to the importance of study for the members of *Opus Dei*:

"We will never forgive the one who has got an opportunity to be wise and do not use it." "If you pray, are humble and do your apostolate in a million ways..., but do not study. - You are no good if you do not change. The study, for whatever profession, is a serious obligation among us." "[...] an hour of study, for the modern apostle, is like an hour of prayer." "If you are to serve God by your intelligence, study is a serious obligation." "If you keep repeating the sacraments, keep praying and being chaste - and you are not studying.....- Don't tell me you are good: then you are only just." "Study, - Study with fervour. - If you are to be the salt and the light, you need science, skills" (This maxim refers to Matthew V13-16 where Jesus addresses his disciples. The metaphors used must be understood as the *conserving salt* and the *guiding light*)⁵⁹

As such professional science-based studies should give both personal success and be the most powerful means for fulfilling the over all apostolate; the creation of the reign of Christ on earth:

"Student: Educate yourself with solid and active piety, excel in the studies, have a burning wish for your professional apostolate. - And I promise you, with the strength of your religious and scientific education, fast and never ending expansions." "For Christ to reign in the world there must be some people who, with their eyes fixed on heaven, seek to acquire prestige in all human activities, so that they can carry out quietly - and effectively - an apostolate within their professions." "Has it ever occurred to you how absurd it is to stop being a Catholic when you enter the university or the professional association or the parliament, as if you left your hat at the door." "Give a supernatural motive to your professional work, and you have sanctified it." "[...] in the professional sphere, never praise the science of whom use it to attack the Church."⁶⁰

I believe maxim no.338 gives us the ultimate reason for all the preoccupation of *Opus Dei* with modern science and technology: "[...] Today, with the extension and intensity of the modern science, it is necessary that we divide our work to defend the Church on all scientific areas."⁶¹ Science and technology were as such not to be instruments for search of truth in itself but was rather conceived of as means to prevent the secularization of society. Thus, it is reasonable to say that modern science and technology acquires a central position within *Opus Dei* purely on theological grounds.

Further, the use of science and technology for a supernatural and religious end should be conducted with discretion:

"Be slow to reveal the intimate details of your apostolate. Don't you see that the world in its selfishness will fail to understand?" "How fruitful is silence! All the energy you lose through your failures in discretion is energy taken from the effectiveness of your work. Be discreet." "You want to be a martyr. - I will give you a martyrdom within reach: be an apostle without calling you apostle, be a missionary - with a mission - without calling you a missionary, be a man of the heaven and act like a man of the world. Pass unnoticed!"⁶²

Each member of *Opus Dei* has got his or her own *Opus Dei* priest as a spiritual advisor. Thus the professional life of the members is strictly controlled by the organization as not to diverge from the over all ends of the organization: "You - you think - have got a lot of personality: your studies - your research - your publications - [...] your political actions - the posts you hold [...] You are no longer a child!... Precisely because of all this you need more than anyone a spiritual guide." "Hierarchy, - every piece in its proper place."⁶³

Thus, two more aspects of the concept of science and technology within *Opus Dei* can be read out of the maxims in *The Way*: Discretion regarding the ultimate end of their professional mission, i.e. discretion regarding the axiology of their science and technology, and the obligation to let their work be controlled by a spiritual guide. I think the maxims exposed clearly show that science and technology had a central position within *Opus Dei* from the start: Science and technology were the means by which *Opus Deists* would reach influential positions in society. From these positions they would work discretely for the

⁵⁹ *Camino*. Maximes n. 332,334, 335, 336, 337 and 340. (my transl.)
⁶⁰ *Op.cit.*, maximes n.346, 347, 353, 359 and 836. (my transl.)

⁶¹ *Op.cit.*, maxim n.338. (my transl.)
⁶² *Op.cit.*, maximes 643, 645 and 848. (my transl.)
⁶³ *Op.cit.*, maximes 63 and 624. (my transl.)

religious ends of the order, a work which should be controlled by, if not the Opus Dei as a monolithic organization, at least by the Opus Dei ethic.

As noted earlier in this chapter, The Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) was strongly influenced by Opus Dei. First and foremost it was so by José Albareda, the leader of CSIC for almost all of the franquist period. I believe his view on science and technology can further illuminate the concept of these phenomena within Opus Dei. In 1951 he stated:

"There was a time when the researcher was an isolated, creative and independent worker. This inclination toward individualism and originality has been undergoing a process of 'proffessionalization.' The team succeeds the individual, regulation replaces the freedom of the creative mind, the working-day supplants the obsessive hobby, the vocation becomes the profession."⁶⁴

José Casanova comments:

"The work of the CSIC was to be based upon the restoration of the traditional Christian unity of all the sciences, a unity which Albareda believed had been destroyed during the 18th century Enlightenment. The tree of science, Arbor, became the emblem of the CSIC, symbolizing the restored organic unity of all knowledge.[...] Albareda took the Royal Society of London as his model of a research institution.[...] One finds in Albareda's writings many of the notions which also appeared in Puritanism: The 'Book of Nature' conceived as the revelation of divine truth; the notion of scientific vocation as the highest religious calling; a certain disdain for speculative thinking and theory, coupled with an emphasis on the empirical and applied sciences; a rejection of the breadth of interest characteristic of Renaissance and Encyclopaedic man on the grounds that it leads to inefficient dispersion, along with a preference for narrow scientific specialization; the view of science as a collective, accumulative task of humble and modest contributions; the emphasis on systematic, sustained and methodical work as the highest virtue of the scientist.[...] Antonio Fontan, a fellow Opus Dei member, criticized the work of the CSIC for having dedicated most of its resources to the natural and the pure sciences, neglecting 'the sciences of the spirit'.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.246.

⁶⁵ Op.cit., pp.242-243. (my italics)

Having in mind the characteristics of scientific positivism explored in the previous chapter, I believe this suggests that the work of CSIC was highly inspired by a positivist and instrumental concept of science and technology: The insistence on the unity of all sciences, an emphasis on the natural and applied sciences coupled with a disdain for speculative thinking and theory are strong indicators of this. Such an instrumental and positivistic concept of science and technology suits well the picture of science and technology as exposed in *The Way*. Within Opus Dei the ends were given and not open for discussion. Science and technology were only means to reach the unquestionable ends. As Casanova says: "A spirit which takes the ends for granted, accepting them as unquestioned permanent principles, is naturally inimical to intellectual, substantial or value rationalization." ⁶⁶ The ex-Opus Deist, Alberto Moncada, stated in 1977: "Do you know of any serious intellectual within Opus Dei? There are rather good professionals, physicians, lawyers, architects, bureaucrats. But the philosophers, poets and humanists have either left or, if still remaining, have been emasculated by self-censorship."⁶⁷

From what has been exposed in this chapter, there are some striking similarities between Weber's Puritans and the Opus Dei. The innerworldly asceticism and the preoccupation with work in this world are fundamentally religiously motivated within both groups. An Opus Dei professor with whom I have spoken characterized Opus Dei, somewhat cheerfully, as the 'Calvinists of Catholicism' and there surely is a lot of truth in this characterization. There are nevertheless important differences. The Protestant pietism may be said to be preoccupied with each individual's personal relation to God, and according to Max Weber's theory of the relationship between Protestant ethic and the growth of capitalism one could say that each individuals ethically embedded administration of worldly possessions has brought about the development of capitalist society. Within Opus Dei it seems rather that it is the apostolic task of the intellectual elite to prepare the ground for worldly prosperity in order to create or maintain a homogeneous catholic society, based on traditional Catholic thoughts of a hierarchical but integrated Christian society.

⁶⁶ Op.cit., p.245.

⁶⁷ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.369. It can be noted that the instrumental concept of science and technology seem to persist among Opus Dei members. On a TV documentary about Opus Dei in 1995, a heart surgeon and a *supernumerario* of Opus Dei, motivated his view on the use of contraceptives by saying: "There is a list of numerous natural methods, because the woman is a well constructed machine. We know her physiology quite well, and it's possible to handle it in a way which is quite satisfactory to the consumer." (In the *Talking Heads* documentary series on Finnish TV1, 7th of November 1995.)

Based on the previous analysis it is not unfair to somewhat schematically characterize the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei as rather pragmatic and instrumentalist. One had a vision of a unity of science inspired by Catholic Christianity where the unified Catholic nation is the final goal. Furthermore I believe that the emphasis on the apostolic mission of the intellectual elite can be judged as being highly compatible with a technocratic rule of society. Nevertheless, the analysis made so far has to be complemented with empirical investigations from the technocratic period in order to be properly qualified. In the following pages I will therefore investigate the concept of science and technology as exposed by central Opus Dei technocrats during my period, and how these things were dealt with in CSIC during a conference in 1964 and in the Development Plan from the same year. By doing this it is possible to strengthen my analysis of the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei.

What the technocrats said

Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora:

The best known and most clear-cut expression of the technocrats' concept of science and technology is most probably found in Gonzalo Fernández de la Mora's *El crepúsculo de las ideologías* (The twilight of ideology) first published in 1965. Fernández de La Mora was minister of Public Works from 1969 to 1972, member of Opus Dei and a close collaborator of López Rodó in the preparation of the *Ley Orgánica del Estado* (i.e. the constitutional laws which were presented as the institutionalisation of Franquism).⁶⁸ This book can be considered as a justification of the works of the technocrats and evoked many reactions in Spanish society, maybe foremost because he characterizes Spaniards in general as irrationalists and that he presented an apology for the governing ideology in, what Tuñón de Lara describes as a 'crude' manner.⁶⁹

He suggests that what is needed in Spain is a kind of *priesthood of rationality*⁷⁰ and this sounds curiously familiar with Saint-Simon's plea for the *sociocracy* as the new religion of mankind. In general he counterposes science vs. ideologies which he characterizes as "mere pragmatic ideas, political, vulgar, elementary, inconcrete, dogmatic and utopian"⁷¹ and we can hear the echo from the

⁶⁸ López Rodó (1990), op.cit., p.7.

⁶⁹ Biescas/Tuñón de Lara, op.cit., p.389.

⁷⁰ Fernández de la Mora, Gonzalo (1986) *El crepúsculo de las ideologías*, Editorial Espasa-Calpe, S.A., Madrid, p.25.

⁷¹ Op.cit., p.63. (my transl.)

technocratic conviction that politics is nothing more than "parochial interests and untutored value preferences of politicians". His analysis of the political development of western society is that it has evolved from a period of pure ideological struggle, but that the present tendency is that the "left is turning port and the right starboard", towards a pure technification of politics.⁷² As for the relationship between science and politics, he says that "science is in the foundations of today's politics"⁷³ and that the increased complexity of society requires specialization and the use of experts in the public administration of all western countries;⁷⁴ "Innumerable political-administrative problems have only one proper solution: The one[...] demanded by physicalmathematical and sociological laws"⁷⁵ He says that the art of governance is being technified through the science of governance.⁷⁶ In other words that governance is nothing more than the application of the science of governance. He explains the use of science and technology in the economic development plans in this way: "Economy is a highly elaborated science. Market studies is another science. And the creation of wealth is application of pure science."⁷⁷

The positivistic taint is quite clear when he says; "All knowledge about nature that is not science is superstition, and all knowledge about the soul that is not philosophy is counterfeit", and later on "we must eliminate the seeds of confusion; we need doctors not quacks, engineers not fixers, experts not ideologues."⁷⁸ Implicitly he is stating that by use of scientific and technological expertise we eliminate confusion and gain *certainty*. The creed in the unity of science is reflected when he states that "The scientific treatment of human conduct was born with empirical sociology and psychology [...] which systematically applies the positive method formerly reserved for the nature."⁷⁹ He does not see this as conflicting with his religious beliefs which he describes as "superrational" and not a part of the domain of human reason.⁸⁰ He justifies his general creed in science and technology by saying: "Reason is the most noble terrestrial instrument [given by God], science is the product of reason and technology is applied science."⁸¹ I think the following citation gives us a good

⁷² Op.cit., p.17.

⁷³ Op.cit., p.138. (my transl.)

⁷⁴ Op.cit., p.142.

⁷⁵ Op.cit., p.136. (my transl.)

⁷⁶ Op.cit., p.15.

⁷⁷ Op.cit., p.131. (my transl.)

⁷⁸ Op.cit., p.26-27. (my transl. and italics)

⁷⁹ Op.cit., p.133.

⁸⁰ Op.cit., p.66.

⁸¹ Op.cit., p. 179. (my transl.)

idea of what the Spanish technocratic project was all about: "Politics, as knowledge about ends, is a part of the ethic [...]. There are also experts in the science of the spirit.[...] Technology is only knowledge about means; it clarifies only *how* not *why*."⁸² By this he suggests that technology can be used both for good and bad. Therefore he advocates the role of the expert elite with the correct virtues and ends.

In general the book can be considered as an argument for why society should be governed by the ones with superior knowledge, about *both* means and ends, and seems to confirm Frank Fischer's remark of technocratic ideas being remarkably constant throughout history.

Laureano López Rodó:

None of the literature dealing with the Spanish technocracy downplays the role played by López Rodó in late franquist policy-making. Although I am not in favour of making history into biographies, one can not overlook the importance of his person, being both the architect behind, and the executor of, many of the changes within the Spanish political system of the period.

As earlier noted he clearly recognizes his vocation to Opus Dei on a moral level, but states that in public life the members of Opus Dei were independent professionals.⁸³ Speaking of the technocracy he believes it is fundamentally wrong to talk of it as a political movement; the technocrats were elected by Franco because of "their technical preparation" and represented, in all nations, nothing more than an evolution in the capitalist civilization.⁸⁴ He says that "Politics based on society's real interests has substituted the old ideological debates."⁸⁵ I think it is fair to characterize this view as holding technology, the technique of the technocrats, to be apolitical and neutral and deterministic in the meaning that technology (here the technology of political decision making) is seen as evolving through predestined paths. During a cabinet meeting in 1962 he said that: "Everything one does to increase the standards of living will contribute to give greater cohesion to the country, and minimize the risk for a

revolutionary situation."⁸⁶ The people who were to instigate this elevation of living standards were "[...]the group of technicians, economists and sociologists who [...] studies both the global and local problems of development, based on a scientifically funded social consciousness, supported by globally valid methods and solutions and in harmony with the peculiarities of our political system."⁸⁷ On another occasion he said that the technical administration was easily transferable regardless of political system.⁸⁸ He judges the establishment of the *The Development Plan Commission* (Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo) from 1962, to imply that "[...] the era of professional politicians gave way to politics of the professionals."⁸⁹ In a conference on the objectives and structures of the *Primer Plan de Desarrollo Económico* in 1963 he compared the work of the plans' commissioner to that of a medical doctor; "[...]we know that we operate on the living, organic body of the nation [...] We know it as does the medical doctor, who feels the responsibility for the life he holds in his hands, but who acts with serenity and 'coolness' to assure that the patient's life will be more healthy, expansive and long-lasting."⁹⁰

I view all of these extracts to be highly compatible with what I described in chapter four as being the core *technocratic belief*; that political struggle should be replaced by scientific and technical decision making. Furthermore I think that it is not unfair to suggest that the use of expressions as *globally valid methods* and *true science* (referring to what can be observed and hence verified)⁹¹ implies a concept of science as the inhabitant of true, value-neutral and solid knowledge and can be characterized as positivistic. During our conversation López Rodó modified this positivism somewhat: "I do not think that the so called positive science is the *only* source of knowledge. I prefer to follow St. Thomas Aquinas who said: I believe what the son of God said, that there is no truth except the word of God", and he added " to me this seems the most reasonable."⁹² In other words, the positive science is subjugated a concept of the unity of science about both man and nature where Catholicism is the guiding principle. I think this concept of science and technology might be labelled *theo-positivistic*. In 1963 he said that the very legitimising reason for the advocated economic development, and the measures taken to achieve this was "[...]the social Catholic doctrine,

⁸² Op.cit., p.206.

⁸³ López Rodó (1990), op.cit., p.98.

⁸⁴ Op.cit., p.101.

⁸⁵ López Rodó, Laureano (1963a) *Objetivos y Estructuras del Plan de Desarrollo Económico* (Objectives and Structures of the Economic Development Plan), Conference held in The Municipal Library of Bilbao, 8th of marz 1963, p.7. (my transl.)

⁸⁶ López Rodó(1990), op.cit., p.310. (my transl.)

⁸⁷ López Rodó(1963a), op.cit., p.23. (my transl. and italics)

⁸⁸ Moya, op.cit., p.166.

⁸⁹ López Rodó (1990), op.cit., p.314. (my transl.)

⁹⁰ López Rodó (1963a), op. cit., p.22.

⁹¹ López Rodó (1990), op.cit., p. 7 and 39.

⁹² Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July 1996.

which holds economic development to be the foundation of common worldly well-being and the final goal of the state."⁹³ In my judgement the essence of this thought, which is the unified, prosperous and integrated Catholic society, resembles that of Opus Dei and may well be considered as a true expression of the convictions of López Rodó.

Science and technology in the 'First Development Plan'

The First Development Plan consists of a general plan for the development of the Spanish economy for the years 1964-67, organized into chapters regarding each sector of the economy and a number of appendixes corresponding to the different chapters. I base the following analysis on the appendix dealing with education and scientific and technological research.

In general the appendix is an attempt to estimate the country's needs for scientific and technological expertise in the following years and to create budgets and make dispositions to meet these needs. In my judgement two characteristics of the appendix are interesting in this context: 1) The emphasis put on upgrading general and technical education, to a great extent at the expense of research and 2) the confidence in letting Spanish development be guided by foreign experience.

1) Education vs. research:

It is recognised that higher education and the formation of researchers is desirable, but it is also acknowledged that this might be a costly affair for a country in the short run. The duration of the creation of professors and researchers makes it a low priority in the plan:

"The creation of professors and research teams is by necessity slow[...], and [...] the necessities one has to have in mind when making university plans, are not part of the country's actual plans, nor the ones to come in the next four or five years, but necessities one has to estimate on longer terms and hence, with inevitable uncertainty."⁹⁴

Further on it is added that one should not establish a new professorate without adding the *indispensable* sum of money for research.⁹⁵ On the other hand the

⁹³ López Rodó (1963a), op.cit., p.7. (my transl.)

⁹⁴ *Anexo al Plan de Desarrollo Económico y social, "Enseñanza y formación profesional, Investigación científica y técnica"*, Madrid 1964, p.121. (my transl.)

⁹⁵ Op.cit., p.126.

plan emphasises the need for professional education, education of technicians and scientists for the industry:

" [We must] increase the number of teachers in secondary education in accordance with a general cultural elevation [...], increase the number of teachers in vocational and technical training as is demanded by the industrialization plan [and] increase the number of technicians and university scientists for industrial and agricultural companies in accordance with the demand of the industrialization process".⁹⁶

Hence the need for *teachers* on all levels seems to be a major concern and I judge this to reflect an overall aim to "upgrade" people to the exigencies of an industrialized society, or more precisely to make people able to operate advanced technology.

2) Confidence in the applicability of foreign experience:

The bottom line argument underlying the plan regarding science and technology is, of course not surprisingly, that the general economic development of the country will benefit from an elevation of both the status and knowledge of these phenomena. More explicitly there has been established a very exact prognosis, within the time-span of the plan, regarding the country's need for technicians on different levels and in different specializations. The chapter dealing with this prognosis bears the relatively immodest and universalistic title: *The relationship between a country's economic development and technical education*.⁹⁷ The whole of this chapter, which ends up with exact estimates and expressed recommendations for Spanish policy, is based on the experiences of the United States, Sweden, France, Belgium and Italy: "The method of professor Moberg applied on Spain, given the estimate of the active Spanish population in 1967, leads to the result that by that time there will be needed 75 000 technicians [...] among whom 1/3 should be of a higher grade and 2/3 of medium grade."⁹⁸

As a final consideration I think the plan regarding education, science and technology in general reflects an attempt to upgrade the status of these phenomena. I think it is also fair to see the emphasis on education at the expense of research as a reflection of a high level of confidence in the applicability of foreign experience and science in general. The technocratic project itself can be

⁹⁶ Op.cit., p.123. (my transl.)

⁹⁷ Op.cit., pp.137-145. "

⁹⁸ Op.cit., p.139. "

seen as a pure adoption of foreign decision-making technology, and it can be assumed that the technocrats saw application of foreign technology as a viable, general and not to risky strategy for making Spanish industry competitive.

Talks on research and Industry'

As previously noted, The Higher Council for Scientific Research (CSIC) was heavily influenced by Opus Dei. Technological research within CSIC was functionally organized through the *Patronato Juan de la Cierva* (PJC). PJC alone represented more than half the CSIC during franquism.⁹⁹ Because of this I find it interesting to try to evaluate the concept of science and technology expressed during a conference arranged by PJC in 1964 with the title; *Talks on research and Industry* (Coloquios sobre Investigación e Industria). This is a period when science and technology were governed by the technocrats, and all budgeting of scientific activity and decision of priorities within the field lay within the *Governments Presidency* (Presidencia del Gobierno) where López Rodó was the technical general secretary.

This conference can generally be seen as an apology for scientific research *per se*, and the single most salient theme of the conference is the necessity of research within a sound economical and industrial development. The argument goes that Spanish industry, consisting predominantly of small- and medium sized firms without the possibility of maintaining proper research departments, needs a strong national research organization to provide the economical *input* of science and technology. During the initial 23 pages there are numerous references to international experiences and on seven occasions there are explicit references to OECD recommendations on research administration and the Frascati manual. In general I think the *Talks on Research and Industry* can be judged as an expression of a somewhat frustrated research centre which the participants feel is not being properly funded. During the *Coloquio* it is stated that, although this is a dangerous strategy in the long run, it is obvious that imports of foreign technology and licensed production is the fastest way to build up the industry, and that both firms and countries will often benefit from external research. It is suggested that what is needed are *models* which can show the profit-making impact of R&D on industry. Only this is thought to induce the funding either on state or company level.¹⁰⁰ General disappointment is expressed with the R&D

⁹⁹ Op.cit., p.10.

¹⁰⁰ "Coloquios Sobre Investigación E Industria" (Talks on Research and Industry), Patronato de Investigación y Técnica "Juan de la Cierva". C.S.I.C., Madrid 1965, p.114.

budget of the First Development Plan and this is explained by the general short term concern of the plan.¹⁰¹

Another salient theme of the *Coloquio* is that of the neutrality of science. How does the search for scientific knowledge apply to the doctrines of a Catholic society? It is recognized that there is a potential danger of inducing general preoccupations with worldly affairs as a result of scientization and automatization of society. Science and technology in general have to subordinate to a "higher order", i.e. Catholicism if not to become an agent of paganism.¹⁰² One participant says that the Christian scientist has to operate in the temporal world and "purify it, sanctify it, ennoble it and vivify it".¹⁰³ Talking about the distinction between a Christian and non-Christian scientist it is suggested that this is most clearly expressed during the theory formulation:

"Here it is sometimes impossible to avoid value judgements and these tend to affect both the data and perhaps even more frequently the outcome regarding the theory.[...] [One] has to be guided by a vision of both the world and man and hence by metaphysics and an attitude towards God.[...] [The Christian scientist] appears as such in the *metascience* upon which the *truthvalue* of his science depends"¹⁰⁴

These may all be judged as pro forma expressions during a conference on research in an authoritarian Catholic country. Nevertheless, I think the extent to which this theme is discussed and the degree to which different opinions are brought to the surface, ranging from conceptions of science as fundamentally neutral to statements that holds science to be the truth and hence inadvertently in congruence with the Catholic dogma to the ones expressed above, suggest that we are here confronting a major dilemma regarding the concept of science and technology in late Franquist Spain: How to use science as an instrument for the benefit of a Catholic society without turning means to ends, and hence induce a process of secularisation. It can be added that the very foundations of Opus Dei rest precisely in a suggested solution to this dilemma.

¹⁰¹ Op.cit., p.163.

¹⁰² Op.cit., p.65.

¹⁰³ Op.cit., p.67. (my transl.)

¹⁰⁴ Op.cit., p.68-69. (my transl. and italics)

The concept of science and technology within Opus Dei

Every characterization inhabits the potential of being so simplistic and general that it more resembles a caricature. This may be even more the case when we are trying to characterize a concept shared by a great number of people over a long period of time. Nevertheless, I believe the previous pages enable me to extract a set of core themes regarding Opus Dei's concept of science and technology, which has to be brought into consideration when trying to understand the workings of politics in the twilight of the franquist era.

Even though Opus Dei might be regarded as strongly conservative, it advocates the use of science and technology, and this 'modernistic spirit' might be considered the single most striking feature of the organization. This modern feature can not be properly understood if we do not have in mind that it was religiously motivated. In the Opus Dei world view science and technology acquires a central position as effective means to reach religious goals. They had a vision of science and technology to be instruments for creating a prosperous and homogeneous Catholic society, and to be applicable more or less regardless of cultural setting. Nevertheless I do not think they considered science and technology *in action* to be neutral. They stress that this activity must be subjugated to higher spiritual values and therefore they advocated the role of the intellectual elite which were guided by the moral values of Opus Dei. The centralisation and bureaucratization which characterize the Spanish scientific community during this period reflects this in real life.¹⁰⁵ Their pragmatic concept of science and technology is reflected both in policy-planning programs and in the sayings of key actors. Although much of it sound more or less as a copy of any technocratic programme, I think there are important differences. Where a 'pure' technocrat will advocate the use of science and technology on all political problems based on a positivistic concept of these phenomena, the Spanish technocrats, I believe, were positivistic only when they defended their work by presenting it as apolitical and neutral. Under this surface they were highly aware that they were making politics and that science and technology were their most powerful instruments for doing so. As such, the technocratic and elitistic policy

¹⁰⁵ Minondo, Carlos / Quevedo, Manuel (1984) "La vida científica y tecnológica (1936-1984)" in Intxausti, Joseba (ed) *Euskal Herria: Realidad y Proyecto*, 1984, p.328 and González Blasco, Pedro/ Jiménez Blanco, José (1979) "La Producción Científica Española de 1965 a 1970" in González Blasco, Pedro/ Jiménez Blanco, José/ López Piñero, José M., (eds) *Historia y sociología de la ciencia en España*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 1979 p.106.

was *theologically* inspired: Within Opus Dei's image of the new society, the members would be a sort of priesthood of rationality.

To sum up this chapter I will characterize the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei to be technocratic and positivist with some important qualifications: They were technocratic in the way they advocated scientific and technological solutions to political problems. They surely had great faith in the applied science model, but their pervading instrumentalism and the character of their goals which were both political as well as religious gave their positivism clear limitations. Science and technology could be used for both good and bad and had to be guided and controlled by the elite with the correct Christian virtues. Nevertheless I judge their works and sayings to reflect a great confidence in the steerability and predictability of the scientific and technological impact on society. Thus they were not afraid to induce rather dramatic changes within the workings and composition of society, changes they believed were under their control. In the remains of this work I will call the Opus Dei concept of science and technology, their instrumentalist positivism guided by the Catholic intellectual elite, for *theo-technocratic positivism*.¹⁰⁶ Technocratic *positivism* will normally be superfluous, but because of the qualifications which have to be made with regard to the positivism of the Spanish technocrats, I think it has to be included. It is important to note that I do not suggest that we are dealing with a static concept. On the contrary, one of the most interesting features of this basic concept of science and technology is the fact that it can so easily be put into a general western trend of the period. Thus, it is my belief that the Opus Dei concept of science and technology was a converging point which could facilitate Spain's process of European integration.

I believe this concept pervaded the works of the Opus Dei technocrats as a sort of a shared tacit dimension from which politics of the so called technocratic period have to be evaluated. As noted earlier, I am not suggesting that the technocrats' idea of science and technology *decided* politics, but rather that it put clear limitations both to problem formulation and the decision making process. Hence I think it can be regarded as a set of common assumptions which strongly influenced on problem definitions and that *the theo-technocratic positivism bears the characteristics of what we can call a policy-paradigm for many central actors of late franquist policy-making*.

¹⁰⁶ The term is inspired by a conversation with Prof. Ruizolabuenaga at the Dept. of Sociology, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, the 30th of April 1996.

CHAPTER 6.

The technocratic administrative reform

Introduction

In this chapter I will initiate an historical interpretation of the so called technocratic administrative reform starting in 1957. In order to do justice to this task it is important to keep several factors in mind during the analysis. First of all it is important to distinguish intentions and effects of the reform. The former must be understood in the context of the present political climate of the day and the political and religious objectives of the group of people centred around López Rodó. The latter must in addition be understood in light of the characteristics of the franquist regime and especially of the special traits of the Spanish bureaucratic system and its traditional functions within the political sphere.

To properly organize the totality of the analysis I have divided the three following chapters in a way that needs to be explained. In this chapter I will concentrate primarily on the history of the Spanish administration and describe the intentions of the reform starting in the late 1950's. Furthermore I will try to analyse why the reform project became viable in this particular way at this particular time in Spanish history. If I am to support the thesis that this reform brought about a new spirit within the higher echelons of late franquist political life, one has to base this upon empirical investigations of both institutions and their activities and the attitudes of the people involved. The next chapter will thus be an empirical analysis of the institutionalization of the reform, and I will focus upon the concrete activities which were implemented to meet its intentions. In the following chapter I will then try to use the findings of the previous chapters to analyse the successes and failures of the reform and evaluate its effect upon the workings of late franquist politics.

This chapter will thus start with an historical overview of the modern Spanish administration whose characteristics surely became obstacles to reform endeavours. It is not unreasonable that by 1968 two sociologists called the Spanish Public administration a "confederation of corpses."¹ Only with this in mind will

¹A. de la Oliva and A. Guitérrez Reñón cited from Beltrán, Miguel (1994) *Política y administración bajo el franquismo: La reforma administrativa y los planes de desarrollo*, Working Paper 53/1994,

the reform efforts of the 1960's become intelligible. Later, I will situate the intentions of the reform within the political and religious credo of Opus Dei and the current state of the regime and try to explain why Opus' and the regime's interests converged at this particular time of Spanish history.

History of the modern Spanish administration

In order to understand the characteristics of the modern Spanish administration we have to go back in time to the period following the Napoleonic wars and the War of Independence in America in the early part of the 19th century. The reaction of the crown to all this secularism and independentism was a strongly hierarchical military and juridical based administration inspired by Napoleonic centralism. Nevertheless, Spain lived through all the antagonisms experienced by a traditional state confronting modernity, between 'golden age' conservatives and those who wanted to induce liberal reforms. Added to the conflict of how to cope with the exigencies of a ever more changing world, these parties were also divided on one of the deepest tensions of Spanish politics, regionalism, a tension which is still very much alive today.² The *moderados* supported a centralist view which held that the local mayors should be merely appointed delegates of the central power while the *progresistas* thought that local administration should be governed by a locally elected mayor. The compromise on this conflict was the *Ley de Ayuntamientos* from 1845 that decided that the appointment of the mayors was the right of the central power, but that it had to select among a body of locally elected delegates (*consejales*). On the surface of these deep dug tensions, Spanish political history of the half century following the War of Independence was a never-ending 'turn of office' between *moderados* and *progresistas* both of whom operated clearly within the field of what was tolerated by the crown but with the *progresistas* as the party most favourable to liberal reforms.³

Under these circumstances the public administration lived a life full of ruptures. It was commonly accepted that each government should have a politically loyal

Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid, p.16.

² A violent testimony of this is that the Basque separatist organization, ETA (Euskaldunak Ta Askatazuna, i.e. "The Basque country and freedom"), during the past three years has dramatically increased its terrorist activities, predominantly directed against the police, politicians and jurists.

³ Beltrán, Miguel (1996) "La Administración" in Jover Zamora, José María (ed) *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal. La época de Franco (1939-1975). Vol I*, Espasa Calpe S.A., Madrid, p.563.

administration at its disposal, a principle known in the Anglo-Saxon world as the *spoils-system*(US) or *patronage*(UK) or in Spanish as *las cesantías*, i.e. a pension system which guaranteed the former servant an income when he was replaced as a consequence of shift in government. This implied a great deal of uncertainty regarding the job situation on behalf of the Civil servants and, at least in the Spanish case, an epidemic discontinuity of the public administration which lead to an almost chaotic situation.⁴

Nevertheless, the mid 19th century saw a gradually more technically professionalized administration, at least within certain parts of the body. Administrators were no longer only to imply through juridical measures what the politicians decided, but an increasing part of the administrative task consisted in applying what was considered merely technical solutions based upon an ever increasing body of technical and scientific knowledge. This was at least the case with the rather small but increasing number of engineers occupied with agrarian, industrial or public works. For both politicians and administrators alike the frequent turnover of these engineers and specialists was considered highly irrational and with the *Bravo Murillo's Royal Decree* (Real Decreto de Bravo Murillo) of 18th of June 1852 these technical corps were "organized or constituted by special laws" (*Cuerpos organizados o constituidos por leyes especiales*).⁵ The corps affected by this law were called by the abbreviation *special corps* (*cuerpos especiales*) and guaranteed immobility. As such the Spanish government was earlier in guaranteeing some of its civil servants immobility than both UK (Northcote-Trevelan act of 1855) and the United States (Pendleton Act of 1883) and introduce a principle which was crucial for the professionalisation within the state bureaucracy. The rest of the administration was nevertheless granted no such exclusive rights and continued to work under general administrative laws and were called *general corps* (*cuerpos generales*).

The engineering *cuerpos especiales* used their special status to fight for their autonomy, and at times they succeeded in being almost completely self-governed. Eventually, in 1918, the *cesantías* system was abolished in order to put an end to the notorious uncertainty surrounding the civil servants' job situation. By then the more or less untouchable *cuerpos especiales* had obtained a high status

⁴ Alvarez Alvarez, Julian (1984) *Burocracia y poder político en el regimen franquista*, INAP, Madrid, p.115.

⁵ Beltrán (1996) op.cit., p.567.

within the administration and served as a model for the newly 'liberated' corps. Each corps wanted to rule itself according to the characteristics of its work and exigencies, and a fragmented reglementacion, distinct for each and every corps became the rule of the day.⁶ In the words of Miguel Beltrán:

In sum, the professionalization of some groups of servants prior to 1918 was the result of particularistic strategies which made these groups privileged (not only juridical), and when the immobility was generalised these strategies subsisted because of the obvious advantages offered by the privileged or special situation. *One must insist in this historical trait which characterise the building process of the Spanish administration and understand that it is one of its most notorious peculiarities which has permitted that only a part of the general laws of the Spanish public administration should be applied on the totality of servants, leaving the rest to the internal rules of each corps.*⁷

The administration during the first part of the franquist regime

During the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1931) efforts were made to modernize the administration. Under the slogan "less politics, more administration" (*menos política, más administración*) the intention was to create an administration of engineers and so to speak substitute the politicians with civil servants. In effect the government during these years was nothing more, in the words of Beltrán, than "a sort of committee of high servants which made decisions by consulting the big corps, always protecting the interests of the dominant class."⁸ The fallacy of these seemingly technocracy-inspired efforts was very much due to the lack of coherence within the administration and the lack of an overall plan to guide the attempted modernization, thus perpetuating the arbitrarism and particularism characteristic of Spanish Civil service. During the following II Republic(1931-36) the political problems which eventually lead to the armed upheaval in 1936 overshadowed any considerations of the workings of the public administration, and this period, in the words of Alejandro Nieto, "added nothing new to the history of the Spanish Public administration [...] and in no

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Op.cit., p.568. (my transl. and italics)

⁸ Op.cit., p.569. (my transl.)

way distinguished itself from the dictatorship whose tendencies it followed and accelerated."⁹

As noted in the second chapter, the franquist state which rose from the Civil War (1936-39) was based on a variety of interests which had found together during the 'national upheaval': Their common reaction was directed against a radically secularized republic, against liberalism and the problems related to both national and international capitalism. In this conflict both social revolutionary falangists, traditionalists and various shades of monarchists and Catholics could ally. Furthermore, the Franco administration which was created during the Civil War had to rely upon a great deal of improvisation as the war developed, and each ministry was for long periods situated in different parts of the country. As Serrano Suñer, the dictator's brother in law and Minister of Interior until 1939 put it:

"Two ministries were situated in Vitoria, two more in Santander, one in Bilbao, in Valladolid another one. The others were in Burgos, and still we had the "case" of Quiapo's almost viceregal status in Andalucía[...] The dispersion[...] made each ministry an independent island."¹⁰

But perhaps most important, once ended the Civil War, the interests of the traditional aristocracy, the Catholic church, the Falange and the various monarchists did by no means converge. General Franco, himself a fullbred military man, was most of all interested in securing the stability of the coalition upon which his rule relied. Thus, the different *familias* within the coalition gained almost hereditary control of certain departments within the dictatorship, at least until the last phase of its existence. In the words of Richard Gunther:

"The Minister Of Justice was almost always a Carlist traditionalist, the military departments were always controlled by career military officers; Foreign Affairs and Education were usually headed by 'Catholics'; economic ministries (Finance, Industry and Commerce) and the Planning Subsecretariat were dominated, after 1957, by members of the Catholic lay-organization Opus Dei; and the social ministries [...] by Falangistas."¹¹

⁹ Cited from Beltrán (1996) op.cit., p.569. (my transl.)

¹⁰ Cited from Beltrán (1996) op.cit., p.583. "

¹¹ Gunther (1980), op.cit., pp.33-34.

The traditional division of highly autonomous corps within the administration served Franco's strategy of 'divide and rule' almost perfectly. In this way he could make each of the 'national' groups control their own departments, serving their own interests whether they were the landowner's, the industrialist's, the exporter's, the falangist's, the traditionalist's, the monarchist's or the church's, and in this way maintaining a sort of equilibrium. This, I believe, was the single most important reason why each and every ministry came to live almost separate lives with their back against each other supported by almost autonomous corps of Civil servants. Miguel Beltrán says that:

[...] the Spanish administration has not been 'thought', but is rather the result of a historical process in which solidarity is no characteristic of the totality but of each and every one of its fragments, and in which the differentiation has produced a highly stratified system where the groups have competed among each other for obtaining and keeping privileged situations. Hence, the 'spirit of the corps' is *the* ethic of this situation, a particularistic ethic evolved through the confirmation of the very group. Its immediate consequence is the tendency of self-government, cantonalism and organisational irrationalism."¹²

As for the competence of the public administration, Franco's military urge to remain in power also highly affected the composition of the administrative body. Thus, when the war was over he installed people which had proven their loyalty during the previous three years in almost every position within the administration, only leaving about 20% open for 'free' competition in the initial part: A law from 25th of August 1939 said that 20% of the positions was reserved for disabled, 20% for provisional officers with a campaigning medal, 20% for ex combatants, 10% for ex prisoners and finally 10% for war orphans.¹³ The franquist state was also initially an extremely interventionistic state. On the paper they relied on a falangist vertical syndicalism, responding to the principles of *unity, totality and hierarchy*. These fascist principles never became reality in Franquist Spain because of the regimes multi-faceted supportbase which never could have been maintained intact with such an organization, but it legitimized the right of the administration to intervene and control, or in another words; its power.

¹² Beltrán, Miguel (1977) *La élite burocrática española*, Fundación Juan March, Editorial Ariel, Madrid, p.142.

¹³ Beltrán (1996) op.cit., p.573.

During the almost ritual shift in governments during the 19th century and during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, the development of the modern Spanish administration must be understood as a natural response from the civil servants who were concerned with creating job security.¹⁴ The object of creating job security was partially obtained during the dictatorship of the 1920's, and subsequently the strive for self government derived a different meaning during the first franquism. In the words of de la Oliva de Castro and Guitérrez Reñón: "[...] Once obtained the job security, the goal of security transformed into that of a career and of obtaining various advantages inherent in the career. And these objectives, which were impossible to obtain for the isolated servant, were to become viable for the servant as a member of a corps."¹⁵ Much of the civil servant's income was obtained through extraordinary services provided by the corps. De la Oliva de Castro and Guitérrez Reñón writes about how the higher servants obtained e.g medical services, scholarships for their children, cheap housing, life insurance, personal credits, extra wages and a lot of extra social security arrangements through the corps.¹⁶ This could be so as the corps had their own financial sources: "[...] the great majority of the superior corps charged taxes and tariffs for their services and were in control of this money."¹⁷ In this way the Spanish administration has developed its most salient characteristic. The differentiation and self-government within the administrative body, and the existence of numerous and almost independent corps, occupied with defending their own interests in a particularistic and arbitrary manner. I think that Miguel Beltrán wraps up well the characteristics of both the franquist political system and its peculiar administration in at least the initial phase when he says:

"It will not be unreasonable to say that a great part of the system of political power during franquism consisted in pleas and grantings of awards or favours through an ever-present web of clientelism and patronage. The fact that beside the legal procedures for obtaining things (licenses, admissions, exams etc.) there existed other ways depending on the awards or gratitude of the powerful [...] gave a great solidity to the situation and was a guarantee for the continuance of the system, both in its social and political aspects. In the initial stages of the franquist regime everybody (if they

¹⁴ De la Oliva de Castro, Andrés/ Guitérrez Reñón, Alberto (1968) "Los cuerpos de funcionarios" in Sanchez Agesta, Luis, *Sociología de la Administración Pública Española*, Centro de Estudios Sociales de la Santa Cruz del Valle de los Caidos, Madrid, pp.133-136.

¹⁵ Op.cit., p.136. (my transl.)

¹⁶ Op.cit., p.139.

¹⁷ Op.cit., p.140. (my transl.)

could) was interested in establish a clientelistic relation with anybody capable of 'obtaining' or 'fixing' things, regardless of these being legal or not [...] In this way clear-cut corruption and black market activities (*el estraperlo*) mixed with the clientelism and a certain degree of suspension of the norms, established from the beginning of the regime some of the traits which were to characterise it in the future."¹⁸

The public administration, at least during the first part of the franquist regime, was dominated by a juridical administrative mentality.¹⁹ Nevertheless, the administration functioned in an particularistic and arbitrary manner. Because of the special traits of the administrative organization (the organization in almost autonomous corps) and the division of power within the franquist coalition, *the law was first and foremost used for defending particularistic interests and keeping the status quo*. Thus, curious as it might seem, the public administration was characterized by its particularistic function administrated by higher civil servants with juridical formalist ideals of administrative work.

To sum up this part on the historic legacy of the Spanish administration which the reformers had to confront in the late fifties, I would like to stress the following points: The Napoleonic administrative centralisation which emerged from the wars in the initial part of the last century was, until the death of Franco, the one and only applied strategy for keeping the nation's unity intact confronting various and important forces advocating a strong regionalism.²⁰ Furthermore, the autonomous role of the 19th century *cuerpos especiales* became the model for the higher echelons of the Spanish administration after the *cesantías* system was abolished in 1918. It became the guiding principle for professional struggle for status and privileges within the corps. This tendency was not suppressed by the political system, neither during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, nor by the impotent II Republic, and became, as we have seen an instrument in Franco's strategy for keeping his own power base intact in the aftermath of the Civil War. Thus, in the late 1950's, the reformers were confronting an administration composed of about 200 autonomous and powerful corps, defending the interests of their own and their clientele (or *familias* in

¹⁸ Beltrán (1996) op.cit., p.587. (my transl.)

¹⁹ Beltrán(1977) op.cit., pp.166-167.

²⁰ The exception to confirm the rule is the federalist attempt during the I Republic (1873-74) which ended as this attempt treathened the unity of the nation.

franquist parlance) in an arbitrary and particularistic manner.²¹ I believe it is important to bear this in the front of one's mind when I in the remains of this work will deal with the intentions, institutionalization and effects of the so called technocratic administrative reform.

Administration for economic growth

The technocratic reform of the Spanish public administration had as its prime objectives to rationalize its function in accordance with universalist principles so as to be the administration for economic growth in an international capitalist market. As it was put in the 1963 annual report of the *Centre for Education and Training of Civil Servants* (Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios), later to be called *National School of Public Administration* (Escuela Nacional de Administración Pública); "we develop the Spanish public administration at all levels, especially by the incorporation of new and highly prepared servants, who will be the executives of the economic and social development of the country."²² In the words of José Casanova: "[...] the direction of their activities was the rationalization of the administration so that it could serve as an instrument of capitalist economic growth."²³

López Rodó's prognosis on future social development from 1958 further illuminates what the reform was all about:

"It is estimated that by the year 2000, the agricultural sector will be reduced to 10% of the work force in the economically developed countries, the industrial sector will reach approximately the same proportion, while persons dedicated to tertiary activities will comprise 80% of this population. [...] In keeping with this evolutionary line of displacement by the active population towards labour of a tertiary character, we have superseded the gloomy Marxist prognosis of the proletarianization of the world, changing it with the more promising of a progressive liberalization of all social classes."²⁴

²¹ Gaita, Aurelio (1963) "La unificación de los cuerpos: posibilidades y desarrollo" in *Documentación Administrativa* n.69:1963, pp.53-57.

²² *Memoria del curso 1963-64*, Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios, Madrid, p.12. (my transl.)

²³ *Op.cit.*, p.305. (my transl.)

²⁴ Cabello Gamez, José (1958) "Modo de operar de los servicios de O.&M." in *Documentación Administrativa* n.3:1958, p.8. (my transl.)

In 1963, he expressed this view in a similar way: "To my judgement, the primal goals of the state can today be considered as establishing economic growth and equal opportunities as the fundament for social progress."²⁵ This economic growth and social progress was thought of as a guarantee against social protest and disorder, and López Rodó claimed to have scientific evidence for such an interpretation: "The concordance between economic fluctuations and social movements, both in the positive and negative sense, is scientifically proved for the 20th century."²⁶ In the spirit of such a perception of the role of the modern state, López Rodó elaborated a report, in the beginning of January 1957, named *Report concerning the reorganization of the State's Central Administration* (Informe acerca de la reorganización de la Administración Central del Estado). In his autobiography, *Memorias*, López Rodó summarizes the content of this 22 pages report in the following words:

"1) The administrative work suffers the lack of co-ordination and absence of plans elaborated by technical organs.

2) Each Ministry moves in its own direction, separated from the others. It is important to declare that the State Administration has juridically one personality aparted from the Ministerial departments.

3) The lack of order derived from the lack of co-ordination [...] is due to the non-existence of an effective organization of the Government's Presidency, and the innappropriate execution of supraministerial functions by some of the departments.

4) The function of political-economic and administrative co-ordination belongs to the Government's Presidency. To be able to execute it effectively, it is important to create a technical organ in connection with the Presidency which should elaborate the economic development plans, and a Government's Secretary.

The second part of the report, related to the organization of the Government's Presidency, can be summarized this way:

1) The Presidency incarnates the political and administrative unity of the Ministerial Council. The immense work of co-ordinating,

²⁵ López Rodó, Laureano (1963b) *La administración pública y las transformaciones socioeconómicas*, Imprenta Nacional del Boletín Oficial del Estado, Madrid, p.82. (my transl.)

²⁶ López Rodó, Laureano (1963c) "Administración pública y desarrollo económico" in *Documentación Administrativa* n.65, p.17. (my transl.)

directing and controlling is impossible to make depend upon a Government's Presidency, which at the same time is Head of State. (*Jefatura del Estado*) Because of this it is advisable that the Government's President delegate the functions of co-ordination and programming to a Ministry of the Presidency.

2) The Minister of the Presidency, subordinated to the Government's President, should be in a superior position in relation to the rest of the Ministers [...]

3) The Secretary General of the Government's Presidency should be awarded the Government's Secretary, a cabinet for Studies of the Administrative reform and a Commission for Economic Co-ordination and Programming."²⁷

Regarding the consequences of the proposed division of competence between the Head of State and the Government's Presidency, Casanova says: "The institutional differentiation of the two offices necessarily worked in the direction of reinforcing the autonomous power position of Carrero Blanco [the President of the Government] and consequently, the administrative power position of López Rodó."²⁸ Furthermore, in the third point (regarding the organization of the Government's Presidency) López Rodó was outlining, almost in detail, what would turn out to be his own influential area of competence within the overall reform project.

López Rodó advocated the view that most of the problems of the regime was due to the inefficient workings of the Public Administration and that what was needed most of all was a thoroughgoing administrative reform. This might not be a surprising utterance from a young professor (he was 36 in 1956) in administrative law when being introduced to the nexus of political power, but I think we have to dig deeper than pure promotion of own interests or narrow professionalism on behalf of López Rodó if we are to understand the process which led to a green light of his project. First of all I think we have to take López Rodó's seriously when he says he truly believes in the *formative force of the law*. In his own words:

" We have to take the law seriously. Perhaps it is because of my condition as a jurist, but I have always believed in the law.[...] They

²⁷ López Rodó (1990) op.cit., pp.81-82. (my transl.)

²⁸ Casanova, op.cit., p.296.

configure the present and the future reality of the country [...] I'll say it again, the formative force of the law is one of my firmest convictions."²⁹

This formative force was to be engaged in a process of social change which clearly escaped the limits of juridical formalism. In 1963, López Rodó stated, referring to what he said during a speech in the national assembly (cortes) on the 15th of July 1958:

"The law can no longer be considered as mere form, but as an efficient instrument for [social and economic] justice. And justice within the economic-social sphere will not be obtained only by dictating juridical norms, but must be united with effective action which stimulate and complement the private initiative in order to handle the situation of unemployment, high pricing of basic commodities, lack of accommodation, insufficiency of communications etc. Without a decisive, homogeneous and rapid administrative action [...] the very juridical guarantees will be insufficient. [...] Today we are superseding the excessive reglementism and we create an administration based on efficiency criteria, and this requires a deep knowledge of economic, administrative and organizational problems which exceed the strictly juridical sphere."³⁰

Thus, the project of administrative reform proposed by López Rodó implied a conception of the role of the law which radically broke with traditional Spanish thoughts on the matter. In López Rodó's view the law should be more of a social scientific instrument to direct social change, and not be conceived of as the guarantist of eternal and philosophically derived rights. He expressed this view perhaps most bluntly in 1970 when stating: "If the state does not take specific measures to ensure the welfare and social justice for all Spaniards, the very juridical order becomes meaningless."³¹

By rationalization the Spanish reformers understood something aspiring to Webers ideal type of bureaucracy. As Casanova says: "[In the thoughts of López Rodó] the monarchy becomes an institutional necessity which guarantees the instrumental rationality of the system, that is, its efficient functioning as an impersonal mechanism. In this sense López Rodó's conception approaches

²⁹ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.284.

³⁰ López Rodó (1963b), pp.93-95. (my transl.)

³¹ López Rodó, Laureano (1971) *Política y Desarrollo*, Aguilar, Madrid, p.11. (my transl.)

Weber's ideal type of 'monocratic bureaucracy' [...].³² This weberian ideal type implies the following five components: 1) Decisions should be made on the basis of formal rules and laws, 2) by a regularly waged staff (independent from other sorts of income) 3) doing specialized working tasks 4) whose authority should follow a formal, not inherited, position and not persons 5) and whose decisions should be documented in writing and archived.³³ At this point we clearly see that these principles seriously collide with some of the principles which in effect guided the work of the Spanish administration in this phase: arbitrariness, clientelism and particularism. The reformers wanted to co-ordinate the work of the ministries and their departments and do away with much of the existing autonomy of the corpses, as well as deconcentrate the administration on the basis of subsidiarity. This implied both a restructuring of the hierarchical system, leaving much power in the hands of the co-ordinators as well as delegation of much of the Madrid corpse's power to local administrators.

Just four days after the approbation in the national assembly (cortes) of the *State Administrations Jurisdictional Law* an important measure for creating a favourable climate towards the reform was taken by the inauguration of the once a year *Administrative Reform Study Week* (Semana de Estudios sobre la Reforma Administrativa). During the first week, between 19th and 26th of July 1957 the thematic was centred around eight papers. The titles of some of these papers might give us a good idea of where the reforms were heading: 1) "Administrative rationalization: its goals: application of productivity in the public administration. Foreign experiences", 2) "The task of the Technical Secretary Generals in the rationalization of the administration", 3) "Simplification of administrative procedures", 4) "Objectives and techniques of the administrative reform", 5) "Documentation" and 6) "Education of administrative personnel".³⁴ From this one might conclude that the main traits of the reform was rather well elaborated from the very start. To my judgement these are: Receptiveness to foreign experiences(1), a focus on rationalizing techniques (1,2,3 and 4) and finally, the need for both investigation and education on the matter (5 and 6).

³² Casanova, op.cit., p.287.

³³ Østerud, Øyvind (1991) *Statsvitenskap: Innføring i politisk analyse*, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, p.79.

³⁴ *Memoria de la Secretaría General Técnica correspondiente al año 1957*, Presidencia del Gobierno, Madrid, 1958, pp.28-29. (my transl.)

In short one can say that the proposed reform had three aspects; the legal, the functional and the cultural. The legal was to be institutionalized through implementation of laws which implied specialization, deconcentration and executive centralisation. The functional through training in new procedural techniques at the *Escuela de Alcalá*, in the so called *Organización y Métodos*. The cultural aspect was sought to be achieved through the training in the spirit of the same school as well through the journal *Documentación Administrativa*. In the midst of the reform in 1963, López Rodó argued for its necessity by citing one of the earliest advocates of scientific management, Cooke, when he said that; "[...] the ideals of Christianity and the dreams of democracy will never be fully realized until the principles of scientific organization has penetrated every corner of the working world."³⁵

Theo-technocratic positivism in the administrative reform

In chapter five I characterised Opus Dei's concept of science and technology as *theo-technocratic positivism*. This implies an extreme focusing on the instrumental rational aspect of science and technology, almost totally overlooking the communicative rationale or meaning creative capability of these phenomena. I believe that the 'hard' and instrumental sciences, the natural and social sciences, are themselves carriers of meanings and values and will at any time affect the sphere which humanists has regarded their domain, the domain of meaning. In the Opus ethic, however, one does not question the ends, the Catholic moral dogmas or if you like, the meaning, but essential to their ethic is that they would be very pragmatic regarding the appropriate means to reach their religious goals.

As noted in the previous chapter Opus Dei regards the creation of a prosperous, homogeneous and integrated Catholic society as the fulfilling of God's creation, and as such the most noble apostolate. The very axiom of this work of God was that the creation of wealth was supposed to erode tensions within society as time went by and the material standards of life rose. Thus it becomes intelligible that Opus Dei embraced modern science and technology as it had shown to be the

³⁵ López Rodó (1963b) op.cit., p.86, footnote 120. (my transl.)

nexus of the impressive rise in the standards of living in the western world, at least since the middle of the past century. They believed that the appliance of modern science and technology in an authoritarian Catholic society where Opus Deists would be the elite, would be the best way to obtain their goals without affecting 'the meaning' of that society. As such one can understand the seemingly paradoxical, morally conservative and scientifically modern traits of Opus Dei as well as how they could feel comfortable within the franquist regime. In this light López Rodó's proposals for an administrative reform based on universalistic, scientific and technological principles, make sense, as they were seen as a prerequisite for economic growth.

On the basis of this I think one must insist on the consistency of the rationale of Opus Dei as an institution and the works and ideas of the Opus Dei ministers and technocrats of the period. Many things are said and written about how Opus Dei nurtured their own economic interests during this period and how they always defended the privileges of the wealthy by obstructing structural reforms of the economy. But I think it is important to note that this was not necessarily due to share opportunism but can just as well be explained by reference to their concept of science and technology which implied an economic instrumentalization of the administration and of the political life in general. The Opus Dei technocrats were not necessarily simply opportunists who 'went with the flow' or merely instruments for the survival of the franquist regime. This is not because they were more resistant to such temptations than most people, but primarily because their ideas and solutions seemed to Franco as the best way out of a political and economic crisis at this particular stage in Spanish history. *Their package was more or less bought wholesale and in detail and because of this they needed not be neither opportunists nor act as mere instruments.*

Thus, we are dealing with people who were members of a Catholic lay organisation which advocated the use of modern techniques for creating wealth, which they thought of primarily in its instrumental aspects as a part of the fulfilling of God's work, more than willing to do service within a Catholic authoritarian reality. In fact, if Opus had anything to regret of the state of the franquist regime, it was that it was not Catholic conservative enough, that the economic misery and inequality treathened the unity of the society, and that the regime was not institutionalized for the period after its founders death. This places Opus Dei firmly within the franquist regime, but as we have seen, the kind

of universalistic and 'scientized' reforms proposed by the Opus Dei technocrats had strong opponents both within the administration and the political 'equilibristic' system. In the words of Miguel Beltrán:

"First, the reform coincided with a period of 'liberalization' (in the economic sphere, that is); second, it was directed towards an 'administrative class' that was the base for recruitment to the 'political class'; third, it apparently was impulsed by a limited group (and also by one specific person) [i.e. López Rodó], and four, it appeared without support neither from the public nor from the civil servants. [...] [It was] an administrative reform dominated by 'political' aspects (those who concerned important changes which affected the *status quo* of the forces and interests which operate in the political and administrative system)[...]."³⁶

Above I have described how the powerful administrative corpses both fought and cherished their autonomy and how these 'independent islands' suited the special power structure of the franquist state, and one immediately understands that the reform project deeply affected important interests within the political system. Thus, the most important question remains: *Why were their ideas allowed to influence the course of Spanish history at this particular time in this particular way?*

The social construction of a political paradigm

In order to explain this curious fact one has to have in mind both the difficult economic situation of the Spanish state and the power struggle between monarchists and falangists within the franquist coalition, described in the second chapter. Without this present, it would almost seem as if the power of new and inherently better ideas was presented from some "think-tank", contributing to a happy advancement in the history of mankind. This is in fact how these events are described by López Rodó when he told me that "there was no other alternative."³⁷ Without neglecting the formative power of ideas in history, and to a certain extent this story is a story of such formative power, I truly believe we have to totally discard a 'no other alternative' explanation as a too simplistic interpretation of historical development. If one is to understand the

³⁶ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.199. (my transl.)

³⁷ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July 1996.

transformation between political paradigms we have to investigate not only the development and rationale of the reform ideas as such, but also how these ideas affect the reality of a political struggle for power. Thus, we have to ask why were exactly *these* ideas embraced by powerful political actors, thus changing the direction of Spanish history?

In the autumn of 1956 López Rodó was giving a speech at the University of Santiago de Compostela advocating the need for an administrative reform which was attended by the Minister of Education, Jesús Rubio. In the next meeting of the ministry council, Jesús Rubio commented López Rodó's speech and attracted the interest of the Minister of Justice, Iturmendi, a Monarchist-traditionalist.³⁸ This occurred in the midst of the conflict between the monarchists and falangists described above in the second chapter. Iturmendi wanted López Rodó to evaluate the anticonstitutionality of Arrese's plan for a falangist reform and present a counter proposal. His work was well received by both Iturmendi and Carrero Blanco (the President of the Government), Franco's 'right hand' and the only man the *Caudillo* is said to have ever trusted. In this way López Rodó first became legal advisor to the Minister of Justice and in short time *The Secretary General Office of the Government's Presidency* (Secretaría General Técnica de la Presidencia del Gobierno) was created under the Government's Presidency. López Rodó was appointed head of this secretary. His first initiative was the elaboration of the *Report concerning the reorganization of the State's Central Administration* referred to above, which was presented to Carrero who subsequently passed it on to Franco.

Nevertheless, López Rodó's proposal for an administrative reform had serious opponents both within the franquist coalition and the public administration. Of course the traditional industrial oligarchy, who were being heavily subsidized by the autarchic INI and as such had been obtaining important concessions during the autarchic period, were opposed to reforms which could jeopardise their current privileges. The big and powerful banks, *the five big ones* (los cinco grandes), which to a large degree controlled national industry, were representing the interests of this traditional financial capitalism.³⁹ They were, if not directly opposed, very reluctant towards reforms which could alter the status quo in favour of a more international corporate capitalism. The proposals for

³⁸ López Rodó (1990) op.cit., pp.62-63.

³⁹ See Casanova, op.cit., pp-354-364.

administrative and neo-liberal economic reform were in addition most directly opposed by the 'revolutionary' falangists. Referring to the administrative reform Joan Estruch says: "Its basic objective is the rationalization of the state apparatus, with the goal of placing it at the service of the economy (contrary to the strategy of the falangists, who throughout the history of the Franco regime tried to subordinate the economy to politics)."⁴⁰ In general the technocrats wanted the economy to be, if not guided by, at least highly influenced by the private sphere and this view was directly opposed to the autarkic proposals of the falangists.⁴¹ Thus important strata of both the economic and political power saw their interests threatened by these wide-ranging proposals.

One can argue that the implications of the proposals were not very clear at that moment, that the technocrats in fact had no long term and well elaborated plan at their disposal at this time and that the reaction among the several *familias* could not be as structured and 'rational choice' dependent as the previous argument would imply. However, it is clear that what was going on was attracting attention. As one contemporary commentator noted; "Under the humble appearance of an administrative law, they are presenting us today with a project which will profoundly alter the basis of the Regime."⁴² As the basic character of the regime was one of the dictator's 'reserved policy areas' this can be interpreted as an intent to 'speak the language of Franco' to make him withdraw his support to López Rodó. Apart from the technocrats, only some of the most patient monarchists were promoting the reforms as they saw the potential of the proposal to be a vehicle for restoration of the monarchy in the long run and in a very pragmatic manner. This is not to say that among those promoting the reform nobody had economic interests in a shift of policy. The *Banco Popular Español* was the most successful of the Spanish banks in the period 1954-1956. Even though it was still unable to compete with *the five big ones* it was increasingly becoming more important as the representative for modern corporate capitalism, and as such favouring "policies of market liberalization, international integration and economic rationalization."⁴³ The president of this bank, Luis Valls Taberner, was a member of Opus Dei and surrounded himself with other Opus Dei members as close collaborators, among them the *numerario*, Navarro Rubio, who was to become Minister of Finance from 1957, and the *numerario*, Alberto Ullastres, who became Minister of Commerce in the same

⁴⁰ Estruch, op.cit., p.227.

⁴¹ Casanova, op.cit., p.60.

⁴² Moya, op.cit., p.169. (my transl.)

⁴³ Casanova, op.cit., p.360.

government.⁴⁴ It is also worth to be mentioned that Valls Taberner resided together with López Rodó and Jorge Brosa, the director of the largest bank, *Banco Español de Crédito*, in the same Opus house.⁴⁵ Also worth noticing is the fact that Escrivá de Balaguer, the founder of Opus Dei, used to refer to Valls Taberner as "my banker".⁴⁶

I think it is important to note that this nexus of Opus Dei members was not in the centre of neither economic nor political power in the period before the change of government in 1957, but it could seem as they were on a winning team. The economic dispositions of the *Banco Popular* had proven successful during the previous period when the economic problems of the state seemed abundant. This point, I think, was extremely important for Franco and must be considered when we try to understand why Franco was willing to take a closer look at the proposals presented from within this group. Furthermore the group of Opus Deists was not perceived as belonging to any of the existing *familias* of the regime and thus not as a threat to the powerbalance among these. Ullastres, the Minister of Commerce from 1957, once said that this was precisely the reason why the new ministers were labelled *technocrats*: "I believe that they called us technocrats because it was impossible to put a political label on us. We were not belonging to any of the regime's traditional *familias*: We were not falangists, not Christian democrats nor traditionalists. We were state servants and they had some right in calling us so"⁴⁷

It is probable that Franco saw this group, and not without reason, as mere technicians and problem-solvers which could mediate between the monarchists, the banks and the church, and as such secure the survival of franquism. Casanova says:

"In the 1950's, when faced with a new Monarchist offensive, Franco found the banks, the army and the Church unified against the attempt to revive the power of the Falange. I believe that in such circumstances Franco saw in the Opus Dei a group which could serve to accommodate the interests of the Monarchists, the banks and the Church, without, however, truly representing any of them."⁴⁸

⁴⁴ Op.cit., p.96.

⁴⁵ Walsh, op.cit., p.135.

⁴⁶ Casanova, op.cit., p.353.

⁴⁷ Cited from López Rodó (1990) op.cit., p.91. (my transl.)

⁴⁸ Casanova, op.cit., p.363.

The technocrats worked for an institutionalization of the regime which would facilitate a transition to a traditional monarchy after Franco's death. Even though the Monarchists supporting the Ruiseñada plan felt that this was inadequate it met their interests in the long run and could be tolerable. The banks and the national industry feared a change in the status quo which could affect their current privileges, but it might be assumed that even they to some extent perceived the inadequacy of the autarchic economic policy. Confronted with the alternative of fundamental structural changes within the economy proposed in different ways by both falangists and Marxist economists, the technocrats' pro-business proposals were more tolerable. As for the Church and its interests, the group of Opus Dei associated people in important positions resided outside the traditional hierarchy, but at the same time they were highly moral conservatives and as such no immediate threat. As a consequence all these groups could apply a 'wait and see' attitude. The only group totally neglected and directly treathened by the technocrats was the falangists. The validity of this interpretation is supported by evidence which shows that throughout the sixties the main opposition within the regime was between the technocrats and the falangists with the other *familias* as more pragmatic bystanders.⁴⁹ Referring to what Manuel Jesus Gonzales has written about this change of orientation within the regime, Casanova says: "[He] is probably correct when he thinks that the partial solution brought about by the technocrats to the economic problems which were endangering the regime's survival, came as 'an unexpected consequence of a cabinet reshuffling which was an attempt to solve the conflicts between the various political families'."⁵⁰

Furthermore, Casanova suggests that Franco perceived this new group as easier to manipulate as they held their positions totally due to his permission.⁵¹ One also has to have in mind the 'technical legacy' of the Spanish administration. As noted above, one of the slogans of Primo de Rivera's dictatorship of the twenties was 'less politics, more administration'. It was by no means new for Franco to call upon technical expertise within the different ministries. Alejandro Nieto says that throughout the franquist period there was no other way to reach influential positions than to present yourself as some kind of technician. As such, Nieto sees the technocrats as followers of a solid franquist tradition, to his judgement the only difference was that these were politicians in a technocratic disguise.⁵²

⁴⁹ Walsh, op.cit., p.145.

⁵⁰ Casanova, op.cit., p.106.

⁵¹ Casanova, op.cit., p.363.

⁵² Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.574.

Everything which could be presented as pure administration was welcomed as it was believed to reduce political tensions within the regime. Thus the 'technicality' of the proposed reforms was not alarming to Franco because it kept clear of what was considered the strictly political spheres of the regime, i.e. the *four reserved policy areas* outlined in the first chapter, where Franco insisted in keeping of full control. The difference was that this time the technicians or experts were not simply the most competent within a certain speciality whose ends were set up by the political family in charge of that specific area. Rather the essence of their speciality, or more precisely, the essence of López Rodó's speciality, was that of altering the function of the entire political system through legal reforms which should co-ordinate and rationalize the public administration as to be an administration for economic growth. This time Spanish politicians were not dealing with mere technicians, although they presented themselves as such, but with people who had a much more far-reaching idea of the technicians' indispensable and central position in the totality of the administration of a modern state.

It is also noteworthy to pay attention to López Rodó's political cunning in gaining influence. During the crucial initial phase he was able to give 'scientific and neutral' legitimisation to the regime as well as making it an instrument for his own political endeavours, by arguing that in the transitional state of an economy towards sustained growth one was in need of a political authority that could implement the correct technical measures without having to go through a dividing and 'irrational' political debate. During the conference at the University of Santiago de Compostela in September 1956 he said that:

"It has always been like this. All the great administrative reforms have taken place under a great political figure. And the administrative work is what has remained during later political changes. [...] Today nothing is left of the Napoleonic empire, but here are still the Prefects and the State Council, giving live and present testimony of its role in French history"⁵³

and later on he stated:

"In his well-known work *The Stages of Economic growth*, Rostow points to the presence of an extraordinary man who knows how to catalyse the latent energies of the people, restoring their self-confidence, as one of the decisive factors for economic takeoff.

⁵³ López Rodó (1990) op.cit., p.64. (my transl.)

The Caudillo is to be credited with making us Spaniards regain our confidence."⁵⁴

In this way López Rodó established an instrumental relationship between his own reform programme and the dictatorship. Franco was to legitimise the reform programme and as such "be credited with making us Spaniards regain our confidence." Casanova sees one of López Rodó's greatest political achievements in having instilled the idea in Franco that this would be his great historical role.⁵⁵ The success of his strategy was immediate: The 23rd of February 1957 he was granted admission to the Caudillo. López Rodó tells in his *Memorias* about this first meeting:

"I had asked for the obligatory audience to thank for my appointment as Secretary General of the Government's Presidency. I knew that Franco by now had my report which was given to him by Carrero. My doubt was whether or not he would mention it. My doubts immediately disappeared because he went right on talking about the report. He said that he had read it, that he liked it and that he would prepare a law which would build upon the ideas exposed in it."⁵⁶

Having established this instrumental relationship, the technocrats were almost free to do whatever they wanted as long as they kept within Franco's zone of political indifference. By the mid 1950's politics, and especially economic politics, were much too complicated for the ageing General to keep himself updated in all areas, and he more and more withdrew to occupy himself solely with what he believed was the most political concerns of the regime. One of Franco's biographers, de la Cierva, says that:

"Franco who did not have a command of the economic field similar to the professional mastery he showed in military matters or the suspicion with which he treated cultural affairs, progressively conceded greater autonomy to entrepreneurs, to the banks and even to his own ministers in charge of economic policy, whom he always selected in accordance with the correct or mistaken opinion of those who passed as reputable experts."⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.290.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ López Rodó (1990) op.cit., pp. 82-83. (my transl.)

⁵⁷ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., pp.113-114.

Franco was by no means pleased when he realized that the new policy would imply that Spain had to be integrated into the capitalist world economy, but at the end he is told to have said; "Hagan lo que les de la gana" which could be translated to something like; "All right! Have it your own way!"⁵⁸ Thus, in the international political context of the cold war which had made Spain more acceptable to western countries and during a period of internal turmoil within the regime, the dictators will to stay in power at almost any cost, made him receptive to the technocrats proposals. As exposed in the second chapter, *public order* was one of the dictators reserved 'policy areas', and things were starting to get out of hand in the late 1950's when strikes, boycotts and university manifestations were becoming the rule of the day. Under these circumstances López Rodó succeeded in creating an almost instrumental relationship between the technocrats' administrative reform for economic growth and the historical role of Franco, and this created a new paradigm for political action within the regime.

Franco had until the late 1950's expressed an almost unimaginable antimodernism and traditionalism at the verge of being paranoid, regarding everything new and foreign as being part of an international conspiracy directed towards Spain led by Communists, Jews, Protestants, Freemasons or whatever. Things had really changed when the same man, in the New Year speech of 1960, defended the administrative reform by saying:

"The Public Administration has to adapt itself to the modern organic and functional techniques. The old conception of an administration is always dilatory and a hindrance due to excessive bureaucratism has to be replaced by a new sense of entrepreneurial service. This is the direction taken by the administrative reform as it moves forward from day to day."⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Casanova, op.cit., p.124.

⁵⁹ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.291.

CHAPTER 7.

Institutionalization of the reform

Introduction

As noted in the previous chapter I believe it is correct to say that the administrative reform worked upon three different levels; the legal, the functional and the cultural. However, in an historical study which tries to establish some coherence and understanding, I believe they must all be seen as interwoven parts of a tendency which would be more difficult to comprehend if analysed strictly separately.

It all started in 1957 with López Rodó getting a green light for his legal reform, *The State Administration's Jurisdictional Law*. In short time there appeared two instruments for institutionalizing the reform in both its functional and cultural aspects: First, in 1958 was the monthly journal *Documentación Administrativa* (DA) created. This should be a forum for debate about the ongoing reform process as well as a 'think-tank' and an important channel for foreign influence on the reform. The second measure was the creation, also in 1958 of *Centre for Education and Training of Civil Servants* (*Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios*), later to be called *The Public Administration school* (*Escuela de Administración Pública*) or simply, *La Escuela de Alcalá*, from it being situated in the near Madrid small town of Alcalá de Henares. The creation of this centre was, to my judgement, the single most important measure taken to institutionalize the reform.

In this chapter I will first summarize the laws which affected the workings of the public administration. This marked the direction of the new administrative policy and gave direction to the subsequent creation of DA and *La Escuela de Alcalá*, both of which directly would influence the functional and cultural aspects of the administration. In the continuance I will therefore analyse both articles in DA during the initial period of the reform and the activities of *La Escuela de Alcalá* during a period of twelve years, paying much attention to how foreign influence on how science and technology should be used in a western rationalized state was incorporated into a Catholic authoritarian reality.

The legal reforms

López Rodó's proposal for an administrative reform elaborated in the last part of 1956 was implemented almost untouched as law on the 15th of July 1957. The *State Administration's Jurisdictional Law* had as its prime objective to establish legal boundaries for the public administration as to prevent the traditional arbitrariness. An important measure was that the entire public administration was subjugated the Ministerial Council as a whole and not as individual corpses serving its particular Ministry. In the first number of DA in 1958, López Rodó said regarding this aspect of the law:

"Obviously, this is a delicate area which can not be approached without serious considerations. In Spain there exists more than a hundred General Directories within the ministries. In addition, there exists numerous autonomous organisms. The Law by Decree were meant to outline the main guidelines of the reorganisation of the administrative service system, to avoid duplications and give the administration a simplified, modern and homogeneous structure."¹

To obtain this it was created an organisation model which could facilitate the co-ordination of the different departments so that the formal control of the administration came in the hands of the head of that council, the Government's Presidency, where López Rodó was the Technical General Secretary. The Government's Presidency, headed by Carrero Blanco, was functionally separated from the Head of State and was in this way given great co-ordinating and programming power which was to be executed by the technical secretary, that is, López Rodó.

Under the dependency of this technical secretary was created both the Governments Secretary which published *The State's Official Bulletin* (El Boletín Oficial del Estado), the *Cabinet for Administrative Studies* (Gabinete de Estudios Administrativos) and the *Office for Economic Co-ordination and Programming*, OCYPE (Oficina de Coordinación y Programación Económica), which was the embryo of the *The Development Plan Commissionary* (Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo) five years later. The prime instrument to conduct the co-ordination was created earlier the same year: A law by decree of the 25th of February had

¹ López Rodó, Laureano (1958) "La reforma administrativa en España" in *Documentación Administrativa* n.1:1958, p.9. (my transl.)

established *the Governments Delegated Commissions* (las Comisiones Delegadas del Gobierno) to co-ordinate and prepare the agenda on matters concerning more than one ministry. Initially less than ten of these commissions were established with the Commission for Economical Matters as the most important.² According to the law these commissions should:

"1) Investigate, in its totality, the questions of general character concerning the departments which is integrated by the commission, and foremost, the work and investment projects which each department has to approve when its importance or the co-ordination of services requires this.

2) Study the matters which by affecting several ministries demand the elaboration of a conjunct proposal previously to its resolution in the Ministry Council.

3) Co-ordinate the action of the concerned Ministries in view of common objectives and edit conjunct programs of "handling/actuación". [...]"³

These laws had established instruments for co-ordination of both the administration and the economic policy and removed much of decision making power from each Ministry and its departments to the 'technical' planners and co-ordinators. In the words of Anderson: "The policy leaders had sought to displace the cabinet as a prime forum of economic policy-making and to reinstrument procedure so that it played essentially a formalizing role. They succeeded in so restricting the policy activity in this instance."⁴ By the implementation of these laws a fundamentally new and important platform for political power was established with López Rodó in its centre, and from this position he was in the midst of both administrative and economic co-ordination and planning.

Once established this platform López Rodó used almost the entire first half of 1958 working on the *Law of Administrative Procedure* (Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo).⁵ If the laws from 1957 had established a platform for political power this law was to guide the direction of the power executed from this platform. Apart from establishing the principles of "ytelse", economy and

² Boletín Oficial del Estado, n.195, 31st of July 1957: §25-7 of Ley de Régimen Jurídico de la Administración del Estado. (The State Administration's Jurisdictional Law)

³ Op. cit.: §25-11 of Ley de Régimen Jurídico de la Administración del Estado. (my transl.)

⁴ Anderson, op.cit., p.125.

⁵ López Rodó (1990) op.cit., p.134.

efficiency as the catchwords of the day, I believe the law in a fundamental matter reflects the intention of turning away from an administration reluctant towards change, leaning on the law, towards an administration which finds its *raison d'être* in managing change and development. López Rodó spoke about the law in front of the National Assembly, two days before its approval on the 17th of July 1958:

"[...] the prime aspiration of a country today do not consist in having an administration obstructed by complicated procedural norms. *Today nobody wants an administration that simply does no harm but an administration that is capable, rapid and efficient.* [...] One has intended to incorporate in the new law the norms of organization and methods of work required for productive improvement. The procedures that guide administrative work must be similar to the practical norms which guide the management of a business corporation."⁶

Another important trait of this law was that it was required economic studies regarding the costs and utility related to the creation and function of each administrative organ. This principle was from now on, in the words of Beltrán, applied "with an unusual cynicism."⁷ In an article in DA in March the same year José Cabello Gómez argued in favour of such cost-benefit analyses by presenting its methods, in a way that showed a great deal of confidence in its suitability, necessity and neutrality. He stated that these methods are universal techniques for administrative work, and that the experts did not have to know anything about the area of administration they were consulting.⁸

To obtain the ambitious goals of the laws, and especially the goals regarding the function of the administration intended by the Law of Administrative Procedures, it was crucial to induce a reformatory spirit among the civil servants. López Rodó says in his *Memorias* that: "One of my principal concerns was to spread a reformatory mentality among the servants which would break the routine and make them cooperate in the ongoing administrative reorganization."⁹ This is the context we have to have in mind when we are to properly understand the creation of the *Centre for Education and Training of Civil Servants* (Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios) the

22nd of September 1958, just two months after the approbation of the Law of Administrative Procedures. The centre was established by Ministerial order from the President of the Government, Carrero Blanco, and was to depend on its Technical Secretary General, López Rodó.

The relevancy of the sources regarding 'La Escuela de Alcalá'

Before I go on describing and analysing the activities of this educational and training centre for civil servants, I must make some remarks regarding my sources. Apart from an interview with one of the students, my work is primarily based upon annual reports from the centre for a period of eight years, between 1957 and 1965, and a ten year chronicle over its location in Alcalá de Henares, made in 1970. In addition I have studied articles in DA during the initial part of the reform process, from 1958 to 1965. All the written sources are strongly biased as they are edited by people more or less directly connected with The Government's Presidency and especially its Technical Secretary General. As such they are representing the pro reform side of a bureaucratic and political struggle for power which I will describe below. Thus, at the first glimpse, these sources might seem of no value as objective information about what really was going on within the centre. The sources will most likely paint an all too glamorous picture of the activities of the centre and overrate its importance as they must be seen to have been a part of a propagandistic project in favour of a controversial administrative reform. Nevertheless, this is interesting in itself, and if one is aware of this ongoing political struggle and the role of the pro reform side within this, the sources will give valuable information about both the ideals of the reformers and the disputable frontlines in a political and bureaucratic process of change. Beside this, much of my material are simple information about course plans and exams and will permit us to be some kind of 'a fly on the wall' in the study rooms.

It could be argued that my analysis should have been based upon an even share of opposing views on the activities of the centre. Critique of the reform is abundant, both from people involved who thought the reform to have failed, from people explicitly opposed to its intentions and from scholars who retrospectively have evaluated its role within Spanish history. I am aware of these views and will explicitly discuss them in the next chapter as part of an

⁶ Op.cit., p.153. (my transl.)

⁷ Beltran (1994) op.cit., p.5. (my transl.)

⁸ Gamez (1958) op.cit., pp.29-34.

⁹ López Rodó (1990) op.cit., p.156. (my transl.)

evaluation of the effects of this so called 'technocratic administrative reform'. In this part of the study, my objective is nevertheless solely to come to terms with the 'spirit' and intellectual orientation of the institutionalization of the reform, implied by the creation of the public administration school. Bearing in mind the considerations I have made above, I find the material quite relevant for my purpose.

A centre in the midst of bureaucratic and political struggle

As noted above, the Centre for Education and Training of Civil Servants was established the 22nd of September 1958 as a more firm institutionalization of the courses and conferences which had been taking part under the Cabinet for Administrative Studies for more than a year. In the initial part, until May 1960, the centre was situated in down town Madrid, in the *Calle Trafalgar*, but from then it was moved to the majestic buildings of the old convent which had housed the former *Universidad de Alcalá* in Alcalá de Henares, some few miles outside the capital. The creation of the new centre in Alcalá was one of the themes in Franco's Christmas speech to the Spanish people in 1960. He said:

"But it is not sufficient to change the institutions if one do not take care of the people who serve them. The change of administrative structure also require a decisive improvement of the civil servant. It is not sufficient to demand the indispensable and generic preparation previous to the calling; one must also assure a later adequate education in accordance with the concrete work and find the precise stimulus to avoid that he does not fail between neglect and routine. The Centre for Education and Training of Civil Servants will be the efficient instrument for this ambitious task. At this centre the suitable persons will be trained for the management of the public interests. Its new head quarter, recently inaugurated in the building of the old University of Alcalá, contain a profound symbolism. The project of modernization of the public administration will as such be rooted in the grand educational tradition of Alcalá, rich in men who dedicated their lives to the service of the fatherland (*patria*).¹⁰

Apart from supporting Casanovas hypothesis of López Rodó being the ghost-writer of many of Franco's speeches, this speech would indicate the

¹⁰ *Memoria del año 1961*, Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios, Alcalá de Henares, p.18. (my transl.)

contemporary significance of the creation of the centre. As in all of Franco's speeches we get no impression of the underlying political conflict, all is a matter of 'public interests, but the speech must be taken as a strong sign of support to López Rodó's project.

The centre was from the beginning established to be the receptor of foreign ideas on how to run a modern administration as it is expressed in its annual report of 1958:

"The importance of getting to know new methods and experiences and to *confront them with the national*, has led the centre to recently accept a determined number of scholarships [...] so that Spanish civil servants would be able to broaden and perfectionize their education in Europe's most important Public Administration schools."¹¹

The perceived need "to confront" the national methods and experiences is a reflection of the intent to challenge the power of the mighty Special Corpses within the administration. These corpses had their own recruitment and training, mainly juridical, and was not to undergo any training in the new centre. The centre had to concentrate on the education and perfection of the so called General Corpses. In order to make a considerable impact of the totality of the workings within the administration a new and supposedly powerful General Corps was created within the centre, the so called *Public Administration Technicians* (*Técnicos de Administración Civil*), or simply the *técnicos*. In the words of Alejandro Nieto:

"[...] the reform proceeded [...] in its own way, materially administrated by one corps which was promoted, the *técnico de administración civil*. In the essence of this fact lies the political decision to make the reform depend upon this corps - much more flexible and ambitious than the traditional ones -, which in this way improved its positions."¹²

This corps was meant to have executive power within each department but at the same time it was an interministerial corps which should work for the co-ordination of the administration as a whole. The creation of this corps, together

¹¹ *Memoria de la secretaría General Técnica correspondiente al año 1958*, Presidencia del Gobierno, Madrid, 1959, p.67. (my transl. and italics)

¹² Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.576. (my transl.)

with the creation of three lower level and interministerial corps¹³, was perceived by the Special Corpses as an act of aggression directed towards their traditional hegemony. They were so to speak, and *de facto*, untouchable regarding their own organisation and recruitment, but was now challenged from the outside. Miguel Beltrán writes:

"The creation of these corpses, which certainly implied a considerable modernization of the divided and obsolete state administration of the period, in this way released an authentic struggle for bureaucratic power, both between corpses (that is between the Técnico de Administración Civil and the 'specials' of higher order within each ministry), as well as between ministries: the Finance department, chief of the most traditional traits, confronted with the Ministry of the Presidency which had initiated the reform. And all this together with, and beside, the struggle for political power which the administrative reform undoubtedly represented for the 'technocratic group'."¹⁴

Thus, it is reasonable to say that the centre which I am studying, the school which later was to be called *la Escuela de Alcalá*, from the very start was placed in the midst of a fierce bureaucratic and political struggle for power. The traditional arbitrariness and dispersion was confronted with the Opus Dei inspired technocratic group, and its efforts through the new centre to create a modern administration for economic growth. A detailed study of the centre's development, successes and failures will reach beyond the scope of this study, but I hope the coming pages will serve my main purpose, that is to give an overall picture of the 'spirit' of the centre and its intellectual orientations and ambitions. The guiding questions will be: What did the centre teach? How many students were there? To which positions did they go? What kind of investigation was conducted and for what purpose? What was the foreign influence? If I can answer these questions properly, it will be easier to evaluate why and to which degree a more or less sudden and intellectually generated reform succeeded in transforming traditional

¹³ From the promulgation of the *Ley de Funcionarios Civiles del Estado* (Law of the civil servants) in 1964, these four corpses were nominated as interministerial and 'general corpses': The *Técnico de Administración Civil* (Public administration technicians) with directive function; the *Administrativo* (administrative) at a mediate level, but with vaguely defined purposes; the *Auxiliar* (assistant) with assisting function and the *Subalterno* (subordinate) which was to conduct the most routine work. (See Beltrán (1994) op.cit., p.13)

¹⁴ Beltrán (1994) op.cit., p.14. (my transl.)

behaviour of an administration which workings were deeply rooted in its country's traditions and culture.

International conferences and contacts

One of the most characteristic traits of the school was that it at all times was extremely receptive to foreign influence. It was as if, in accordance with its initiators' concept of science and technology, foreign administrative organisation was seen as a science based technology which could be easily transferred to the Spanish reality. López Rodó had spent much time during 1957 in the United States, Great Britain and France to meet central policy makers and administrators and so to speak 'pick from the shelf' in the international supermarket of administrative technology. During a conference in the London School of Economics, the 7th of November 1957, López Rodó said that "The political institutions may differ from one country to another because of its distinct characteristics, but the administrative institutions and activities are on the contrary a common factor in the life of all nations."¹⁵ In the annual report from 1958 one could hence proclaim with satisfaction that ; "[...] the centre studies those systems which are applied abroad and which gives us better knowledge of not only the organisation and structure of the Public Administration Schools, but also of the entrance procedures and study plans. Because of this, the centre has established contact with the most relevant schools and centres."¹⁶ In the 'ten year chronicle' from 1970 the list of these 'relevant' administrative centres is as follows: - I.I.A.S. (Bruxelles) - Ecole Nationale d'Administration (Paris) - I.I.A.P. (Paris) - I.R.F.E.D (Paris) - I.R.I.A. (Paris) - Institute for Social Studies (La Haye) - Dept. of Administrative Studies (University of Manchester) - Royal Institute of Public Administration (London) - The British Council - Ministry of Interior (Germany) - International Bank of Reconstruction and Development - UN division of Public Administration - Federal Academy of Administration of Spira (Germany) - General Directory of Education and Selection (Belgium) - Superior School of Public Administration (Caserta, Italy) - I.C.A.P. (Costa Rica) - Administration Academy of Hilden (Germany) - All schools and administrative centres associated with the International Institute of Administrative Science in

¹⁵ López Rodó (1958) op.cit., p.14. (my transl.)

¹⁶ *Memoria de la Secretaría General Técnica correspondiente al año 1958*, p.68. (my transl.)

Bruxelles.¹⁷ It is also worth to mention that López Rodó in 1959 was admitted to the permanent presidency of the *International Journal for Administrative Science*, which was the journal of the International Institute of Administrative Science mentioned above.¹⁸ The Head of the Cabinet for Administrative Studies said in 1958 that: "The project must utilise the best techniques regarding the administration of personnel, and these are applied in the modern civil service statutes of France, Italy, Belgium and Germany, or in the pragmatic regulations of the civil service in the United Kingdom and North-America."¹⁹

Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that the most immediate inspiration of the work within *La Escuela de Alcalá* was drawn from the French *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*. In the annual report from 1959 it says that: "Because of the characteristics of our administrative regime, the utility of knowledge and study of the French administration is unquestionable. This is the administration which has got structures and problems most similar to our own."²⁰ The benevolent relationship between ENA and *la Escuela de Alcalá* can be read out of the almost panegyric regards from the director of the French school, after a visit at Alcalá in 1966:

"I knew that Alcalá de Henares was a peak of the Spanish civilization and modern administrative education. But I could not imagine, before this visit which has filled me with admiration and envy, to what extent this old universitarian palace, so notably restored, constitute the world's most beautiful example of austere work regarding the education of civil servants."²¹

It is nevertheless important to note a special characteristic of the Spanish administrative school: *La Escuela de Alcalá* was from the very start meant to deal with both education of new civil servants and training of those already in service. In France, ENA dealt solely with education of new servants while *Centre des Hautes Etudes Administratives* took care of the subsequent training of those in service. In France this was perhaps no problem as the workings of the administration was not in the front-line of political struggle. In Spain on the contrary, where administrative reform meant confronting strong political

¹⁷ 1960-70: *Crónica de 10 años*, Escuela Nacional de Administración Pública, Madrid, p.29.

¹⁸ *Memoria de la Secretaría General Técnica. Año 1959*, Presidencia del Gobierno, Madrid, p.37.

¹⁹ Carro Martínez, Antonio (1958) *Documentación Administrativa* n.4:1958, p.5. (my transl.)

²⁰ *Memoria 1959*, op.cit., p.39. (my transl.)

²¹ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.20. "

powers, the organisation of both education and later training in one centre, might reflect a perceived need among the reformers to build up a powerful block which could control and keep the direction of the reform within one building. A further expression of this concentration was that when the centre moved to Alcalá in May 1960, both the library of the Government's Presidency and the direction of DA went along.²² In this way DA subsequently became the journal of the school in December 1960.²³ This would indicate that the technocratic reformers were quite aware of what they were confronting and as such the propagandistic aspects of the process was not neglected. Concerning the creation of DA in 1958 it was stated that the intentions of this journal were threefold; "to inform and facilitate documentation of the administrative reform; to spread a general concern about administrative problems and create a favourable climate for the reform."²⁴

During the 1960's the *Escuela de Alcalá* was housing several international conferences related to administrative work and economical development. During these conferences people like Ernst Forsthoff (*Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Sozialstaatlichkeit: aufsätze und erfahrungen*), Georges Langrod (*The International civil service: its origins, its nature, its evolution*), Fritz Morstein Marx (*The administrative state: an introduction*), Albert Waterston (*Development planning: lessons of experience*), Alfred Sauvy (*Histoire économique de la France*), Brian Crozier (*The minimum state: beyond party politics*), Pierre Bauchet (*Economic Planning: the French experience*), and W.W. Rostow (*The stages of economic growth, A non-communist manifesto*) participated. In addition, Marcelo Caetano, President of Portugal after the death of Salazar in 1970, gave lectures at the school.²⁵ He was a close friend of López Rodó from the time they both were professors in administrative law at the University of Salamanca.

Among this group of foreign lecturers I have to make some further remarks regarding W.W. Rostow. Rostow's theory of the stages of economic growth²⁶ was

²² *Memoria de la Secretaría General Técnica: Año 1960*, Presidencia del Gobierno, Alcalá de Henares, p.53.

²³ *Memoria del año 1961*, Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios, Alcalá de Henares, p.151.

²⁵ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.7.

²⁶ Rostow proposes in this theory that all societies pass through five stages of economic development i.e. traditional society, preconditions for take off, take-off, road to maturity and the age of high mass consumption. (Larrain, Jorge (1989) *Theories of Development*, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, p.96)

highly influential on López Rodó's perception of the relation between administration and economic development, and he makes a number of references to Rostow in his auto-biography.²⁷ Both Rostow and López Rodó converged in wanting to contain communism in a crucial phase of economic development and in the recommendations of techniques for doing so. Rostow as Director of Policy and Planning in the US State Department during the Kennedy administration and chief adviser on Vietnam to President Johnson²⁸ and López Rodó as key politician within the fiercely anti-communistic franquist state. As noted in the previous chapter, Rostow was used by López Rodó as a scientific justification of the necessity of an authoritarian state at this particular stage of Spanish economic development ('preconditions for take-off'), and as such instrumental in establishing the close relationship between the reforms and the dictatorship (see pp.106-108). In fact, López Rodó told me during our conversation that what Spain had been going through the last forty years was exactly the transition from 'preconditions for take-off', through 'take-off' during the later franquist regime, to 'road to maturity' in the post-franquist period and that "we have not yet reached the age of high mass consumption."²⁹ Thus, Rostow's linear theory of modernization seems to persist with López Rodó, at least when he retrospectively explains and justifies the process of change which he heavily affected. Among the other foreign lecturers it is also important to mention Georges Langrod which were giving lectures at the third course for the *técnicos de administración civil*,³⁰ as he was both an OECD consultant on administrative matters and director of The French Higher Council for Scientific Research.³¹

Among the conferences which took place in Alcalá it is worth mentioning: An International study conference about "Methods for Industrial Development", "The II session of the intergovernmental conference of studies of the European public administration" in 1962, arranged by the European Council and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "International conference of administrative information" arranged by the Technical Secretary General of the Governments Presidency, Study seminar about "The public administration, instrument for economic development" in 1964 arranged by OECD, XVII Round table of the "

²⁷ López Rodó (1990) op.cit.

²⁸ Larrain, op.cit., p.97.

²⁹ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July 1996.

³⁰ *Memoria del curso 1963-64*, op.cit., p.34.

³¹ *Proyecto de memoria curso 1964-65*, Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios, Alcalá de Henares, p.6.

Association for the study of European problems" in 1965 arranged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and *Banco de España*, and the "II International Congress of education for higher civil servants."³²

I believe it is important to note that the receptiveness to foreign experiences within the centre, not only was a matter of promoting the *techniques per se*. One of the most characteristic traits of the 'theo-technocratic' group was that they were predominantly highly in favour of letting Spain take part in the ongoing European integration process. Within *La Escuela de Alcalá* the second group of *técnicos* from 1962, had seven lectures focused on the themes; *Historic development of the European community* and *European unity*.³³ Once again, I believe that this 'Europeanism' was more of a means to reach the overriding goal; the economic development of Spain. With the theo-technocratic attitude towards science and technology which implies a great deal of pragmatism and faith in the cultural neutrality of these phenomena, they simply thought that a strategy aiming at European *economic* integration was the strategy that served the economic interests of Spain in the long run. López Rodó stated in 1963 that: "The national planning [...] is nothing more than a necessary stage toward plurinational planning within the context of great economic regions."³⁴ We have to understand the Spanish application for EEC membership in 1962 in light of these thoughts. Even though the application was rejected, I believe it is important to note that such an influential group within the franquist regime worked for European integration, long before Spain officially became a part of this process as a democracy. It is also important to note that they were quite successful in getting beneficial agreements with the EEC during the 1960's, and in fact had a more favourable balance of trade with the EEC-countries in the late 60's than the country have today.³⁵ As Miguel Beltrán told me: "Regarding the economic development, the servants, primarily within the ministries of Finance and Commerce, closely followed the progress achieved by what has turned out to become the European Union."³⁶

³² *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.30. (my transl.)

³³ *Ciclos de conferencias sobre política y planes de la administración del estado, problemas políticos y sociales de actualidad y estudios superiores de derecho administrativo que fueron pronunciados al II curso de técnicos de administración civil*. Document from Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios, Alcalá de Henares.

³⁴ López Rodó (1963b) op.cit., pp.125-126. (my transl.)

³⁵ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July 1996.

³⁶ Conversation with Miguel Beltrán, the 17th of April 1997.

Selection of candidates to promote the reform

The first year 70 vacancies within the different departments were to be filled with people from this corps of *técnicos*: 1 in the Government's Presidency, 25 in Public Works, 15 in National Education, 6 in Labour, 14 in Industry, 5 in Commerce and 4 in the Ministry of Information and Tourism.³⁷ The following year the total number was increased to 131 with a notable contribution from the Ministry of Finance which was to receive 50 of the candidates from 1962.³⁸ In the forthcoming years the number of students could vary according to the need of new servants within the different departments, and of course due to the state of the over all ongoing struggle within the distinct ministries regarding the competence of the *técnicos* vs. the traditional 'special corpses'. The *técnicos* went to all the ministries, but during the first three years (1961-1963) they made most impact, at least in numbers, in the ministries of Finance(74), Public Works (47), Industry (45) and Labour (42).

The candidates were to be selected after having gone through three eliminative tests. The first year there were 1056 applicants registered for a total of 70 vacancies within the ministries. 470 were invited to the first language test, which consisted in translation in writing of an English or French text of the candidate's choice. Among these 290 were approved for the second test which consisted in a four hours exercise in writing on one of the following themes: Economy, Political History, Administrative Law or Political Science. From this test 105 were approved.³⁹ The final test was to be oral with a duration of maximum one hour. During the test the candidate was to answer questions related to the following themes: Political and social history of Spain and the rest of the world, State Organisation, Economy, Public Finances, Administrative Law and Administrative Science. In the States Official Journal (*Boletín Oficial del Estado*) the program for this third and final test was presented through 133 points related to the above mentioned themes. 46 of these were related to Administrative Science and ranged from knowledge of the new formal organisation of the

³⁷ "TV. Oposiciones y Concursos" in *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 14th of April 1960.

³⁸ *Memoria del año 1962*, op.cit.,p.35.

³⁹ *Primera Oposición conjunta de técnicos de Administración civil*, Document from the Ministry of Public Administration (Ministerio para las Administraciones Públicas), Madrid, p.61-62.

administration to rationalization techniques to be applied within given departments.⁴⁰ Hence, one could say that a great part of the curriculum for the final entrance test was concentrated on the two basic laws affecting the reform; the *State Administration's Jurisdictional Law* concerning the formal organisational reform, and the *Law of Administrative Procedure* concerning the new procedural techniques to be applied within the administration.

It is further noteworthy to pay attention to the intellectual direction the reformers wanted to put into the tests:

"Notwithstanding the similarity with previous exams, some interesting novelties must be mentioned: The great importance one has put on knowledge of basic economical concepts and problems. [...] With this educational criterium one has also included themes of Political and Social History, in order to broaden the mental horizon of the candidates as to be intellectually prepared for a better understanding of the political and social development."⁴¹

This citation is related to the third and final oral exam. But this new orientation is also very much present in the themes to be elaborated on in the written test: "General characteristics of the Spanish economy, Non juridical aspects of the public administration, Money politics as an instrument in the economic policy, The public administration in Spain; its evolution and present state."⁴² We can here clearly recognize an effort to direct the education towards a less formalistic, more change oriented attitude which goes well with the overall aim to break with the traditional juridical formalism and make the *técnicos* more of a social engineer type characterised by " [...] an innovative and dynamic spirit far from the pure formalism which guided the old formulas."⁴³ Miguel Beltrán says that one of the special traits of the education at Alcalá was that it was directed to let the norms of the law be a factor for transformation, not as previously to guaranty privileges or work for the maintenance of status quo. As such the school was very much inspired by Anglo-Saxon, and especially North-American, juridical pragmatism.⁴⁴ The school was hence to teach; budgeting techniques as opposed to financial law, administration of personnel as opposed to juridical boundaries of

⁴⁰ "Oposiciones y Concursos" in *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 19th of May 1960.

⁴¹ Op. cit. (my transl.)

⁴² Op.cit. "

⁴³ *Memoria del año 1961*, op.cit.,p.12. (my transl.)

⁴⁴ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.147.

the public administration, economy, sociology, political science and history as opposed to administrative and constitutional law.⁴⁵

The entering exams were in this way very much related to qualify a certain type of personnel as almost all of the qualifying tests were intimately linked with the ongoing reform. Another illustration of the reformers' urge to find the 'right men and women'⁴⁶ is the fact that, before entering the courses, each participant had to undergo a so called "psychotechnic test"(sic) in order to collect data on the students intelligence, personality and character. This was done to " [...] give [...] the necessary data to investigate the procedures of selection and education [so that we] will have a rational base for evaluating the utility and value of these tests for the public administration."⁴⁷

To my judgement it is thus fair to characterize the qualification process as not primarily a question of whether you were in possession of some type of formal knowledge or not, but whether *you understood the reform process you were supposed to be a part of and whether you as such could be a useful instrument for its fulfilment.*

Educational courses for the 'Técnicos de Administración Civil'

In this part of my work I will investigate the study programs for the education of the higher civil servants, the so called *Técnicos de Administración Civil*, as they were the 'target corps' to be educated at the centre. Thereafter I will also touch upon the courses, the so called *training* (perfeccionamiento), that were given to elite servants already in service. A great part of the educational activity at the centre was also directed towards lower level servants, to those in the Administrative, Assistant and Subordinate corpses. In fact, the majority of those who attended courses at *La Escuela de Alcalá*, are to be found within this group. Nevertheless, in order to detect the 'spirit' and intellectual orientation of the school I find it rational to concentrate on the education and training of the functionarial elite.

⁴⁵ Op.cit., p.150.

⁴⁶ Eight of a total of fifty-eight *Técnicos de Administración Civil* who was approved the first year, were women. (*Memoria del año 1961*, pp.73-74)

⁴⁷ *Plan de Estudios para el I curso de técnicos de Administración civil*, Alcalá de Henares, 1960, Document from MAP, pp.7-8. (my transl.)

It was not until the centre had moved to Alcalá de Henares that a distinct course for the *técnicos* was elaborated. The 14th. of April 1960 was the first qualifying test for the first candidates announced in *The State's Official Bulletin*.⁴⁸ Until this date the centre was giving courses in a less systematic manner. In 1958 444 civil servants took part in a total of 26 courses concentrated on a general 'scientization' of the administrative work, and the distinct courses dealt with among others: "Human Relations in the Administration", "Mechanisation and automatization", "Directing reunions", "Basic education in administrative organization", "Organization and methods of administrative work", "Scientific organization of work in the administration" and "The technique of administrative organization."⁴⁹ The same traits were followed in 1959, but now with a total of 1019 participants divided on 68 courses.⁵⁰ The courses given these two first years were predominantly 'informative' as they were called.⁵¹ They were set up to introduce the servants to the new techniques which the reformers wanted to guide the administrative work. It was all a matter of breaking the old juridical routine and introduce new science based ways of doing things which would make the organisation a more 'rational' instrument to fulfil its ends.

During the period I have studied, between the end of 1958 and 1970, a total of 15 455 persons got their education or training at the centre.⁵² This includes those who attended courses before the programme for the *técnicos* was created in 1960. It seems as if the majority of the people attending courses in the first two years were so called higher civil servants with executive authority (*superiores*), because only a little more than 20% had no university degree.⁵³ If I am careful and suggest that 50% of those trained at the centre previous to its relocation to Alcalá were higher civil servants, it would imply that for the total of the period approximately 4.500 Spanish higher civil servants either got their education or subsequent training in *La Escuela de Alcalá*.⁵⁴

What I have called the 'target corps' of the school was as previously noted designated to hold executive functions in their respective departments, paying

⁴⁸ "IV. Oposiciones y Concursos" in *Boletín Oficial del Estado*, 14th of April 1960.

⁴⁹ *Memoria del año 1958*, op.cit.,p.68. (my transl.)

⁵⁰ *Memoria del año 1959*, op.cit.,p.57.

⁵¹ Op.cit., p.52.

⁵² *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit.,p.27.

⁵³ *Memoria del año 1958*, op.cit.,p.70 and *Memoria del año 1959*, op.cit.,p.59.

⁵⁴ *Crónica de 10 años*, p.27.

considerable attention to the interministerial Co-operation and co-ordination. The *Técnico de Administración Civil* corps was to represent "[...] a decisive step towards the uniformation of the corpses"⁵⁵ as it was put in the schools annual report from 1960. In the annual report of the next year this is stressed further, using foreign experiences as an example to follow:

"The conjunct selection and education will increase the unifying and cohesive spirit among the servants, and as such to a strong degree avoid suspicion between the corpses which has made the co-ordination of the departments so difficult. This is a widely recognized principle today, and as the most characteristic examples one could mention Great Britain, France and West Germany."⁵⁶

The *técnicos* were selected among candidates with a university degree and were to get their education at *La Escuela de Alcalá* during a highly intensive course which was not to last more than 6 months, followed by a period of practice in one of the departments.

After the first year's selection 59 candidates were approved, i.e. with a shortage of eleven compared to the 70 in the original calling. It is symptomatic of the traditional juridical dominance of the Spanish public administration that among these 56 had degrees in Law while only two and one respectively had degrees in Philosophy and Political Science.⁵⁷ In the study plan for this first group of *técnicos* it is stated that an important part of the education will intend "[...] to promote a creative administrative mentality and a dynamic attitude in their future service."⁵⁸ To obtain this it is proposed that the education should consist of 1) frequent practical works, 2) visits, at least once a week, to different organizations (here it is stressed that these organizations should not only be public administration organizations, but also business, industrial and financial ones), 3) use of visual media as much as possible, 4) journeys to study the realization of administrative projects and 5) efforts to promote further individual study and research on relevant topics.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *Memoria del año 1960*, op.cit., p.65.

⁵⁶ *Memoria del año 1961*, op.cit., p.58. (my transl.)

⁵⁷ *Memoria del año 1961*, op.cit., p.62.

⁵⁸ *Plan de Estudios para el I curso de técnicos de Administración civil*, p.4. (my transl.)

⁵⁹ Op.cit., pp.5-6.

In 1961 the centre had five permanent instructors but in general the teaching was very much based on hired personel who gave courses in their respective specialities within the ambit of 'Administrative Technique'.⁶⁰ This year ten specialists were hired for such purposes among whom three were specialists in 'Organization and Methods', four were engineers and the remaining three were respectively Mercantile Professor, Psychologist and State Lawyer.⁶¹ In 1961, 27 University professors took part in the education and training of those designated for, or already holding a higher position within the administration, i.e. the *técnicos* and higher servants outside the 'special corpses'. Of these, 14 were professors in Law, predominantly in Administrative Law (nine out of fourteen). Eight of the professors had their specialities within economy, ranging from Economic Theory and Economic Policy to Public Finances. Of the remaining five, two were philosophers, two statisticians and one was Psychiatrist.⁶² Apart from this, the centre invited 41 General Directors and Subsecretaries within the public administration to give lectures about the ongoing work in the different departments.⁶³ It is also worth paying attention to the fact that forty-one servants from the distinct departments played a considerable role as participants in conferences and seminars in relation with the education of the *técnicos*.⁶⁴ Last but not least, during the two first years in Alcalá (1960-1961), twenty-two foreign specialists and professors took part in the activities of the centre, mainly as lecturers. Six of those were French, four came from the United States, and apart from this participated people from Italy, Germany, Portugal and Switzerland.⁶⁵ In the annual report from 1961 it is pointed out that *La Escuela de Alcalá*, despite its short existence, had attracted a great deal of foreign interest. Through three pages, names of forty-eight international prominences who had visited the centre, are listed up.⁶⁶

Regarding the content of the educational programmes of the *técnicos* it is interesting to look at some of the lectures given during conferences as a part of the second course, in 1961/62. It becomes more than evident that what we are dealing with is what I have called 'administration for economic growth'. In twelve lectures the planning of economic development was explicitly the theme

⁶⁰ *Memoria del año 1961*, op.cit., p.37.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Op.cit. pp. 40-41.

⁶³ Op.cit., pp.38-40.

⁶⁴ Op.cit., pp.42-44.

⁶⁵ Op.cit., pp.44-45.

⁶⁶ Op.cit., pp.140-142.

as in D. Enrique Fuentes Quintana's *The planning of economic development and financial politics*. Other lectures bore titles as *Social economic development, Planning and its objectives, Econometric models for economic planning, Social aspects of economic planning, Social security and economic development, Planning of economic development in relation to transport, Planning of economic development in relation to agriculture, The social aspects of planning, Politics of promotion and development of tourism, The impulse of administrative action and Economic development in Civil Governments*.⁶⁷ Once again we get the impression of an active, social engineer ideal of the public administration, far removed from juridical formalism.

I stated above that the education of the *técnicos* was to have a duration of up to six months. The course programme for the fourth course from 5th of October 1964 to 31st of March 1965 will serve as an example of the content of these six months. In fact there are very small changes in the content of the courses for the *técnicos* during all of the period, except the fact that it was prolonged from four to six months with the third course in 1963-64. The programme was divided in two areas; the general which was compulsory for all the students and one specialized in accordance with the respective Ministry of service after the termination of the course.

The general programme consisted of a total of two hundred and ninety-eight hours of lectures evenly divided on the following subjects: 1) *Organization and Methods*, 2) *Administration of personnel*, 3) *Administrative procedure*, 4) *Finance and cost administration*, 5) *Administrative Psychosociology*, 6) *Statistics*, 7) *Economic policy*, 8) *Economic structure*. Throughout the whole period the students were attending courses in their specialization whether it be in the Ministry of Finance, Interior, Education, Labour or Industry⁶⁸ for a total of seventy-two hours.⁶⁹ The lectures went from Monday to Friday with the morning session from 10 to 13.30 and the evening sessions from 16 to 18. During the course the students thus attended 370 hours of lectures apart from conferences,

⁶⁷ *Ciclos de conferencias sobre política y planes de la administración del estado, problemas políticos y sociales de actualidad y estudios superiores de derecho administrativo que fueron pronunciados al II curso de técnicos de administración civil*, op.cit., pp.1-3.

⁶⁸ These were the Ministries for which this particular group of *técnicos* were designated, and the specializations offered were of course in accordance with the demand in the respective ministries.

⁶⁹ *Indicaciones Sobre el desarrollo del IV curso de formación de técnicos de administración civil*, 1964. Document from MAP, Madrid 1964, pp.1-2.

seminars, journeys etc. Before the final exam they had been tested in three partial exams.⁷⁰

Before I proceed with a more detailed description of the course contents I must make a qualification of my sources. The course plan described above is from the fourth group (1964-65). It was only possible to find a more detailed description of the courses regarding the third group from 1963-64. Nevertheless I believe this is no major problem because, as it is said in the centre's annual report from the academic year 1964-65: "The general characteristics of the programme are the same as last year, and are as such known from the annual reports of the previous courses, but with some novelties worth mentioning."⁷¹ The most interesting novelty in this context is that for the course of 1964-65 they had; "[...] foremost increased the economic education of the Public Administration Technicians with an ample course in *Politics and Economic Structure*, under the guidance of Professor D. Enrique Fuentes Quintana."⁷² Apart from an increased focus on economy, I thus think I am on safe ground when presenting the content of the courses of 1964-65 on the basis of the detailed programme of 1963-64.

As noted earlier the courses in *Organization and Methods* dealt with new procedural techniques for doing the administrative work more efficiently. To be more specific, one part of these courses dealt with problems related to the management of an organization centred around concepts as planning, programming, co-ordination and control. The central point here is "organizational structure as a technical productivity factor."⁷³ Another part of these 'O&M' courses dealt with the simplification of procedures. The key concept here is 'scientific organization of work', explicitly inspired by Taylor. It is furthermore elaborated on how to do time and cost studies etc. and thereby increase efficiency.⁷⁴ Yet another part of 'O&M' consisted in the study and elaboration of procedures for standardization and classification of documents. The final part of these courses dealt with mechanisation of the administrative work, i.e. introduction of new technology as physical instruments.⁷⁵

⁷⁰ Op.cit., pp.2-3.

⁷¹ *Proyecto de Memoria del curso 1964-65*, op.cit., p.6. (my transl.)

⁷² Ibid. (my transl.)

⁷³ *Memoria del curso 1963-64*, op.cit., p.41. (my transl.)

⁷⁴ Op.cit., pp.42-44.

⁷⁵ Op.cit., pp. 44-46.

Courses regarding *Administration of personnel* stressed the similarity between the administration of a business enterprise and the public administration and the need to see administration as such as a technology based upon science.⁷⁶ During these courses, problems concerning the flexibility of the administration vs. a rigid legislative administration are discussed in relation with the *State Administrations Jurisdictional Law*. Furthermore, the Spanish administration is analysed in a comparative perspective: Both its function and selection procedures are seen in relation to experiences in US, UK, France, West Germany and Italy. Throughout this part of the course, it is repeatedly focused on for what purpose and how the servants should be educated.⁷⁷ The following issues deal with principles of retributions within the administration, economic incentives such as prizes for exceptional performance, and the need to do periodical evaluations of the personnel.⁷⁸

The courses in *Administrative procedure* dealt in their totality with the principles of the Law of Administrative Procedures. In short these classes focused on how to rationalize the administration, and the manner in which these principles were embedded in the new law.⁷⁹ Central themes were; information channels, public information, initiatives for administrative action, how to deal with reclamations and registration of documents.⁸⁰

Finance and cost administration lessons had the character of a basic course which most of all intended to present the basic concepts and problems regarding the subject. It was elaborated on both the political, juridical and economic aspects of the administrative responsibility regarding budgeting.⁸¹ Furthermore it was paid attention to control, both internal and external, of the financial administration and the way to evaluate its effects on society.⁸²

The course in *Administrative Psychosociology* opens with an introduction to the methodology of experimental psychology and sociology and the utility of the application of these sciences in organisations in general. The concepts and attitudes within Human Relation theory is presented and related to the

⁷⁶ Op.cit., p.49.

⁷⁷ Op.cit., p.50.

⁷⁸ Op.cit., p.51.

⁷⁹ Op.cit., pp.52-53.

⁸⁰ Op.cit., pp.53-56.

⁸¹ Op.cit., p.56.

⁸² Op.cit., pp.56-57.

businesslike aspects of the public administration. The affiliation to the behavioural sciences is stated when as an opening remark, personality is analysed on the basis of "human behaviour" and the "goals of behaviour within administrative work".⁸³ The course goes on with conclusions regarding the applicability of these sciences in the actual work of the *técnicos*. In the continuance the course deals with studies of motivation and attitude and techniques for improving these. The rest of the course are centred around concepts such as frustration in the administrative work, moral as a personal and group phenomenon in the administrative work, management and informal communication. The last part deals with public relations techniques and its social effects, and the relevancy of utilising these techniques within the public administration.⁸⁴

The *Statistics* course highlights the function of statistics within, the by now famous, *Organización & Métodos*. Much of the lessons dealt with the sampling of data, making questionnaires and analyzing results. Apart from this it was worked upon getting to know and use mathematical and graphical concepts through practical exercises. The course also included training in making different statistical presentations.⁸⁵ The importance given to this subject becomes clear through the last part on the course programme: "Statistics as the fundamental science for activities of 'programming and control'".⁸⁶

Miguel Beltrán was educated as *técnico de administración civil* in 1963, and he later worked in the Ministry of Commerce for some years. At present he is a sociologist at the *Universidad Autónoma de Madrid* and has recently written the chapter about the history of the Spanish administration in the XLI edition of one of Spain's most important works on national history; *La Historia de España, Menéndez Pidal*. I find his attitude towards the centre and all of the reform process quite ambiguous. At the one side he is highly critical towards the manipulative tendencies of the curricula at *La Escuela de Alcalá*, but at the same time he highly regrets the occasional lack of influence of the *técnicos* in their subsequent service. I do not find his attitude inconsistent: It is quite possible to regret the lack of coherence implied by the power of the more or less autonomous 'special corps' and as such advocate a co-ordinating administrative reform, and

⁸³ Op.cit., p.46. (my transl.)

⁸⁴ Op.cit., pp.47-49.

⁸⁵ Op.cit., pp. 57-59.

⁸⁶ Op.cit., p.59. (my transl.)

at the same time be critical towards the actual content of the education who should guide the reform. This is how he characterizes the content of the courses for the *técnicos*:

"It was very much a matter of administrative science of the 1950's, derived more or less directly from Taylorism; time and motion studies, operation analyses etc. In short, all the principles of scientific management. Apart from this it was influenced by Human Relations theory, and some of this in its worst and manipulative version: Not to let people participate, but to believe that they participated. For example they had lessons in management and group meetings etc. with the explicit intension to manipulate people. The worst orientation of the applied and business-oriented, North-American school of Human Relations. Much of it was fundamentally manipulative."⁸⁷

On the basis of this investigation, I believe it is fair to say that the educational courses for the *Técnicos de Administración Civil* aimed at creating a new *persona* within the Spanish public administration; the non-formalistic social engineer trained to administrate change and efficiency through knowledge of procedural techniques, administrative sociology, group psychology and financial administration for defined social purposes. As it is stated in the ten year chronicle from 1970: "[...] La Escuela de Alcalá represents a living chapter of the Anglo-Saxon 'behavioural sciences', which has such great influence on the present renovation of the political and administrative sciences."⁸⁸ Notwithstanding recurrent talk of the legitimate task of the modern civil servants to be the "representatives of the collective interests"⁸⁹ I have found nothing to contend Beltrán's evaluation of the courses, in least during the initial phase, to a large extent to promote "fundamentally manipulative" techniques for being so.

Other courses

Regarding the training of the higher civil servants already in service, the so called *perfeccionamiento*, the courses were usually directed towards one special issue concerning their actual work:

⁸⁷ Conversation with Miguel Beltrán, the 17th of April 1997.

⁸⁸ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.4. (my transl.)

⁸⁹ Op.cit., p.1. (my transl.)

"The training activities are diverse, and in its execution it works upon three concrete levels: Specialization courses, among which the course in Organization and Methods is the most salient [...]; Management courses, through which the centre has created the figure of the servant-manager (*funcionario-directivo*) as a technician qualified for the possession of a diploma which gives him the right to hold a position of greater responsibility; and concerted courses with different services of the central and institutional administration, on their petition, and which are set up to meet the essential goal of operating the necessary change of mentality among the servants, to successfully work on the tasks of structural and functional reform which at all times might be advisable."⁹⁰

These courses had gathered;

"[...] specialists from private enterprise, from the administration, from the university and other cultural centres to discuss living and varied issues: ranging from personnel politics to incentives for socio-economic development, from agricultural economy to the use of mathematical models for decision making."⁹¹

In a strict sense these courses dealt with the functional aspect of the reform as they treated new techniques to be implemented in the servant's daily work. To participate in the courses of *Organization and Methods* one had to be in possession of a university degree, be between 30 and 50 years of age and having served in the public administration for a minimum of 5 years.⁹² Until 1965 the applications for these courses were six times higher than the centre could offer.⁹³ The courses lasted for ten weeks followed by a compulsory practical work of three months which applied elements of the course in the actual service. The course content was very similar to parts of the courses for the *técnicos*: The programme included Organizational and Directive Techniques, Simplification of administrative work, Administrative Psychosociology, Statistics etc.⁹⁴ Naturally, these courses also affected the cultural aspects of the reform: "As the courses are directed to an elite of the civil servants it is easy to understand that the courses

⁹⁰ *Memoria del curso 1963-64*, op.cit., p.41. (my transl.)

⁹¹ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.5. (my transl.)

⁹² "Formación de especialistas de O. & M. en la Administración pública española" in *Revista Internacional de Ciencias Administrativas*, Vol XXXI - 1965, n.1, International Institute of Administrative Science, Bruxelles. Article from *Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios*, p.45.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Op.cit., p.46.

will promote greater unity of the public administration, and hence, a better co-ordination of the services."⁹⁵

Thus, the direction and intellectual orientation of the training of those already in service do not differ at all from the main tendencies within the educational courses at the centre. It is nevertheless, once again, important to note the flexibility of the centre with respect to outside institutions and organisations, just as if it were some kind of a service centre to promote and facilitate the implementation of a new way of thinking on administrative matters.

Research Activities

1962 was the opening year for research activities within the centre by its participation in the finalization of two doctoral theses.⁹⁶ During the period I have studied, two research institutes of importance were established at the school. First, by order from the Government's Presidency of the 11th of September 1963, one year before the implementation of the *First Plan for Economical and Social Development* (Primer Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social), the *Institute for Economic Development* (Instituto de Desarrollo Económico) was created. As an opening activity the institute arranged a cycle of conferences regarding questions of economic development, in co-operation with OECD.⁹⁷ From 1969 the institute was to edit the journal *Documentación Económica*. This had been created in 1957 as a journal for OCYPE (The Office for Economic Co-ordination and Planning), and from 1962 it depended on the *Commissionary of the Economical and Social Development Plan* (Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo Económico y Social). From 1969 on, the journal was to inform on research activities of The Institute for Economic Development.⁹⁸ Subsequently, in 1966, the *Institute for Administrative Studies* (Instituto de Estudios Administrativos) was created.⁹⁹ This institute was soon to become the nexus for, among other issues, planning of educational reforms, and was lead by D. José Luis Villar Palasí. In 1969, Villar Palasí became Minister of Science and Education and was as such responsible for the implementation in the following

⁹⁵ Ibid. (my transl.)

⁹⁶ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.13.

⁹⁷ Op.cit., p.14.

⁹⁸ Op.cit., p.37.

⁹⁹ Op.cit., p.16.

year of the *General Law of Education* (Ley General de Educación). This law has later been considered the most modern and future oriented laws of the franquist period, and has fomented a great number of studies.¹⁰⁰ The historian, Carlos Páris, has for example evaluated it to contain almost all the proposals and intentions which were embedded in the Socialist Party's proposal for educational reforms in 1988.¹⁰¹

Both these institutes were created as direct responses to the development of the technocratic reform process in large, i.e. economic reform by the use of indicative planning (Institute for Economic Development) and the demand of qualified personel to deal with the exigencies of the administration in an increasingly technified and complex society (Institute for Administrative Studies). In the over all reform process, economic development plans was at the centre of political debate in 1963, as was the need for educational reform in the latter part of the 1960's. In this way we can clearly perceive the predominantly *instrumental* aspect of *La Escuela de Alcalá* within the overriding modernization and 'europeanization' of the regime. As it is stated in the ten year chronicle: "[...] the school has always been flexible and realistic, and it has frequently proceeded in accordance with the 'demand'."¹⁰² It must be added that this 'demand' is that of the overall technocratic reforms.

By the end of 1970 the Institute for Economic Development had published twenty-two books and the Institute for Administrative Studies a total of ninety-eight.¹⁰³ The studies concerning economic development were predominantly case oriented and specific and dealt in general with practical problems regarding the different economic sectors of the country or social problems in relation with economic development and change. The Institute of Administrative Studies published books of a more theoretical character concerning the role and impact of the public administration in society. Some titles should be mentioned to indicate the orientation of the studies conducted: 1) *The public administration and socio-*

¹⁰⁰ E.g. *Revista de Educación. Número extraordinario; La ley General de Educación veinte años después* (The General Law of Education - twenty years after), (1992) Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación (MEC), Madrid.

¹⁰¹ Páris, Carlos (1991) "La Universidad Tecnocrática" in Carreras Ares, Juan José/ Ruiz Carnicer, Miguel Ángel, *La universidad Española bajo el régimen de Franco(1939-1975)*, Zaragoza, 1991, p.452. In connection with this reform, education spending increased by 66% in real terms between 1969 and 1971. (Gunther (1980) op.cit. p.171)

¹⁰² *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.18. (my transl.)

¹⁰³ Op.cit, pp.32-37.

economic change by Laureano López Rodó; 2) *The limitations of monetary politics* by Javier Irastorza Revuelta; 3) *The administrative organization of the development plans* by José Luis Meilán Gil; 4) *Industrial Society and public administration* by Ernst Forsthoff; 5) *Technification of the public administration* by Celestino Fernandez de la Vega; 6) *The administrative rationalization in local administration* by Luis Blanco de Tella; 7) *Administrative organization in its social context* by Salvatore Cimmino; 8) *The Administrative State* by Fritz Morstein Marx; 9) *The non juridical thinking within public administration* by Georges Langrod; 10) *Education and development* by Miguel Siguán Soler; 11) *Educational policy and financing* by Ricardo Diez Hochleitner; 12) *University plans for education in contemporary Spain* by José Luis Meilán Gil and 13) *Educational Planning* by various authors.¹⁰⁴

The central issues in the different book collections of the Institute for Administrative Studies were predominantly; the relation between administration and economic development (1-4), rationalisation of administrative procedure (5-9) and the need for educational planning as an integrated part of this process (10-13). It is also noteworthy to pay attention to the notable innslag of books concerning foreign experiences. In addition to twenty-one books which are predominantly theoretical and of a universalistic scope, thirteen studies deals explicitly with foreign, and predominantly French, issues. It can also be mentioned, both as a curious fact and as an expression of the social relevance of the topics studied, that one of the school's publications received the literary price, *National Book Award Menendez y Pelayo*, in 1969.¹⁰⁵

As a part of the research activities of the centre I think it is also proper to mention the journal DA. Although DA could not be considered as dealing with research in a strict sense, it is important as it debated themes of the reform throughout the process. In the annual report of the school from 1963 it is said that the journal "[...] has tried to remain in the difficult but adequate position between a scientific journal for experts and an informative booklet[...]"¹⁰⁶ In the preface of the first edition of the journal it is said that its purpose was to "inform and facilitate the documentation of the administrative reform" and "spread a general concern about administrative problems to the public". The motive was to "create a

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Op.cit., p.36. The study was José Antonio Escudero's *State and office secretaries*.

¹⁰⁶ *Memoria del curso 1963-64*, op.cit., p.64. (my transl.)

favourable climate for the reform."¹⁰⁷ In general the journal was effectively promoting the reform from day to day, or more precisely, from month to month. In this study I have included articles from the journal when appropriate. Apart from this, it is obvious that the general intellectual orientation was totally in line with the spirit of the school in Alcalá, on which it depended. To simplify somewhat I will conclude that all the articles deal either with foreign experiences, exploration of management techniques or actual implementation of the reform in Spain. It was most of all an instrument for spreading information about the ongoing reform to the servants themselves. In 1961, one year after the move of the centre to Alcalá, 1 603 were subscribing for the journal and most of these were civil servants.¹⁰⁸

Opus Dei and 'La Escuela de Alcalá'

As noted in chapter five, whether a person is associated with Opus Dei in one way or another is not to be found in any kind of membership register. A person's connection with this organization is strictly a matter of ones own business, and this makes it somewhat difficult to analyse the degree to which the school was directly influenced by Opus Dei.

It should nevertheless be clear by now that the creation of the school was almost entirely a project of the Opus Dei *numerario* Laureano López Rodó. His personal friend and *numerario* of Opus Dei,¹⁰⁹ José Luis Meilán Gil, was professor in economical administration at the school¹¹⁰ and published seven books in its different collections throughout the sixties.¹¹¹ In 1969 he was appointed Technical Secretary General of the Governments Presidency,¹¹² the same position as the one López Rodó had held before his subsequent appointment as Commissioner of the Development Plan in 1962. José Luis Villar Palasí, *numerario* of Opus Dei as well,¹¹³ was professor in financial administration of the school¹¹⁴ and was appointed Director of its newly created Institute for Administrative Studies in

¹⁰⁷ Introduction to *Documentacion Administrativa*, n.1:1958, p.4. (my transl.)

¹⁰⁸ *Memoria del año 1961*, op.cit., p.164.

¹⁰⁹ Conversation with Miguel Beltrán, the 17th of April 1997.

¹¹⁰ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p. 39.

¹¹¹ Op.cit., pp.32-37.

¹¹² Op.cit., p.24.

¹¹³ Casanova, op.cit., p.232.

¹¹⁴ *Crónica de 10 años*, op.cit., p.39.

1966.¹¹⁵ As mentioned above, he became Minister of Science and Education in 1969. Javier Irastorza Revuelta, also *numerario* of Opus Dei, was Adjunct Director of the school's research oriented *Institute for Economic Development*, and became eventually, in 1969, Secretary General in the Development Plan Commissionary.¹¹⁶ Although this list is not complete, it would indicate that people strongly associated with Opus Dei held both central positions within the school, and eventually core political positions within the regime.

Regarding the ideological orientation of the higher civil servants of the elite corps during this period, Miguel Beltrán told me that they were predominantly;

"servants more or less in sympathy with Opus Dei. My impression is that it was not required any formal connection with Opus Dei or any explicit activism or adhesion, but one could not be against, and most of the servants were benevolent towards Opus Dei or explicitly sympathetic."¹¹⁷

It is not my intention to present the public administration school in Alcalá de Henares as an exclusively Opus Dei project. Nevertheless I think it is fair to say that the spirit of the school was highly influenced by 'Opus Deistic' thoughts of the concept and role of science and technology within a Catholic authoritarian reality. It is equally fair to say that the school served as a loyal instrument for all of the main projects of the so called 'technocratic' reforms starting in the late fifties; the administrative reform, the economic reform and eventually the educational reform. I think the empirical evidence to support my evaluation of the school as highly influenced by the spirit of Opus Dei and that this accounts for an important part of the characteristics of the school. More precisely, these characteristics are its receptiveness to scientific and technological instruments for directing and to some degree manipulating the work of the public administration so as to become the concerted administration for economic growth. It is thus my belief that the tremendous efforts which were done at the school to alter the functioning and spirit of the public administration were strongly motivated by the professional ethic of Opus Dei which told that your apostolate was to extoll in your profession and work for a great an integrated Catholic worldly reality. Apart from the fact that many of the central actors of the school were Opus Dei

¹¹⁵ Op.cit., p.19.

¹¹⁶ Op.cit., pp.24 and 26.

¹¹⁷ Conversation with Miguel Beltrán, the 17th of April 1997.

members, the intellectual orientation of the school almost completely converge with the Opus Dei concept of science and technology implicated by its professional ethic. As this professional ethic and concept of science and technology radically broke with traditional Spanish thoughts regarding these phenomena, I must conclude that the public administration school in Alcalá de Henares could not be properly understood without having in mind the influence of Opus Dei.

Conclusion

I stated in the beginning of this chapter that the administrative reform worked upon three different levels; the legal, the functional and the cultural, and that they must all be seen as interwoven parts of a tendency which should be analysed in conjunction. In this chapter I have situated the activities of *La Escuela de Alcalá* during a period of twelve years within the context of an ambitious and thoroughgoing administrative reform. The school must be understood as a functional and cultural institutionalization of the legal reforms. As such, the activities at the centre could be said to represent the 'spirit' and intellectual orientations of the reform process at large.

In the period I have studied, approximately 15 000 civil servants were educated or trained at the school. Among these almost 4 500 were higher civil servants who had, or were to have directive functions within the administration. The 'target corps' of both the reform in general and the school in particular, the *Técnico de Administración Civil*, was situated in the front-line of a struggle for power throughout the 60's. This will be further analysed in the next chapter. Through *La Escuela de Alcalá* the reformers tried to create a 'social engineer' type of civil servant through training in various aspects of foreign administrative science and technology. As such, the school gave education and training in concrete intellectual technologies which could be made operable in daily administrative work. The manipulative and 'one best way' character of these technologies gives the centre a strong technocratic taint. The activities of the school comprised both education, training and research. In spite of widespread co-operation with universities, these activities were at all times explicitly in accordance with the development of the reform process in large. One was not seeking knowledge for its own sake but rather as a tool to promote both administrative, economic and

educational reforms: *The Institute for Economic Development* was created in 1963, one year before the first economic and social development plan. The *Institute for Administrative Studies* was created in 1966, as a research institute concerned with the practical implementation of the administrative reform, as well as with the need for educational reform. The research activities at Alcalá were as such intimately linked with the day to day development of the reforms.

The overall aim of the administrative reform was to break with the traditional juridical formalism of the Spanish administration and introduce procedures and mentality which could facilitate what I have called 'administration for economic growth'. Administration should be seen as an instrument for fulfilling the changing needs of society as these were defined by the reformers themselves. Foreign administrative science and technology became the prime tools in this project and the school in Alcalá de Henares became *the* place for this to make an impact on the Spanish administration. I think the following three characteristics capture the spirit and intellectual orientation of the school and as such the reform process in large: 1) An almost unconditional acceptance of the relevancy of foreign experiences, 2) the extent to which education in different aspects of administrative science was seen as both a formal and mental means to reach the overriding goal of economic growth, and 3) the belief in science and technology as neutral instruments in this process.

The centre was very much open for input and influence from the outside world, both from the work and life of the Spanish administration and business community and especially from the international scene: Those who were in favour of breaking with the old routine which was at the same time formalistic and particularistic, and in some way could contribute to promote the reformers' desire for an administration for economic growth, were very well welcomed. Nevertheless, all this broadmindedness and receptiveness was carefully administrated and concentrated in the *Escuela de Alcalá* where it became an important tool for both a struggle for political power on behalf of the technocratic group as well as an influential institution for change of the workings within the franquist state.

The reforms were ambitious as they radically broke with Spanish administrative culture. In the following chapter I will turn to the question to what extent this, at least initially, intellectually generated reform, succeeded in gaining support and as such give momentum to an alteration of the workings of the public administration.

Chronology of events concerning the administrative reform

15th of July 1957:

The *State Administrations Jurisdictional Law* (Ley de Régimen Jurídico de la Administración del Estado) was approved in the National Assembly (Cortes). Its prime objective was to be an instrument for the co-ordination of the public administration.

19th of July 1957:

An important measure for creating a favourable climate towards the reform was taken by the inauguration of the once a year *Administrative Reform Study Week* (Semana de Estudio sobre La Reforma Administrativa) in Santander.

January 1958:

The monthly journal *Documentación Administrativa* (DA) was created. This should be a forum for debate about the ongoing reform process as well as a 'think-tank' and an important channel for foreign influence on the reform.

17th of July 1958:

The *Law of Administrative Procedures* (Ley de Procedimiento Administrativo) was approved in the National Assembly (Cortes). This law reflected the intention of turning away from an administration reluctant towards change, leaning on the law, towards an administration which found its *raison d'être* in managing change and development by establishing the principles of service, economy and efficiency as the catchwords of the day.

22nd of September 1958:

Centre for Education and Training of Civil Servants (*Centro de Formación y Perfeccionamiento de Funcionarios*) was created and temporarily situated on *Calle Trafalgar* in the centre of Madrid.

The 14th of April 1960:

The first qualifying test for candidates to the executive and interministerial corps, *Technicians of Public Administration* (Técnico de Administración Civil), was announced in *The States Official Bulletin* (El Boletín Oficial del Estado).

May 1960:

The centre was moved to the old convent which had housed the former *Universidad de Alcalá*, in the near Madrid small town of Alcalá de Henares.

December 1960:

Documentación Administrativa (DA) became the journal of the school.

11th of September 1963:

The *Institute for Economic Development* (Instituto de Desarrollo Económico) was created at Alcalá by order from the Government's Presidency.

21st of July 1966:

The *Institute for Administrative Studies* (Instituto de Estudios Administrativos) was created at Alcalá by order from the Government's Presidency, and the centre changed name to *National School of Public Administration* (Escuela Nacional de Administración Pública).

CHAPTER 8.

Effects of the reform

Introduction

Several social scientific studies regarding the effects of the technocratic administrative reform have been done.¹ Most of these are in some way related to Juan Linz' and Amando de Miguel's study, *Attitudes of the Spanish bureaucratic elite concerning the administrative reform* (La élite burocrática española ante la reforma administrativa) based upon a survey among high officials in 1967. This survey was conducted by a group of sociologists and experts in public administration on the request of, and financed by, The National School of Public Administration in Alcalá de Henares.² I believe it is correct to evaluate both this survey and the subsequent studies as a part of an intent to rationalize the bureaucracy as to be a part of what Carlos Moya has called a general 'national liberal reform'.³ As such there was a notion of this project being distinct from López Rodó's initial project of rationalizing the bureaucracy solely to be an administration for economic development.⁴ Even though López Rodó and the Alcalá research group converged in wanting to break the traditional particularism of the Spanish public administration, the overriding political projects of rationalizing the bureaucracy were as such distinct.

¹ The studies to be considered in more detail in this chapter is Beltrán, Miguel (1977) *La élite burocrática española*, Fundación Juan March, Editorial Ariel, Madrid. Beltrán, Miguel (1996) "La Administración" in Jover Zamora, José María (ed) *Historia de España Menéndez Pidal. La época de Franco (1939-1975). Vol I*, Espasa Calpe S.A., Madrid. Beltrán, Miguel (1994) *Política y administración bajo el franquismo: La reforma administrativa y los planes de desarrollo*, Working Paper 53/1994, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid. Linz, Juan J./de Miguel, Amando (1968) "La élite funcionarial española ante la reforma administrativa" in Sanchez Agesta, Luis (ed) *Sociología de la Administración Pública Española*, Centro de Estudios Sociales de la Santa Cruz de la Valle de los Caídos, Madrid. Nieto, Alejandro (1976) "De la República a la Democracia: la Administración española del franquismo (I)" in *Civitas. Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo*, n.11 and Nieto, Alejandro (1977) "De la República a la Democracia: la Administración española del franquismo (II)" in *Civitas. Revista Española de Derecho Administrativo*, n.15.

² Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.7. The researchers designated to conduct the survey were F. Andrés Orizo, Francisco Ansón, Miguel Beltrán, Luis Fernando Crespo, J. Julio Feo, Manuel Gómez-Reino, Eduardo Gorrochategui, Alberto Guitérrez Reñon, Juan J. Linz, Amando de Miguel, José Luis Romero y Darío Vila. (Beltrán (1977) op.cit. footnote 32, p.27)

³ Op.cit., p.27.

⁴ Ibid.

In my study of the reform I have focused on the reception and use of administrative science and technology as basic instruments in a political struggle for power on behalf of the Spanish technocrats. In this chapter I will therefore focus on how this reception and use influenced on *changes* of mentality and work of the civil servants. This is an aspect which is put in the background in the studies alluded to above. This can be explained as these studies are conducted in a context where the discrepancies between ideals and effects of the reform are striking. In addition, those who conducted these studies are highly critical to both the manipulative tendencies of the technocratic reformers and the traditional traits of the Spanish public administration. As such I feel them all to be biased toward focusing upon the aspects of the workings of the administration that are reminiscent of its historical past. In such a situation the natural question is; what have gone wrong? This judgement is supported by de la Oliva de Castro and Guitérrez Reñon when they in a study from 1968 says: "Perhaps never before have the historical-sociological process of the corpses reached such a high level of 'formalization' and 'fixation'. Perhaps, precisely because of this, one addresses more directly its defects, its mistakes and is as such inclined to make critical analyses."⁵ My own bias is rather to focus on the universalistic and pro modernizing elements which I believe can be read out of Linz' and de Miguel's survey. This is not merely a tactical move to support my own hypothesis, but an element which I believe must be put in explicit focus as to understand the historical significance of both the administrative reform itself, as well as the overriding process of change it undoubtedly was an important part of. Thus, in the last part of this chapter I will reformulate and modify the critique and ask: what was obtained by the reform, despite the discrepancy between the very ambitious ideals and the real effects? In order to prepare such an analyses I will use the first part of this chapter to summarize the most common critique regarding the effects of the administrative reform.

Academic critique of the reform

The critique of the administrative reform can be divided into three areas. These are; 1) critique of the reformers insistence on the political neutrality of their project, 2) critique of their retrospective rationalistic justification of the reform process in general and 3) critique of the alleged failure of the reform. The third

⁵ De la Oliva de Castro/ Guitérrez Reñon (1968) op.cit., p.147. (my transl.)

aspect is the one that is most directly relevant for this study. However, I believe that the two first aspects also have to be considered as they might clarify the discrepancy between the political impulse of the technocratic administrative reform and that which was advocated in most studies regarding the effects of the reform.

1) *The reform was not really technocratic but rather a part of a political project in disguise.*⁶ It has been a recurrent critique of the technocrats that they were much more politicians than technicians. I believe this partially to be true. The reforms surely was a part of a political project, but then again, all technocratic projects are in their very nature, as they fundamentally deal with ways of making policy. Whether the reform was technocratic or not deals with the techniques of decision making and not whether it was politically motivated. As I stated in chapter four, I believe that the most salient characteristic of a technocrat is that he or she will advocate that even *political* decisions must be scientifically or technologically made. I think this is exactly what the Spanish technocrats proposed. I also believe that my study of the activities at *La Escuela de Alcalá* strongly indicates that the spirit of the reform was truly technocratic.

Although I believe no technocratic project can ever be politically neutral, as Nieto implicitly says it can, he supports both the latter judgement and suggests the influential impact of *La Escuela de Alcalá* when he in the continuance of his article states:

"But nevertheless, there is some kind of truth in this picture of a technocratic administration which must be cautiously analysed. The most interesting case, as it could be expected, is the one regarding the so called economical ministries. [...] [i.e.] (Public Works, Housing, Agriculture, Industry and to some extent Commerce) [...] [They] developed an independent activity, vaguely co-ordinated by the direction of an economical plan of unmistakably technocratic inspiration (the so called Development Plan)." In fact, each and every one of these ministries is a technical island where the typical elements of a technocratic administration can be observed: a total lack of political inspiration [...], decisions are made by ministers of a highly technical qualification, assessed by corporate or sectorial councils, and their efficiency is expressed and supported through the enormous investment spendings attributed to them. The work of these departments is something the citizen can see, touch and frequently use[...]"⁷

⁶ Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.579.

⁷ Nieto (1977) op.cit., p.575. (my transl.)

2) *The technocrats in retrospect have presented an image of their project as being too instrumental and rational. As such they have created the national myth that the administrative reform preceded the economical development.*⁸ López Rodó's four volume autobiography are the prime advocate of such a rationalistic interpretation of the technocratic period in general and of the relation between administrative reform and economic development in particular. This is a debatable question, but I agree with Nieto to the extent that the technocratic reforms at large is a story of a lot of unintended consequences, and that a linear explanation of the relation of administrative reform and economic development is unable to detect a complex historical reality. Miguel Beltrán goes one step further when he argues that administrative reform and economic development were two almost separate projects of López Rodó's, and that "the administrative reform lost all of its political impulse when its promoter [López Rodó] abandoned it to dedicate himself to the economic development[...]"⁹

I find this argument contestable. Beltrán argues that as time went by and the hindrances of administrative reform seemed abundant, López Rodó more or less left this project and concentrated on economic development, at least from his appointment as Commissioner for the Economic Development Plan in 1962. I think that Beltrán by this suggests that López Rodó's actions were opportunistically motivated. I nevertheless think it is important to note that OCYPE was created with the administrative reform in 1957, thus making economic co-ordination and programming an integral part of the very administrative reform. In the first edition of DA from 1958, under the title *Themes of the Administrative reform*, López Rodó stated that: "The economic Ministries must act in coherence, regardless of how complicated their respective functions are, because if they do not the economic prosperity of the nation will remain compromised."¹⁰ Thus, as exposed in chapter six, economic prosperity was directly linked to lack of administrative co-ordination from the initial phases of the reform.

It is true that as time went by it was all the more talk about economic development and all the less about the administrative reform, but I believe one makes a mistake if one narrowly consider the administrative reform in its

⁸ Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.577.

⁹ Beltrán (1994) op.cit., p.29. (my transl.)

¹⁰ López Rodó (1958) op.cit., p.9. "

technical aspects without taking notice of the innate tacit assumption; that it would facilitate economic growth. López Rodó was no economist and may wisely, in the initial phase, have focused on the administrative aspects as an instrument and precondition for economic growth. But it surely was no matter of chance that OCYPE was created in 1957 as a part of the administrative reform and became in Beltrán's own words: "[...] in effect a very important centre of power: The National Investments Program was elaborated by OCYPE[...], and in some way anticipated the conceptual direction of the development policy."¹¹ I think it is important and correct to emphasize the close connection between the administrative and economic reforms from the very start as well as the continuity of this relation throughout the technocratic period. Perhaps one can say that this relation changed over time. In the initial phase, administrative reform and co-ordination were seen as prerequisites for economic growth. As time went by, and the economic indicators had shown favourable, López Rodó said in 1963 that the forthcoming Development Plan from 1964 hopefully would serve as a catalyst for the administrative reform and that planning and an effective administration were interwoven and indispensable parts of the economic development project.¹² Even though the focus may have changed I think it is important to keep in mind that administrative reform and economic development were closely connected from the very start.

I think that these two aspects of the critique presented above are important in the context of this study as it shows that both Beltrán and Nieto were highly critical of the political project of which the technocratic administrative reform was a part. I further believe that their attitude are very representative of the one favouring what Moya calls a 'national liberal reform', and which can be found among several intellectuals during the later franquist regime. Miguel Beltrán says that this 'national liberal reform' "[was] based on Webers' conceptual framework [...]."¹³ Thus, I find it reasonable to suggest that the studies of the effect of the administrative work was conducted by researchers who extolled the objective and universalistic aspects of science and believed these ideals to be a prerequisite for liberalisation within the Spanish state.

¹¹ Beltrán (1994) op.cit., p.9. (my transl. and italics)

¹² López Rodó (1963c) op.cit., p.27.

¹³ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.27. (my transl.)

3) It was a great discrepancy between the ideals of the reform and real effects. We remember López Rodó's report on the current state of the public administration in January of 1957.(see pp.80-81) In the 1967 survey one of the respondents said that;

"The first thing a good Spanish citizen must do when he has to resolve a matter of official character, is to become terrified. Later he must begin to think how to solve the problem and resort to his special 'friends'. Because in Spain the idea persists, and unfortunately it is often true, that the civil servant is a being who will bite the citizen."¹⁴

It is a striking similarity between López Rodó's report in 1957 and Linz and de Miguel's conclusions on the state of the public administration eleven years later. After having presented the weberian ideal type of bureaucracy as a model, they concluded that any administrative reform in Spain, in order to approach the ideal, still had to confront the following problems:

- The non existence of true political dedication towards the public administration.
- The lack of a fixed, public and budgeted income.
- The non existence of clear distinctions between the political and bureaucratic elites.
- The lack of information and co-ordination among ministries.
- The proliferation and minimal control of autonomous corpses and organisms.
- The connection between income and the offered services¹⁵

It could seem as if things had not changed much during the ten years preceding Linz and de Miguel's survey. The picture of a rather profound failure of the reform is to my judgement the most salient in all of the studies reviewed in this chapter:

Linz and de Miguel stated in 1968 as a part of the conclusion of their own survey conducted the previous year; "[...] one was not to undergo an explicit and coherent reform, neither was it easy to execute it and its successes were not to become as spectacularly as it was initially declared."¹⁶ And they continue; "[...] it was a group initiative which the Government and the other sectors of the

¹⁴ Linz/ de Miguel, op.cit., p.248. "

¹⁵ Op.cit., p.225.

¹⁶ Op.cit., p.226. (my transl.)

administration never bought."¹⁷ One of their respondents stated: "Except two or three Ministers the rest have no interest in an administrative reform."¹⁸

Beltrán says in his study from 1975 which is based upon the same survey, that one must not;

"[...] ignore a status quo concerning some of the most peculiar traits of the Spanish administration, particularly the rigid stratification of the corpses which do not operate according to rational criteria [...] or functions [...], but according to pure social acceptance and valoration of the privilege."¹⁹

He goes on to evaluate the data from Linz and de Miguel's survey to be an expression of;

"[...] a type of juridical-administrative mentality which [...] still is quite extended in the Spanish public administration. A really *juridistic* mentality, in the meaning that it implicates an exaggeration of the role of the law, [...] which obviously constitute the central element of the administrative work. [...] [The] general image this elite give of itself is a juridistic and conservative which not suits the changing circumstances they have to administrate[...]."²⁰

In his study from 1996, Beltrán says: "It can be supposed that the expectations which initially inspired the reform was let down as time went by; at least, one must consider its impulse to be worn out by 1970."²¹

This critique is most relevant as it deals with the central theme of this chapter; the effects of the administrative reform. In order to establish a more solid base for a subsequent modification and reevaluation of the critique, I believe it is important to concretize the critique regarding the last aspect. I will do this by analyzing the destiny of the target corps of the reform; the *Técnico de Administración Civil*.

¹⁷ Op.cit., p.231. "

¹⁸ Ibid. "

¹⁹ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.141. (my transl.)

²⁰ Op.cit., pp.166-167. "

²¹ Beltrán (1994) op.cit., p.19. "

Frustration among the 'técnicos'

In 1960, the Head of the Cabinet for Administrative Studies and as such one of the prime advocates of the reform, Antonio Carro Martínez, stated that:

"[...] The Spanish public administration today has got an important number of experts educated at the courses of the *Centre for Education and Training of the Governments Presidency* [i.e. *La Escuela de Alcalá*], and through amplification of studies abroad. Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that the experts mentioned usually are designated to positions which only permit timid application of these techniques."²²

Thus, it can be argued that the group of people educated and trained at *La Escuela de Alcalá* were confronting problems in their subsequent service during the initial phases of the reform. I think the survey from 1967 can give us a more complete picture of these problems:

In the middle of the 1960's the Spanish public administration consisted of about two hundred corpses²³, and in Linz' and de Miguel's survey seventy-five of these are considered to be elite corpses.²⁴ Among the 843 civil servants who took part in the survey, 183 were *técnicos de administración civil*, i.e. almost 22% of the total population.²⁵ By considering the following data from the 1967 survey, we get the impression of frustration among a high proportion of the participants in the interministerial 'target corps' of the administrative reform:

1) 67 % of the *técnicos* were not satisfied with their salary (i.e. the second least satisfied corps among the total of 75), and Beltrán attributes this to a "clear consciousness of their directive functions."²⁶

²² Carro Martínez, Antonio (1960) "La reforma administrativa en España" in *Documentación Administrativa* n.28, p.14. (my transl.)

²³ Guaita (1963) op.cit., p.53.

²⁴ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.64. The definition used in the study is "those who belong to a corps which as a criterium for acceptance exigés [...] a university degree or a degree from the Technical High School." (my transl.)

²⁵ Op.cit., p.94. It is important to note that some of these *técnicos de administración civil* were not educated at Alcalá but go back to the creation of *cueros técnicos* within the different ministeries by the statute of 1918. However, through the administrative reform, these 'old' *técnicos* had been integrated in the new interministerial *cuero técnico de administración civil*. As such, the opinions expressed by those figuring under the label *técnico* in the 1967 survey can not be identified totally with the responses of the higher servants educated at Alcalá. Nevertheless, I believe the numbers to be adequate in this context as an expression of a tendency within the new interministerial corps.

²⁶ Op.cit., p.137. (my transl.)

2) 74% of them thought that the existing corps system, which gave great power to the so called special corps, should be abolished. Only two among the other corps expressed a more negative attitude regarding the corps system.²⁷

3) 20% of the *técnicos* expressed general dissatisfaction with their present job situation. Again, only two other elite corps were more negative.²⁸

If we are to consider the interministerial corps of *técnicos de administración civil* as the corps of the reform, I think we have to conclude on the basis of these data that the administrative reform in general were confronting severe problems throughout the 1960's. This group of higher civil servants expressed high degree of frustration regarding their salary, their job situation and the state of the corps system which they were designated to co-ordinate. I think it is correct to say that, despite the political power and impact of the technocratic reformers, the reform process met hard resistance within the public administration as such. Carro Martínez said in 1960 that; "[...]despite favourable political predisposition, reality has shown that the administration has patented its lack of reform capacity."²⁹ Nevertheless, I do not think it is correct to paint an all to gloomy picture of the situation and deduce from these data that the reform was a failure in its effects. We have to have in mind the high ambitions of the reform on behalf of López Rodó and his fellow travellers, what Nieto calls its "disproportionate illusions"³⁰, and the following confrontation between two completely distinct ways of thinking and doing administrative work: On the one hand a juridically based administration biased towards status quo and the keeping of privileges, and on the other hand an administration dominated by a social engineer type of civil servant designated to administrate economic growth and social change by the use of management and various social scientific techniques. Miguel Beltrán told me an anecdote from his own service as *técnico*, and I believe this to give a more nuanced picture of the reform process in real life:

²⁷ Op.cit., p.143. "

²⁸ Op.cit., p.181.

²⁹ Carro Martínez (1960) op.cit., p.11. (my transl.)

³⁰ Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.575. (my transl.)

"I was a witness to the conflict between the *técnicos* and the specials regarding administration of personnel. Traditionally this was a task for a higher servant from a 'special corps' with no technical preparation for doing this. When the *técnicos* arrived conflicts arose. I once did a work for the administration in Ministry X, where the Head of Personnel was a servant of the traditional order. The one who tried to replace him was an expert in administration of personnel, which not only had been educated at Alcalá but also in the United States. This was not successful because of the jealous special corps within the Ministry which did not allow this important position to be disputed by a person from outside 'the house'. Some places the servant of the traditional order would win such a battle, other places the *técnico*. These years I worked as a *técnico de administración civil* in Ministry Z, and within this department the *técnicos* rapidly occupied the Budgeting Cabinet and the Centre for Data Processing where they recently had installed the first big computers. These were both critical positions and influenced directly on the strategy of the ministries work. In some ministries the new interministerial corps, which presented itself as powerful, modern and rationalistic etc., would succeed. In others, the power of the 'special corps' was irreducible. In all the ministries the impact of the new interministerial corps was felt, but more in some than in others."³¹

Because of the power of the special corps, the administrative reform was not able to fulfil all its intentions. Nevertheless, "the impact of the new interministerial corps was felt in all the ministries", and this "more in some than in others". This suggests that the reform was in no way a total failure and that much of the expressed disappointment must be understood in relation to the high ambitions of the reform. In reality a process was under way and made its impact more clearly in some ministries than in others. The varying success of the *técnicos* within the different ministries can also be read out of the survey. Almost an even share of them were satisfied (43%) and not satisfied (41%) with the status of their corps within the Ministry they served. In addition, the opposition from within the special corps needed not be against the new *techniques* as such. Aurelio Guaita expressed the view, in an article in DA from 1963, that the opposition was not directed towards a reform they thought were good or bad, but rather was an opposition towards *any* reform which could affect their present privileged situation.³²

³¹ Conversation with Miguel Beltrán, the 17th of April 1997.

³² Guaita (1963) op.cit., p.57.

This implies that one did not have to be opposed to the spirit and intellectual orientation of the reform in order to be opposed to the reform process within the administration as it proceeded. If one narrowly consider the confrontation between *técnicos* and *specials* within the ministries as an expression of the mentality of the civil servants, I believe one miss out on a crucial point, which I will now turn to: The rather wide spread universalistic and modernizing mentality among the higher civil servants expressed in the survey.

A change of mentality

It is important to note that I will not present a completely new interpretation of the survey from 1967. The studies which are based on this survey and reviewed in this chapter, do not neglect a partial success of the reform. My intention is rather to focus on aspects which confronts what I judge to be the overriding evaluation done in previous studies, namely that things had not changed very much after ten years of administrative reform. I believe that the distance in time can come to my aid when I am to give an historical interpretation of the most salient and influential effects of the administrative reform on general historical development.

First I want to contend Beltrán's evaluation of the data to support a judgement of the public administration to be dominated by a "truly juridistic mentality": Only 20% of the higher civil servants evaluated law as being *the* most important or as indispensable knowledge for the civil servants,³³ and almost half of the respondents wanted to reduce the impact of the juridical knowledge.³⁴ Another aspect which could indicate the degree of 'traditionalism' and juridically dominated mentality, is the degree to which *precedence* are weighted as criterium for administrative work. Although only 27% responded directly in opposition against the value of precedence on the basis that it might be a hindrance for creativity, it was no more than 3% that thought precedence should be the primal guide for administrative work. The majority of 53% showed a moderate attitude, regarding precedence to be just another element to be considered when making decisions.³⁵

³³ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.151.

³⁴ Op.cit., p.152.

³⁵ Op.cit., p.160.

I do not think these answers to be an expression of a too solid "juridistic mentality", especially when compared to an administrative tradition totally dominated by formal juridical thinking. I think it rather suggests that the predominantly juridical mentality is giving way to a different paradigm for administrative work. Remember, not more than 22% of the survey population are *técnicos* and as such servants who must be considered biased towards a devaluation of law as fundamental criteria for administrative work. I think the number suggests that a non juridistic way of thinking is also reasonably strong among the so called 'special corps'. A devaluation of law needed not necessarily represent an attack against their privileged positions.

The survey also deals with what values the servants defined as success criteria for their work. Beltrán argues that the most 'orthodox answer' among the alternatives would be "reach the highest possible level in the administration". Only 14% of the respondents chose this alternative. In contrast, what Beltrán characterises as the 'idealist answer'; "gain a solid scientific and technical reputation", was chosen among 69% of the civil servants. Beltrán sees these numbers as indicators of a lack of feeling of a distinct administrative career, because such a great majority chose an 'extrabureaucratic' value as definition for professional success.³⁶ It could also, or as well, be an indicator of that more universalistic values were gaining support within the public administration, and that the value of "gaining a solid scientific and technical reputation" could be an expression of rather universalistic values among the servants.

The servants were also asked what they felt was respectively the ideal and the existing criteria for promotion within the public administration. The answers to this question can further illuminate the status of universalistic values among the servants: More than half of the group were in favour of merit as selective criterium, and only 9% were in favour of pure discretionality. When it came to describing what they felt was the *existing criteria* for promotion, 70% thought universalistic principles such as "to be well prepared", "to have original ideas and suggestions", "seniority" and "to work hard" to be the most salient. 28% thought particularistic criteria such as "friendship"(11%), "belong to a particular corps"(8%), "luck"(4%), "not to make trouble for the superiors"(3%) and "extra-administrative professional activities"(2%) to be decisive factors for promotion.

³⁶ Op.cit., p.213.

Not surprisingly, a greater part of those of lowest rank and position, and the younger servants thought particularistic principles to be decisive and vice versa.³⁷ For example it is understandable that the more or less frustrated *técnicos* within those departments where they were shut out by the 'special corpses' as it is described by Beltrán above, perceived the situation to be too particularistic for their liking.³⁸ Beltrán says that:

"The only conclusion to be drawn from these data is that the 'idealistic' attitude is taken by those belonging to powerful corpses with a great deal of self-government and social prestige [...]: and on the other side, the 'realistic' attitude are expressed by those belonging to corpses which do not feel they hold an adequate position in the Ministry due to their education[...], although all of the cases can not be explained this simply."³⁹

It might be some truth in this. The so called 'realistic' attitude, which Beltrán sees as the one that regard the administration to work under particularistic and conservative criteria, can be judged to be expressed by those who are not satisfied with the present situation, and as such in favour of change and modernization. I nevertheless believe it would be mistaken to take this to be exclusively an expression of a predominantly conservative, uncritical and status quo oriented attitude among those who answered in favour of universalistic criteria for promotion. According to Beltrán himself "all the cases can not be explained this simply". My point here is not to decide whether universalistic or particularistic principles actually predominated, but to pay attention to the fact that such a great majority answered that promotion should occur and in fact occurred according to universalistic criteria. To imply that they answered so solely, or predominantly of convenience or because it suited their own interests, would be to downplay the normative and moral aspect of the respondents. In order to evaluate the responses I believe we have to take people seriously and pay attention to the action orienting impact of norms. Thus, I believe the data analysed here could support the hypothesis that *the higher civil servants understood themselves and expressed both critique and satisfaction within a predominantly universalistic and modern paradigm for administrative work*. I further think that such a paradigm is prevalent in all of the studies reviewed in this chapter.

³⁷ Op.cit., pp.213-214.

³⁸ Op.cit., p.215.

³⁹ Ibid. (my transl.)

There are also some interesting results in the survey regarding religiosity and degree of modernizing mentality. 68% among the higher civil servants identified themselves as 'very good Catholics' or 'active Catholics'. In similar, but not identical surveys, the results were respectively 51% for free professionals, 42% for university students and 34% for workers and employees.⁴⁰ The religious selfqualification is thus almost as high as that of housewives which is characterised as "the most conservative and religious of all possible strata of the population."⁴¹

Beltrán suggests that this could be attributed to the fact that the Spanish civil servants are recruited among the high and high middle class which traditionally are more religious than the rest of the population. Nevertheless, the interesting point here is the connection between religiosity and motivation for entering the administration: The 'professional vocation' option answer increased with religiosity: Among those who auto-qualified themselves as 'very good Catholics' a total of 26% considered 'professional vocation' as the prime motive for becoming a civil servant. This in contrast to an average of 17% and only 8% among the non Catholics.⁴²

Regarding personal success criteria, 81 % of those who defined themselves as 'very good Catholics' responded that they regarded 'to gain a solid scientific and technical reputation' on top. This in contrast to an average on 68%.⁴³ 80 % of the same group were in favour of universalistic criteria for promotion, in contrast to an average of 70%. 13% of the 'very good Catholics' were in favour of particularistic criteria for promotion, against an average of 23%.⁴⁴ From this it can be concluded that within this survey, a high degree of religiosity disposes for universalistic criteria of administrative work. This is interesting as it puts question to the traditional perception of opposition between religion and modernity. I have no grounds to conclude that this results are caused by a high proportion of Opus Dei members among those who qualified themselves as 'very good Catholics'. Nevertheless, I believe it is clear that all Opus Dei members will characterize themselves as such, and these results fit well with the concept and role of science and technology within the professional ethic of Opus Dei.

⁴⁰ Op.cit., p.223.

⁴¹ Op.cit., p.225. (my transl.)

⁴² Op.cit., p.244.

⁴³ Op.cit., p.246.

⁴⁴ Op.cit., p.247.

Furthermore, in 1967 the bureaucratic elite in general responded very much in favour of the administrative reform:⁴⁵ 91% agreed that the majority of the servants should be obliged to go through educational and training courses and 81% were in favour of changing practices and habits which had a long tradition within the country's administration.⁴⁶ Although Beltrán says that this could be explained by a general lack of information about what the reform was really about, I think these answers suggests a rather positive climate among the servants regarding the ongoing reform. Not to exaggerate the effect of the propagandistic efforts of the reformers, I nevertheless believe it is quite clear that the topics regarding the administrative reform was effectively extolled by the advocates of the reform, primarily through the journal *DA*, but also by the fact that more than 15 000 servants attended courses at *La Escuela de Alcalá* until 1970. Equally important is the qualification made by Linz and de Miguel:

"[...] an explicitly modernizing will among the civil servants do not have to be salient in order to accept an administrative reform 'in principle'. Nevertheless, even in consideration of a mere verbal attitude (one answer what "is expected" by a high civil servant), it can be no doubt that this is precisely the first symptom of change."⁴⁷

79% said they had detected some increase in administrative efficiency in general, and only 6% of the servants judged the reform process to have had a negative effect on the administrative output.⁴⁸ The most applauded institutionalizations of the reform was the *Law of Administrative Procedure* (67%), the *State Administration's Jurisdictional Law* (58%) and the creation of *La Escuela de Alcalá* (55%).⁴⁹ In the midst of a cautious liberalization of press censorship after the implementation of the *Press Law* (*Ley de Prensa*) in 1966, approximately 90% thought that a more open critique in the press would serve as a stimulus for both

⁴⁵ It should be noted however that the respondents were well aware that the survey was conducted by researchers from Alcalá, and this might of course have influenced on their responses. Nevertheless, as will be exposed later in this chapter, the servants were quite explicit when formulating critique against both the reform in general and the Public Administration School itself. As such, I believe the survey was conducted in a climate where the respondents felt quite free to express whatever opinion regarding the theme.

⁴⁶ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.200.

⁴⁷ Linz/ de Miguel, op.cit., p.230. (my transl.)

⁴⁸ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.201.

⁴⁹ Linz/ de Miguel, op.cit., p.236.

a more effective work within the administration and more effective political action.⁵⁰

No equivalent survey for the pre-reform period exists, but the data from the 1967 paints a picture of a distinctively more universalistic administration than the one of the 1950's which I described in chapter six as being centralistic but highly uncoordinated, consisting of almost autonomous corpses which defended the interest of themselves and their clientele in an arbitrary and particularistic manner. In this way I believe the data from the 1967 survey to suggest that important mentality changes had taken place within the higher echelons of the Spanish public administration, much as a result of the reform process.

The impact of 'La Escuela de Alcalá'

As noted in the previous chapter, the public administration school in Alcalá de Henares was central in the functional and cultural institutionalization of the reform. The following citations from the study of Linz and de Miguel and from my conversation with Beltrán will hopefully clarify in what way *La Escuela de Alcalá* affected these aspects of the reform.

Linz and de Miguel says in their study that:

"69% admit that during the last few years there had been important innovations in the country regarding the education of civil servants. Among these 74% spontaneously mentioned *La Escuela de Alcalá* among these innovations. We asked these about the advantages and inconveniences regarding this centre. In general, they were more explicit when talking about the advantages than the inconveniences of *The National School of Public Administration*. [...] In addition, the most frequent critique [...] was very constructive, because it regarded a perceived insufficiency of courses."⁵¹

The less constructive critique concerns a perception of the courses to be too vague and not specialized enough (12%), that the selection of candidates was

⁵⁰ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., pp.241-242.

⁵¹ Linz/ de Miguel, op.cit., p.239. (my transl.)

monopolistic and not objective (10%), that the centre was controlled by a limited group of people (read:Opus Dei) (6%) and that the professors were incompetent (6%).⁵²

By analyzing these answers it becomes clear that *La Escuela de Alcalá* was in front of the mind of the higher civil servants, and that they predominantly had a positive and constructive view on its activities. It is also interesting to notice the critique of the centre to be monopolistic in its selection and as controlled by Opus Dei. Although this critique is not expressed by a great number in the survey, it illuminates the picture of an institutionalization which might reflect a perceived need among the reformers to build up a powerful block which could control and keep the direction of the reform within one building. (see p. 119)

Regarding the scientific and technical impact of the school, Miguel Beltrán told me that:

"La Escuela de Alcalá was *the* place for time and motion studies, taylorism, fayolism, Human Relations, direction of reunions or maybe better; manipulation of reunions, statistics, national contability etc. It was not just the only place, initially at least, where you did study these things, but it played an important role in the reception of a type of knowledge for public administrative action which previously did not exist in Spain. As both a student at La Escuela de Alcalá and as a civil servant during several years, I was a first hand witness to how this new knowledge was received. The whole process implied a transmission of knowledge which practically did not exist in Spain at the time, at least not in the public administration but also very timidly within private enterprises. A certain type of administrative science, which already at that time was contested, was imported to the Spanish public administration. In this way a reception actually took place."⁵³

As such, the school in Alcalá was *the* place for an importation of a way of thinking and doing administrative work which was fundamentally new in Spain. Here it was received by a group of people who were to use administrative science and the social engineer ideal of the civil servant as a tool in a bureaucratic and political struggle for power. As I have argued above, the administrative reform and the creation of *La Escuela de Alcalá* were closely

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Conversation with Miguel Beltrán, the 17th of April 1997.

linked with the subsequent economic development plans. Even though it is difficult to decide the causality in the relationship between administrative reform and economical development, it is clear that the economic progress *was* administrated, for better or for worse, in the spirit of an administration for economic growth. The professional ethic of Opus Dei made *La Escuela de Alcalá* highly receptive to the imported techniques and mentality. These techniques and this mentality were later put into a struggle for power within the franquist state where they made strong impact on the function and culture of the Spanish public administration as well as on the country's economic development. In order to concretize this impact, I will in the continuance reformulate and modify the critique on the effects of the reform in accordance with the change of mentality explored above.

Reformulation and modification of the critique

On the basis of my review of the survey from 1967 and the subsequent studies based on this, I will thus reformulate the question; what went wrong?, towards the more constructive question; what had been obtained? By doing this, it is possible to modify and concretize the critique of the effects of the administrative reform. The studies reviewed in this chapter do also consider that important changes had taken place:

In the conclusion of their study, Linz and de Miguel writes;

"[...]the administrative reform will not reach its goals before many other reforms of an educational type have begun to bear fruits and as such produce a change of mentality. It is also possible that some of the mechanisms of this change are produced as a result of partial successes of the very administrative reform."⁵⁴

In his study from 1977 Beltrán said that;

"In general it might seem as if one has passed the times when the *cuervo* was the only conceivable structural organisation model of the public administration; by no means this implies that this peculiar characteristic of the Spanish administration has disappeared, but rather that it has suffered from the tides of time,

⁵⁴ Linz/ de Miguel, op.cit., p.248. (my transl.)

and that the implicit feudalistic and estate traits have in some way become impossible today, or at least that they are not so incarnated as they used to be only a few years ago."⁵⁵

And finally, Nieto says in his article from 1976;

"Unfortunately, the reform did not by far reach its intentions, but failed in each and every one of them. Hence, it let down the hopes of both the public opinion and the very civil servants in a regrettable way; but it would be unjust not to recognize the fact that it was the first serious attempt - partially obtained - to adapt the Spanish administration to economical and social transformations, and in this way improving both its image and mentality. From this reform on, the administration was ready to take responsibility for a strong public intervention in social life and for some degree of economical guidance; responsibilities they were not yet prepared to take, and this is the tragedy, but at least they did not avoid neither the mission nor the responsibility.[...] Probably one of the most transcendental consequences of the reform - although it was not the most appreciated at the time - was that it totally broke the rigid corporate structure of the administration, such as the rigid hierarchy existing within each corps."⁵⁶

Beltrán and Nieto agree that it was very difficult to maintain the traditional rigid corps structure as the reform proceeded. As such they admit that the reform partially succeeded in obtaining one of its main intentions; to challenge the power of the almost autonomous 'special corpses' which represented the most particularistic aspect of the public administration. Linz and de Miguel also argues that the responses could indicate that a change from a pluralistic towards a more universalistic mentality among the higher civil servants had begun.

In order to modify the critique I will go back to my initial division of the reform in three spheres; the legal, the functional and the cultural:

The legal was aiming at specialization, deconsentration and executive centralisation. This was by far completely obtained during this period. Although the administration became legally one body, the laws could hardly touch upon those corpses established by 'special laws'. In the words of Beltrán: "[As] the so

⁵⁵ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.123.

⁵⁶ Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.576. (my transl. and italics.)

called 'special corpses' stuck to their own rules, one can understand that it was difficult to make solid affirmations in this aspect."⁵⁷ This part of the reform could only succeed to the degree which the general corpses gained power within the different ministries. Beltrán's anecdote above concerning the varying success of the *técnicos* could illustrate the partial success of this aspect of the reform.

The functional aspect was to be achieved through training in new procedural techniques at the *Escuela de Alcalá*, in the so called *Organización y Métodos*. This part of the reform concerned the way of doing administrative work and was in the survey from 1967 expressed as the most unpopular part of the reform.⁵⁸ We remember that the Head of the Cabinet for Administrative Studies, Carro Martínez, in 1960 regretted that people educated and trained at *La Escuela de Alcalá* did not always get in position to use their knowledge. Nevertheless, even if this part of the reform was so unpopular it can be assumed that it was so because it contended traditional ways of doing things, and as such influenced the daily routine of administrative work. It is also worth remembering that despite the unpopularity of this aspect of the reform, the applications for the courses in O&M was six times higher than could be offered at Alcalá by 1965 (see p.133).

These two aspects directly affected daily work and a struggle for power within the administration. Having in mind the power of the uncoordinated and particularistic system, it is no surprise that an intellectually generated administrative reform did not do away with all resistance within ten years. As the reform proceeded the result was rather that the traditional and modern ways of doing administration coexisted in a peculiar manner. In some ministries, predominantly the economic ministries, the impact of the 'modern way' was greater. Nieto says: "[...] the alteration of the economic policy is [...] now being based upon technical instruments which demanded the participation of the bureaucrats of the new breed."⁵⁹ However, a simple replacement of administrative paradigms did never occur. When the traditional way of doing things and the 'special corpses' came under attack, they reacted by reducing their services.⁶⁰ Thus, it was difficult to replace one system with another. The "bureaucrats of the new breed" surely made their impact, but this was nevertheless limited to the areas which were not held by the previously so

⁵⁷ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.207. (my transl.)

⁵⁸ Linz/ de Miguel, op.cit., p.236.

⁵⁹ Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.574. (my transl.)

⁶⁰ Nieto (1977) op.cit., p.579.

powerful special corps. As they, as a defensive strategy almost boycotted the reform, the bureaucracy was beginning to dissolve. Still in the words of Nieto:

"[...] during the 60's the Spanish administration experienced a back-breaking process of transformation. The corps, which had always been its spinal core, moved into the background. In this way the administration became more flexible, but also, in the lack of a consistent support, it could not withstand the attacks from a politics in disguise. The period, which usually are understood as the one in which the administration reached its peak and invaded the sphere of politics, is in reality - and perhaps because of this - the period which marks the beginning of its dissolution."⁶¹

The cultural aspect of the reform aimed at introducing a more universalistic and change oriented spirit among the civil servants and break the formal juridical routine. This was sought to be achieved as the servants educated and trained at *La Escuela de Alcalá* made an impact through their subsequent service. The journal DA was also an important measure for obtaining this aspect of the reform. I believe that the analyses of the survey made above, would indicate that this seemingly was the most successful part of the reform. This could be explained by the fact that this was a 'softer' element of the reform, and that the respondents said what was expected of them. The ideals did not necessarily threaten current privileges in a direct manner such as the legal and functional aspects certainly did. Nevertheless, as Linz and Miguel pointed out, it can also be seen as the first sign of a change of mentality. Apart from this, and far more important, I think the support of universalistic ideals implied a legitimisation of a new way of thinking about and subsequently doing administrative work. These ideals would appeal to an ever increasing and well educated urban middle class.

Initially the administrative reform was a part of a political project of people associated with Opus Dei. When we come to the so called transitional period, after Franco's death in 1975, it is clear that the reforms' universalistic mentality had reached far out of this political project. In fact, the Spanish technocratic project was dead by the beginning of the 1970's, some years before Franco's death, but the impact of the reform was still very much alive. Nieto says that: "The new bureaucrats, who had not participated in the Civil War, had a totally different

⁶¹ Nieto (1976) op.cit., pp.577-578. (my transl.)

character: without any political illusion, they were on the other side devoted to a much higher technical competence[...].⁶²

In the midst of the transitional process Miguel Beltrán wrote:

"If one was to repeat the survey today, one would probably find a reform attitude very similar to those which were detected then, but also a much more clearly pronounced scepticism regarding the acceptance of determined means, regarding the education and training of civil servants, regarding the improvement of the administration ('economy, speed and efficiency' as expressed in the Law of Administrative Procedures), and regarding the perception of the authorities' interest in the reform."⁶³

In this context it is highly relevant that the civil servants no longer identified their own interests with those of the regime and started to articulate interests as *civil servants* and not as members of a particular corps. Miguel Beltrán says:

"In general, the projects of this 'struggle of the civil servants' [from 1973 on] [...] were labouralistic, anticorporative and egalitarian, and their instruments were the assemblies, the writings and protests of whatever kind and a certain level of mobilization. Even if this struggle reached greater dimensions among the workers, the hired servants and the personnel of the lower level corps, servants from the higher and more or less 'privileged' corps participated from the very beginning."⁶⁴

It can be suggested that, however favourable some parts of the Spanish society were for the coming of democracy, that the transition and consolidation of democracy in Spain would have been much more difficult to carry out if the civil servants, who traditionally had been the recruitment base for political positions, had been obstructing the process as they saw their privileges and status threatened. Regarding the attitude of the civil servants in the transitional period, Nieto says "[...] the myth of the technical infallibility which previously made administrative decisions unquestionable, has disappeared. [...] The technocratic myth is broken."⁶⁵

⁶² Op.cit., p.574. (my transl.)

⁶³ Beltrán (1977) op.cit., p.204. (my transl.)

⁶⁴ Beltrán (1996) op.cit., p.625. "

⁶⁵ Nieto (1976) op.cit., p.578. "

Thus, as the reform broke the traditional structure of the public administration and the 'Opus Deistic' technocratic project had lost its momentum, it was again left space for politics 'in open' to play its part in Spanish history. The heritage of the technocratic administrative reform can as such be summarized to have been; a fairly dissolved public administration where the civil servants had lost the 'myth of the technical infallibility' but who nevertheless were benevolent towards technical competence and universalistic principles for administrative work.

CHAPTER 9.

Technocracy on the road to democracy

Introduction

In the introduction to this study I stated that my prime intention was to use the investigation of the technocratic administrative reform to discuss how it can illuminate the peaceful transition and consolidation of democracy in Spain. In connection to this, the reform must also be seen as a part of the overall process of change within economic policy and business culture in Spain. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is twofold: First, I will use this study of the administrative reform as a case study which can qualify the hypothesis of Opus Dei being the carriers of modernity in Spain during the period under study. Second, I will evaluate the relative importance of the administrative reform on the general process of change within Spanish politics and culture of the period.

To comply to the intentions of this chapter I will first return to the critique that says that, despite being an influential force within late franquist politics, the technocracy did not in itself contribute to the modernization of the country, but must be considered as an inseparable part of a repressive dictatorship. Such interpretations will argue that later development and transition to democracy has to be explained with reference to factors outside the technocracy. Further, I will contend, or more precisely, modify this view by using the findings of this study to evaluate how the Opus Dei concept of science and technology, exemplified through the administrative reform, was appropriated in Spain and how it influenced on the way of thinking and doing politics during the period in question. In the continuance I will then discuss the consequences of the administrative reform and relate these to subsequent historical development. I think that such an evaluation has to take place on two levels: First, on the level of the direct impact of the reform on late Spanish politics and culture and second, on the level of its indirect consequences through shifts in both economic and educational policy, of which it was clearly connected. In the last part of this chapter I will finally make some remarks about the relationship between technocracy and democracy in this historical context.

A control crisis within the regime?

As noted in chapter three, some observers argue that Spanish transition to and consolidation of democracy must be understood with reference to explanatory factors outside the technocracy. Such factors are the alteration of the Spanish role within the development of international capitalism, to a large extent due to the international political situation in the context of the Cold War, and political struggle from explicitly democratic forces within the Spanish society. To my judgement these interpretations have in common that they identify the technocrats interests with those of the regime and that the shift in the regimes orientation from the late 1950's may be understood as a result of what James Beniger in general terms has called a *control revolution*.¹ As such, the insurgence of the technocrats meant nothing more than the coming of a new group for administrating the interests of the franquist elite.

Applying Beniger's model for explaining technological development on this Spanish historical context one could say that severe economical problems and gradual integration among the western allies in the context of the Cold War, had produced a situation of unprecedented complexity. In this setting, the project of making Spain into 'a country of small farmers' (see p.13) was no longer viable and hence the shift could be understood as a pragmatic response to both political oppositions within the Spanish society and especially to a new international political situation. In such a perspective it may be appropriate to interpret the shift as Franco's attempt to regain control of both the social and political situation: Confronting both domestic social instability, and a gradual integration with international organisations, the autarkic project, however dear, could be jeopardising the very foundations of franquism. If we also take into account the relatively dramatic conflict between falangists and monarchists described in the second chapter, the rationalisation and bureaucratization of the regime, which implied a significant delegation of political power to the 'apolitical' technocrats, might be perceived as the implementation of what Daniel Bell has labelled an *intellectual technology*² in order to respond to a specific set of social and political problems.

At the first glimpse it might seem paradoxical that the dictator, so to speak, withdrew from of day to day politics on economic and administrative matters

¹ Beniger, James R. (1986) *The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information Society*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.

² Op.cit., p.21.

and gave away decision-making power to a group of technical problem-solvers which made decisions on the basis of technical and scientific knowledge. Of course a technocratic rule of society may be highly compatible with an authoritarian regime which wants to downplay diverging interests in society, but Franco was no Hitler who offensively advocated the use of strictly controlled scientists and technicians for his own political purposes. Nevertheless, when studying this period closely it becomes obvious that the interests of general Franco and the technocrats, given the historical context, converged in many areas. As Gabriel Tortella, notes it was characteristic of the ruling style of General Franco, both in war and politics, to be defensive and turn attacks against him into victories.³ If we understand the late 1950's as a period of a control crisis within the franquist regime the insurgence of the technocrats might become more intelligible. The technocrats had their own religious and political objectives and saw franquism merely as a stage towards a more traditional catholic monarchy, where they by using modern science and technology, would be the guiding elite. As long as this was not perceived as a threat to franquism, but on the contrary, as a welcome solution to a set of pressuring political problems, it is not difficult to see that interests converged: The technocrats acquired decision making power in areas which were perceived by Franco as merely technical. Franco was still the head of the state and is likely to have felt in full control of the situation. At the same time the technocrats could go on making changes which they also believed, because of their tacit concept of science and technology, were under their full control. My point is that this expertise was guided by a set of religious and political objectives which were not allowed to be discussed and hidden behind, or more precisely, intended applied through, what I have called their *theo-technocratic positivism*.

This last point suggests that a 'control crisis' interpretation can only help us to understand why the technocrats acquired central positions within franquist society in the late 1950's. It does not clarify the subsequent development and changes which can be related to the technocracy in both *ways of making politics*, in *politics itself* and in *political culture* throughout the rest of the franquist period. Of course the international political situation to a strong degree defined the problem context for the mid-1950's Spanish politicians, but it was no necessity of this so called control crisis that one was to open up the economy for foreign investments, and adhere to a neo-liberal capitalist model through the use of indicative planning in order to create economic growth. It was neither no

³ Tortella, op.cit.,p.386.

necessity of the control crisis that *equal opportunities* (igualdad de oportuñidades), highlighting the value of education in order to improve your own position within society, became a catchword in late franquist society. I do by no means want to downplay the role of economic development for the resurgence of democracy in Spain after Franco. Quite the contrary, I think that the economic development during the 1960's is one of the most important factors for explaining this most recent course of Spanish cultural and political development. My point is that in order to understand the complexity of this process one must consider the internal responses to the external challenges. To do this one must not consider the technocrats merely as pragmatic bystanders to events or as the administrative representants of the elite, but as people who profoundly affected the way politics and culture developed. The Opus Dei technocrats were from the outset political players concerned with the restoration of a traditional Catholic monarchy, and as such taking part in a political struggle within the highly diversified franquist coalition. But more important, their political instruments, imported administrative science and technology, were to have a lot of unintended consequences when applied within the Spanish society.

Opus Dei as the carrier of modernity in Spain

As noted in chapter three, several observers have interpreted Opus Dei as being the carrier of the spirit of capitalism in a mid 20th century Spanish historical context. José Casanova says: "The historical role of Opus Dei was precisely to form the kind of other-directed organization men who were to lead this transformation [toward the routinization and bureaucratization of the Puritan entrepreneurial ethos] in Spanish society."⁴ In the words of Carlos Moya: "[Opus Dei] has fulfilled, for the development of a bureaucratic-entrepreneurial ethic in Catholic Spanish Society, the same driving function that Max Weber assigns to the Calvinist ethic in relation to the development of the spirit of capitalism."⁵ José Pérez Vilariño says that: "Opus' modern contribution to the Church and to Spanish society can be defined as the delayed but effective introduction of the spirit of capitalism, in the form of an ethic of individual vocation as professional achievement."⁶ Qualifying these weberian notions somewhat, Joan Estruch finally says: "In Spain there was capitalism, but there was no industrial

⁴ Casanova, op.cit., p.246.

⁵ Cited from Estruch, op.cit., p.222.

⁶ Cited from Estruch, op.cit., p.220.

revolution or rationalization of the economy until the arrival of the technocrats."⁷ I fully agree with these interpretations, but from the outset of this study I have explicitly focused upon the concept of science and technology inherent in the Opus Dei ethic as these phenomena hold such central positions within modern societies. As such, my story of the relation between Opus Dei and modernization has treated science and technology as variables in themselves. Thus, I think that this study of the administrative reform can illuminate actually *how* the Opus Dei ethic became the carrier of modernity in Spain, at least within the public administration.

To my judgement the administrative reform primarily got its inspiration from two sources; first, from the Anglo-Saxon behavioural sciences, and second, from the French elitistic administrative ideology. My study of the activities and the spirit at *La Escuela de Alcalá* confirms that the administrative reform was very much inspired by the principles of north-American scientific management with its Weberian rational-bureaucracy ideal, to the extent of almost being a blueprint. *Efficiency, indicative planning* and *rationalisation* became the catchwords of the time, and the similarities of public and private administration were repeatedly extolled. The educational courses for the *Técnicos de Administración Civil* aimed at creating a new *persona* within the Spanish public administration; the non-formalistic social engineer who was trained in procedural techniques, administrative sociology, group psychology and financial administration. We also remember that the school characterized itself as representing the Anglo-Saxon behavioural sciences, and I think it was perfectly right in doing so (see p.132). Likewise, I believe it is correct to say that the reformers were very much influenced by the workings of the French administrative system. Charles Anderson says that; "they simply borrowed French planning procedure wholesale and in detail.[...] Even the titles of institutions and offices were retained, merely being translated from French into Spanish."⁸ The introduction of these techniques in the Spanish context of the 1960's was to my judgement directly mediated by the Opus Dei concept of science and technology, through their notion of these phenomena to be the most effective instruments for reaching the political and religious goals of the organization.

Traditional Catholic thoughts of the role of the state may be said to be both elitistic and authoritarian, but before the coming of Opus Dei the instrumental

⁷ Op.cit., p.226.

⁸ Anderson, op.cit., p.164.

use of administrative science and technology for defined social purposes would be considered as just one more step toward a secularized and heretic society. Likewise, the liberal part of Spanish intellectual culture, represented by the *The Institute for Free Learning* (Instituto Libre de Enseñanza), with which thinkers such as Unamuno and Ortega y Gasset may be associated, was firmly rooted within the culture of the humanities, and as such not inclined towards working for socio-economic transformation through the instrumental use of the behavioural sciences.⁹ In addition, it is not thinkable that the I.L.E. would have any sayings at all within the franquist coalition which regarded it as a threat to the very foundations of the franquist society. As shown in chapter six, Opus Dei, on the contrary, was firmly rooted within the franquist coalition, and an important part of the historical role of the organisation was to become the carrier of a completely new administrative tradition within Catholic Spain. Their view of modern science and technology to be applicable in a Catholic society as long it is guided by the intellectual elite with the correct virtues, made it possible to use administrative science and French-inspired administrative organization within late franquist society. Nevertheless, this science and technology was to gain a distinct meaning within the franquist context. As I have exposed in chapter seven, the administrative reform was a project which entered directly into a political struggle for power within the regime. The administrative reform was presented as a national importation of an "organizational technology" which could be technically applied in Spain indifferent to the peculiarities of the Spanish political system.¹⁰ I nevertheless believe that my investigation in chapter seven reveals that this organizational technology was conceived of as a more or less manipulative instrument which had to be controlled by the reformers themselves. The imported science and technology were thus initially part of a clearly defined political project, and modelled into the Spanish reality, the administrative science and organizational ideology became tools for a clearly defined political purpose of guiding the development towards the Opus Dei conception of the good society.

The technocrats introduced a new executive and management ideal for the men of the business world, the professions and the higher civil service in Spain. This

⁹ José Casanova says about this institute: "The I.L.E. [...] was an association of innerworldly mystics who were striving for inner self-growth and intellectual and esthetic rationalization. The I.L.E. was the first truly modern movement of ethical and intellectual reformation in Spanish history. Its impact upon Spanish cultural life was, to say the least, extraordinary. The 20th century Spanish revival in literature, science, the arts and culture in general owes a great deal to the I.L.E. and its related institutions." (Casanova, op.cit., pp.153-154)

¹⁰ Tortella, op.cit., p.166.

ideal extolled the notion of discretion, merit and professionalism in contrast to the rhetoric of the charismatic leader. Amando de Miguel tells that: "They looked down on the role of the professional politician and performed their tasks as pragmatic, aseptic and dispassionate executives. They exalted the cult of efficiency."¹¹ In the extension of this the value of education was changed through the notion of 'equal opportunities' as it was presented as *the* way to reach influential positions in society, and in this way *merit* was introduced as the main factor for social advancement. A consequence of this was that Opus Dei became a path for upward social mobility in this period. How this happened is illuminated by Joan Martínez Alier when he says: "It seems to me that in Spain Opus Dei did not command so much as the economists did, or, better said, Opus Dei commanded because Opus Dei recruited economists or accepted them as fellow travellers."¹² Thus, Opus Dei both attracted people who considered merit as being an adequate base for their personal social advancement and was also highly receptive to the services of those who shared their instrumental concept of science and technology and the meritocratic ideology. This indicates how the Opus Dei concept of science and technology induced a diffusion of meritocratic ideology in Spanish society. In this process, both the ethic of Opus Dei as well as the middle class ideology was affected and mutually assimilated. As such, this is an excellent example of how notions of science and technology are both socially constructed and affecting the society in which it operates. Casanova says:

"As an avant-garde Opus Dei technocrats were 'parvenu'. When Opus Dei members appeared in Spanish religious life in the 1940's, in intellectual-political life in the late 1950's, they were easily recognized as such, and consequently treated accordingly by the established groups. In the 1970's, however, the Opus Dei technocrats and managers were no longer easily distinguishable from the other bureaucrats and managers. By this time their economic ethic had spread throughout society and their own differences had become more diffused in a dialectic process of mutual assimilation"¹³

I believe that my investigation in the previous chapter regarding the effects of the administrative reform confirms that the imported science and technology derived a different meaning within the Spanish public administration as time went by. The universalistic and meritocratic ideals related to science and technology persisted, or spread, as can be read out of the 1967 survey, but was no

¹¹ Cited from Casanova, op.cit., p.78.

¹² Cited from Estruch, op.cit., p.226.

¹³ Casanova, op.cit., pp.320-321.

longer solely part of a controlled and highly technocratic political project. From the previous chapter we remember that Miguel Beltrán, in the mid 1970's, thought that, despite being favourable to an increased rationalization of the administration, the higher civil servants would now be much more sceptical regarding the political project of which this rationalization was a part (see p.163). As such, I believe my study to have illuminated how the imported science and technology, exemplified through the development within the public administration, eventually became the basis for the claims of social advancement made by an ever increasing middle class. Thomas Brante says:

"We might say that while the ideology of the bourgeoisie is based on economic capital and the ideology of the working class on political capital, the ideology of the middle class is based on the notion of human capital, measurable in knowledge and skills. Thus professional ideology is *meritocratic*. Opposing the two others, it simultaneously constitutes the predominant ideology of modern society."¹⁴

Regarding the Spanish context, José Casanova says that the technocrats "[...]were the representants of the rising new middle-class."¹⁵ To a certain extent this is true, but I believe it is important to note that they were so quite unintendedly as the imported science and technology changed meaning and became part of a non-technocratic political project of the growing middle class. Thus, the core elements of the very technocratic project became, as time went by, a powerful catalyst for social mobility. It both affected the creation of a powerful middle-class and legitimized the ethic which this middle class could use in order to promote its own advancement and interests.

Technocratic administrative reform and democratic transition

Throughout this thesis I have argued that the technocratic administrative reform was strongly interconnected with the totality of what can be considered the overall technocratic reforms of the period, comprising economic and educational aspects as well. The administrative reform did as such not only affect society through the direct change in the workings of the public administration but also through changes in economic and educational policy. Hence, I find it necessary to

¹⁴ Cited from Jacobsen, op.cit., p.112.

¹⁵ Casanova, op.cit., p.317.

divide the analyses of the effects of the reform for later development in both indirect and direct consequences.

As for the indirect consequences of the administrative reform it gave both direction and limitation to Spain's economic policy throughout the 1960's. Without entering the debate of the causality between administrative reform and the economic development, an issue which is beyond the scope of this study, it is clear that the techniques advocated by the reformers heavily affected economic dispositions during the later franquist regime. Between 1964 and 1973 Spain experienced the outset of three four-year economic and social development plans which was to be implemented by whom Alejandro Nieto called the bureaucrats of the 'new breed' (see p.161). The process of migration, urbanisation, demographic explosion and the growth of the urban middle-class described in chapter three, was indubitably very much a consequence of these development plans. One of the fundamental axioms of the administrative reform was that economic growth would give greater cohesion to the country. As far as the reform gave direction to the economic development, in reality it had the opposite effect: Never was the opposition to the regime as strong as in the wake of the economic boom.

In addition, educational reform was seen as a prerequisite for economic growth. For the technocratic reformers it was essential that education should be both qualitatively and quantitatively elevated, so that people should be prepared to function within an ever more technified society. Even though educational policy was not directly influenced by the administrative reform, it was very much so in an indirect manner. As exposed in chapter seven, one of the focal points for the Institute for Administrative Studies at *La Escuela de Alcalá*, was precisely the preparation for educational reforms (see pp.134-135). Manuel de Puelles Benítez says that;

"In order to effectuate his ambitious project (the educational reform), Villar Palasí (the Minister of Education and Science from 1969) surrounded himself with a well prepared group of professionals, among whom Ricardo Díez Hochleitner, a high servant of international organizations extolled[...] It was a group of technicians, not of politicians; thus fairly distanced from the spirit of the *Movimiento* [...]. It was also a competent and efficient group, which soon demonstrated a great capacity of both work and innovation. Without doubt, its appearance was something exceptional in the Spanish public administration."¹⁶

¹⁶ de Puelles Benítez, Manuel (1992) "Tecnocracia y política en la reforma educativa de 1970" in *Revista de Educación. Número extraordinario; La ley General de Educación veinte años después*, Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación (MEC), Madrid, p.19. (my transl.)

Díez Hochleitner was both a researcher and lecturer at Alcalá, and Villar Palasí, the Minister of Education and Science, was professor in Financial Administration at the school from the very beginning, and headed the Institute for Administrative Studies from its creation in 1966 to his appointment as minister in 1969. As such, the activities at Alcalá had clear consequences also on the educational policy. As previously noted the educational reform from 1970 is in retrospect considered as having been surprisingly modern and comprising many of the aspirations of the educational policy of the socialist party throughout the eighties.¹⁷ Regarding the cultural effects of the educational policy of the technocratic era, Felix Ortega says;

"To my judgement there are three ideological components juxtaposing each other in the [educational] reform process: the *spiritualistic technocratism*, the *education for economic development ideology* (the human capital) and the ideology of *equal opportunities*. None of these were conceived of as a basis for undermining the legitimisation of the regime, but quite the opposite. Nevertheless, a latent function of this ideological conjunction was that it eroded even more of the cultural foundation of the dictatorship."¹⁸

As a consequence of this, it is reasonable to say that the activities within *La Escuela de Alcalá* dealing with the preparation of the educational reform in an indirect manner contributed to an erosion of the legitimacy of the regime. In contrast to the traditional franquist regime's rhetoric which, so to speak, used the past tense in order to justify itself, the technocrats emphasized the possibilities of the future, both for the individual and for the totality of society, as the regimes justification: The prime objective of the state was now to increase living-standards and improve living-conditions for Spaniards in general through scientific and technological education while downplaying all kind of ideology. In fact some of the contemporary critique of the technocrats alluded directly to their governing style and their "dry econometric and technocratic formulations" which did not evoke any emotions among the population.¹⁹ Needless to say, this was a much more prosaic foundation for an authoritarian dictatorship than the previous war-like rhetoric so characteristic of General Franco and the traditional *políticos* of the regime.

¹⁷ See Páris, op.cit., p.452. See also Ortega, Felix (1992) "Las ideologías de la reforma educativa de 1970" in *Revista de Educación. Número extraordinario; La ley General de Educación veinte años después*, Ministerio de Ciencia y Educación (MEC), Madrid, and de Puelles Benítez, op.cit., p.24.

¹⁸ Ortega (1992) op.cit., p.36. (my transl.)

¹⁹ Solé Tura, op.cit., p.197. (my transl.)

Nevertheless, in order to properly qualify the hypothesis outlined in this study, the direct consequences of the administrative reform on subsequent political and cultural development has to be focused. Based on the analysis done in the previous chapter, I find it reasonable to say that even though the reform did not succeed in its intentions of uniting and co-ordinating the Spanish public administration, it surely obtained partially and important effects. These effects are fundamentally different from the intentions of the reform outlined in chapter six. We remember that the technocratic reform of the public administration had as its prime objectives to rationalize its function in accordance with universalistic principles so as to be the administration for economic growth in an international capitalist market. This must further be understood within the Opus Dei project of creating a prosperous, homogeneous and integrated Catholic society where the creation of wealth was supposed to erode tensions within society as time went by and the material standards of life rose. Having these intentions in mind, the story of the so called technocratic administrative reform is to my judgement a story of a lot of unintended consequences. Thus, I will concretize the direct consequences of the reform and its paradoxes in the following two points:

1) The reform broke down the old particularistic structure and culture of the Spanish public administration. It did not so only by offering a new paradigm for administrative work, but also as a consequence of the defensive strategy of the formerly privileged groups, the so called *special corpses* within the public administration, which to a strong degree boycotted services as their privileges were being threatened throughout the reform process. Hence, the reform did not succeed in co-ordinating and unifying the public administration, but rather opened up space for more traditional political struggle. This consequence was directly opposed to the reformers technocratic intention of making politics in general a question of a certain kind of technical decision making.

2) As noted above the reform legitimized a new way of thinking and doing administrative work which suited the interests of an ever increasing and educated urban middle class. The reform was initially a part of the Opus Dei project of struggle for political power. Nevertheless, the concept of science and technology implied by the professional ethic of Opus Dei, would also appeal to a new generation of Spaniards who wanted to gain influence on the basis of personal merit. Thus, the Opus Dei professionalism, exemplified by the attitude of the civil servants, became a carrier of, or legitimized, an instrumental conception of science and technology which reached far out of the Opus Dei

group and became a part of the habitus of a growing middle class. It can be suggested that this habitus worked in favour of transition to democracy after the death of Franco. Giner and Sevilla say:

"The more 'radical' and adventurous reformers [...] were willing to take chances and risk the responsibility of shouldering the transition. They were young, and were led by Adolfo Suárez²⁰, a recent Minister of the Movement [...] who suddenly converted to democracy (and became the first democratically elected president of post-franquist Spain in June 1977). Their basis was direct access to high political office and they were mostly governed by pragmatic notions of political expediency. They were the least ideology-bound of all Francoists. For all these reasons, this group soon acquired a crucial importance in the process of transformation."²¹

This point might illuminate one of the reasons for what Richard Gunther describes as a "[...] remarkable continuity in the Spanish state administration [...]" during the transitional period.²² Science and technology have got both its manipulative and anti authoritarian aspects. On the one hand it can legitimize political decisions as 'the one best way' of doing things. This is to my judgement the aspect which is most salient in the initial technocratic project in Spain. On the other hand, science and technology can open up for communication and debate where arguments are the ultimate authority. Once let loose, it is hard to control which part of the Janus face of science and technology would look you in the eye.

Thus, I think it is fair to say that the most salient direct consequence of the administrative reform with regard to the subsequent transition to democracy in Spain, was that it gradually legitimized a weapon which could be used to break one of the fundamental pillars of the franquist political system; the particularistic and uncoordinated public administration. This had throughout the initial stages of the regime been an important element in Franco's tactics of 'divide and rule'. As such, the technocratic administrative reform, which was set out to save the regime in a period of turmoil and grave problems in the late 1950's, was from the outset carrying an instrument for attacking its very base of existence throughout

²⁰ It can be noted that Adolfo Suárez was appointed by López Rodó for a chief position within the newly created *Office of the Technical Secretary General of the Government's Presidency* in 1957. (López Rodó (1990) op.cit., p.102)

²¹ Giner/Sevilla, op.cit., p.124.

²² Gunther, Richard (1996) *Spanish Public Policy: From Dictatorship to Democracy*, Working Paper n.84, Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Madrid, p.3. (my italics)

the 1960's and beginning of the 1970's. If the intention of the reform was to create an administration for economic growth, in effect it rather created an administration which facilitated the dissolution of the regime it was supposed to save.

On the grounds of the findings of this study and my interpretation of the technocratic administrative reform, I will conclude that the reform both indirectly and directly changed late franquist politics and culture. Indirectly the reform affected an economic and cultural development which eroded the base on which the regime rested. Directly it contributed to the dissolution of the traditional Spanish administration which administrated and represented the division of power within the franquist coalition.

"From verbalistic politics - to the politics of expertise"

In this chapter I have analysed the way in which the technocratic administrative reform can illuminate the transition to democracy in Spain. There is nevertheless one more aspect which must be taken into consideration when we are to understand the story of the 'technocracy on the road to democracy': Technocracy in Spain signified an assimilation of the administrative and economic techniques to those most prevalent in the western world of the period.

In franquist Spain *politics* in the western democratic meaning of the term was strictly taboo. This kind of politics was perceived as the very cause of tension within society because the political parties were seen as juxtaposing groups of people with different interests and henceforth working against the interests of the nation as an organic hole. The technocrats did not by any means express a tendency toward politics in the western democratic version of the term, and in this respect they represented nothing new. Politics as *technique*, or work for the integration of society, was on the other hand perceived as neutral. Thus, the change from 1957 on is more likely to be understood as a shift in *the way of making politics*, which in itself was motivated by a technocratic political project. As López Rodó told me: "The almost Copernican revolution in Spanish politics of this period was the change from verbalistic politics to the politics of expertise."²³ Without taking this expression at face value I think it indicates the direction of the development within the franquist political system during this period. A politics of expertise is usually associated with technocracy, and in

²³ Interview with Laureano López Rodó, the 23rd of July 1996.

almost all academic writings this is evaluated to be fundamentally incompatible with basic democratic principles. I nevertheless think that technocracy, presented as apolitical and neutral, must be regarded as a threat, not only to the democratic political sphere but to the political sphere *in general*, and in franquist Spain the political sphere was the dictatorship. Even though Franco and the technocrats converged in wanting to downplay ideologies and politics in a western democratic meaning of the term, the technocrats also ruined the traditional franquist legitimacy by substituting the old nationalist-catholic-charismatic ideology with their own 'apolitical' technocratic ideology. I am not suggesting that technocracy is anything like a 'natural path' to democracy: Technocracy may well be in the foundations of an authoritarian or totalitarian regime, but in the context of the late 1950's Spain, the turn towards technocracy was more of a defensive move by the dictator, a move whose consequences were hard to anticipate, not only for Franco but also for the technocrats themselves.

We remember López Rodó stating in 1963 that increased standards of living would give greater cohesion to the country. (see pp. 78-79) In contrast to his prediction, social unrest rose with standards of living and rising expectations in society in general. As in other western countries, the now rather substantial university community, was strongly radicalized from the late 1960's and a large number of illegal trade unions were formed in the 1960's.²⁴ The fact that the character of social changes were somewhat unanticipated by the policy-makers suggests nothing more than the difficulties involved in predicting the scientific and technological impact on society when science and technology are seen as mere instruments and not evaluated as a part of a wider sociocultural context where the underlying values of these activities are reflected upon. In retrospect one can say that the technocrats had their hands on the steering wheel but were too busy reading the drivers manual to see where they were going.

Finally, when speaking of the transition from an authoritarian technocracy to a western style democracy one must not forget the latter's *technocratic taint*. Theodore Roszak has put it this way:

"The language and iconography of democracy dominates all the politics of our time, but political power is no less elitist for all that. So too the technocracy continues to respect the formal surface of democratic politics; it is another, and this time extraordinarily potent means of subverting democracy from within its own ideals and institutions. It is a citadel of expertise dominating the high ground of urban-industrial society."²⁵

²⁴ Gunther (1980) op.cit., p.42.

²⁵ Cited from Fischer, op.cit., p.11.

The prevalent form of political interest-articulation and representation in the western world surely is no unproblematic and settled matter, and one of the most salient problems concerns *what kind of decisions are to be taken on what level and by whom*. I believe it is fair to say that for example the ongoing project of coordination of politics through the European Union has a technocratic dimension which must not be neglected. Even though the political expertise today is not as loud-mouthed as the classical technocrat, the technical and scientific expertise certainly make a wide range of decisions in contemporary politics. It can often seem as if politics are reduced to keeping the 'machine running', and in this process most citizens are likely to feel somewhat run over by the experts who 'know how this is to be done.' When speaking of the United States, Frank Fischer points at a problem which I believe is salient in all contemporary democracies: "[...] discussion is diverted away from the *value* issues underlying economic and technological progress itself."²⁶ I think this resembles one of the most striking features of the Spanish technocracy: Within the theo-technocratic positivism of Opus Dei all attention was focused on economic and technical progress without questioning the underlying values. In other words: At least on the level of administrative technique and economic policy the transition from an authoritarian-style technocracy to a western-style democracy was not necessarily as big as one could expect.

²⁶ Op.cit, p.47.

CHAPTER 10.

Conclusion

"How little Spain changes"

In the spring of 1996 I listened to a debate on Spanish national radio regarding Spanish application to the convergence criteria of the European monetary union. The participants were political and intellectual prominences, and the debate was initially held in an unmistakably elevated and serious tone. During the programme the debaters started to reflect upon differences in business culture throughout Europe, and one of the participants painted a favourable picture of the working day in Northern Europe as opposed to the Spanish: "They get up at day-break to have a solid breakfast before going to work while we have a donut and a *cortado* at the local café at more agreeable hours. Because of this they just need a quick standing lunch before going back to work, while we are making plans for the three-hours siesta with a three-course meal. In the evening they relax at home in front of the TV preparing for the next day at work, while we discuss football over a *tinto* in the old-town. No wonder we have more than 20 % unemployment." There was a pause before the hostess broke the silence: "Well, that seems perfectly well, but all this efficiency sounds.....extremely *boring*, doesn't it?" New pause for about two seconds before the whole lot bursted into laughter. The rest of the debate sounded more or less as if it was held during a long-table late dinner among good friends. I believe this story might suggest that Spain still *is* somewhat different and how it is so: For a great number of Spaniards life is much too precious to be wasted altogether on work. The post-franquist ex-Mayor of El Toboso in Graham Greene's *Monsignor Quixote* puts it this way: "How little Spain changes. You would never feel in France that you were in the world of Racine or Molière, nor in London that you were still close to Shakespeare's time. It is only in Spain and Russia that time stands still." Thus, I believe it is important to note that the cultural and political assimilation of Spain to the rest of the western European countries during the technocratic period must not be exaggerated beyond recognition. However, Spain is today a firmly established democracy which has thoroughly departed from its almost exclusively authoritarian past, and I believe this study has illuminated the process of political and cultural change through which it did so.

Summary of the study

At the outset of this work I argued that the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Spain cannot be properly understood without reference to development within the franquist regime during the Spanish technocracy. In this period the country experienced strong economic development which was accompanied by heavy urbanization and, despite the considerations made above, an assimilation of general culture to that of other western European countries.

Furthermore, I have argued that a study of the administrative reform starting in 1957 is essential in order to understand both the intellectual and political orientation of the overall technocratic project. The administrative reform was not only the initial technocratic reform but also intimately linked to economic and educational reforms throughout the rest of this period. I believe that this study has clarified that the Spanish technocracy must be understood as highly inspired by the Catholic lay-organisation Opus Dei. In several other studies it has been argued that Opus Dei became a sort of weberian carrier of the spirit of capitalism in a mid 20th century Spanish context. I have not contended this view, but to my judgement the most salient characteristic of the influence of Opus Dei on Spanish society was the way in which this spirit of capitalism was operationalized, that is, through the instrumental use of administrative science and technology for the sole purpose of creating economic growth. I have throughout this study argued in favour of considering these phenomena as social constructions which in themselves are in need of historical interpretations, and in order to concretize this weberian hypothesis on recent Spanish historical development I have focused on the concept of science and technology within Opus Dei.

In chapter five I argued that Opus Dei must be understood as an organization which from the very outset aimed at getting a Catholic upper hand in dealing with the exigencies of modern industrial or post-industrial society. As such, Opus Dei's role within the Spanish historical context has first and foremost been to contain liberalism, socialism and communism which all were considered secular and heretic ideologies within Catholic Spain. In this project science and technology became tools for creating a fusion between religion and the world: The very axiom of the Opus Dei ethic is that one has to work in this world for the improvement of material life in order to create a great, homogeneous and

integrated Catholic society. As scientific and technological competence were seen as the most adequate instruments for fulfilling these religious and political goals, the intellectuals of Opus Dei would consider science- and technology-based professions as the most noble positions for carrying out their apostolate. I believe many of both the central policy-makers and the higher civil servants conceived of themselves as being "the conserving salt and the guiding light of society," (see p.72) and while being so they were in the lucky position of both serving their own interests and improving their status. This is the place to remind of the maxim n.338 of the indispensable manual of for all Opus Dei members, *The Way*: "Today, with the extension and intensity of the modern science, it is necessary that we divide our work to defend the Church on all scientific areas." On the basis of my historical and theoretical investigation of the concept of technocracy and the role of science and technology within this, I have called this instrumentalist positivism guided by the Catholic intellectual elite for *theo-technocratic positivism*.

The definition of this concept of science and technology has aided my investigation of the intentions, institutionalizations and effects of the administrative reform. The reformers of the late 1950's were confronting a highly particularistic administration, consisting of almost 200 autonomous corpses. The tendency towards administrative cantonalism and self-government was not suppressed by the political system, neither during the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, nor by the II Republic, and became, as has been exposed in chapter six, an important instrument in Franco's strategy of 'divide and rule' within the coalition upon which his regime rested. However, in the international political context of the cold war which had made Spain more acceptable to western countries, and during a period of internal turmoil within the regime, the dictators will to stay in power at almost any cost, made him receptive to the technocrats proposals for reforming the public administration into an administration for economic growth in an international capitalist market. The internal situation of the country in the late 1950's was threatening the public order, one of the dictators 'reserved policy areas'. Under these circumstances, López Rodó succeeded in creating an almost instrumental relationship between the technocrats' administration for economic growth and the historical role of Franco who should be the 'rostowian' authority during the phase of economic take-off.

In the continuance I have investigated the institutionalization of the reform, primarily through the activities at the public administration school which was created in 1958. By doing this I have tried to come to terms with the spirit of the administrative reform as well as to understand the political struggle of which the reform was a part. In keeping with my focus on science and technology I have investigated how this centre became a receptor of Anglo-Saxon administrative science and technology to be incorporated into a Catholic authoritarian reality. On the basis of this investigation, I believe it is fair to say that the educational courses of the *Técnicos de Administración Civil* aimed at creating a new *persona* within the Spanish public administration; the non-formalistic social engineer trained to administrate change and efficiency through knowledge of procedural techniques, administrative sociology, group psychology and financial administration for defined social purposes. As such the old formalistic and juridistic paradigm of administrative work was confronted with López Rodó's view that the law should be more of a social scientific instrument to direct social change, and not be conceived of as the guarantist of eternal and philosophically derived rights which could be applied in a particularistic and arbitrary manner.

The manipulative and 'one best way' character of the intellectual technologies taught at *Alcalá* gives the public administration school a strong technocratic taint. Even though the activities of the school comprised both education, training and research, and in spite of widespread co-operation with universities, these activities were at all times explicitly in accordance with the development of the reformat process in large. One was not seeking knowledge for its own sake but rather as a tool to promote both administrative, economic and educational reforms in accordance with the intentions of the technocratic policy-makers. In accordance with the theo-technocratic concept of science and technology, foreign administrative science and technology became the prime tools in the project of creating the Opus Dei 'good society' and the school in Alcalá de Henares became *the* place for these sciences and technologies to make an impact on the Spanish administration. In chapter seven I concluded that the following three characteristics captures the spirit and intellectual orientation of the school: 1) An almost unconditional acceptance of the relevancy of foreign experiences, 2) the extent to which education in different aspects of administrative science was seen as both the formal and intellectual means to reach the overriding goal of economic growth, and 3) the belief in science and technology as neutral instruments in this process.

One of Catholic Spain's recurrent problems during the past two centuries was precisely to find answers to the problems related to the development of modern industrial society, and the Catholic part of the country had before the coming of Opus Dei been highly sceptical towards any tendency that could be said to be leading towards a modern science-based society. Thus, an important part of the historical role of Opus Dei is in my judgement that it was to become the carrier of a completely new administrative tradition within Catholic Spain. In keeping with the terms of the TMV research group, one could say that Opus Dei appropriated American managerial ideology in franquist Spain through a highly elitist religious ethic, and in this way an aspect of 'Americanism' was modelled into a traditional elitist Catholic tradition, previously reluctant to a 'scientization' of society. Only from 1965 to 1968 the number of professionals within the active population rose by 66%, businessmen and managers by 45%.¹ However, I have argued, primarily on the basis of the survey conducted among higher civil servants in 1967, that the imported administrative science and technology acquired a different meaning within late franquist society as time went by. In chapter seven I concluded that the data from this survey could support the hypothesis that the higher civil servants understood themselves and expressed both critique and satisfaction within a predominantly universalistic and modern paradigm for administrative work. I believe that such an interpretation is strengthened by the fact that all the studies regarding the effects of the administrative reform conducted in the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's extoll the objective and universalistic aspects of science and believed this ideal to be a prerequisite for liberalisation within the Spanish state. As such, both Linz, de Miguel, Beltrán, Nieto and Moya can exemplify what I mean by saying that the imported social sciences derived a different meaning as time passed: The universalistic and meritocratic ideology was no longer solely part of a controlled and highly technocratic political project, but became a carrier of, and legitimized, an instrumental conception of science and technology which reached far out of the Opus Dei group and became a part of the habitus of a growing educated middle class, promoting what Moya called a 'national liberal reform'.

Confronting the hypothesis I outlined in chapter one, I believe that my investigations have shown that the technocratic administrative reform was highly inspired by the theo-technocratic positivism of Opus Dei. Furthermore, I believe my investigations to have supported the hypothesis that the

¹Maravall/Santamaría, op.cit., p.76.

administrative reform facilitated the subsequent transition to democracy, but that it did so primarily as a result of the following three unintended consequences which are intimately connected: 1) *It affected an economic and cultural development which eroded the base on which the regime rested through its connection with the economic and educational reforms,* 2) *directly it contributed to the dissolution of the particularistic and uncoordinated Spanish administration which administrated and represented the division of power within the franquist coalition and* 3) *it legitimized a new way of thinking and doing administrative work which suited the interests of an ever increasing and educated urban middle class.* As such, the technocratic administrative reform is one of the important factors which must be taken into consideration when we are to understand the relatively undramatic transition to democracy in Spain in the late 1970's.

Final remarks

The story of the transition to and consolidation of democracy in Spain is not a story of a non-controversial and coherent dissolution of the franquist regime starting with the insurgence of the technocrats on the Spanish political scene in the late 1950's. The years 1970-1975 were more or less characterized by a permanent political crisis within the regime. In addition, the transition to democracy, in the aftermath of the dictator's death, was mediated through political actions in favour of democracy which in no way were pre-determined. However, these actions can not be properly understood without considering the political, economic, social and cultural development during the later part of the franquist regime. This development was mediated through the impact of the world capitalist system in the context of the Cold War, and through national social movements, trade unions and clandestine political organizations in favour of political liberalization. However, a more complete understanding of the development during this crucial phase in Spanish history, in which the country broke with its almost exclusively authoritarian past, must be complemented with an understanding of the dynamics through which the Opus Dei affected internal changes in policy-making and political and intellectual culture. The intentions of this study has been fulfilled if the investigation of the technocratic administrative reform has contributed to such an understanding.

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Appendix: Categories of Opus Dei membership

Extracts from Daniel Artigues' *El Opus Dei en Espana, 1928-1962*, Ruedo Ibérico, 1972, pp.76-78. (my translation)

a) The 'numerarios' (numerarii) represent the highest category within Opus Dei. They are totally initiated in *La Obra*, and must have a very solid intellectual background and be in possession of a university degree corresponding to a doctorate. After having given temporary vows they study two years of philosophy and four years of theology: then they give eternal vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Often, without this being obligatory, they live in the houses of the order. Their philosophical and theological studies resembles the normal theological education, and they have the possibility of becoming priests, although only a few have been ordained. Nevertheless, the numerarios continue executing their normal profession, even if they are ordained priests: then they become lawyer-priests, engineer-priests, doctor-priests.[...]

b) The 'oblatos' (oblato) are distinguished from the numerarios by the fact that they are not in possession of a university degree. They are normally recruited from lower social layers than the numerarios.[...] The oblatos, likewise as the numerarios, dedicate their person to Opus Dei; give the three vows and go through, or might go through, the religious studies which prepare them for being priests. But in difference to the numerarios they live [...] with their respective families and not in *La Obra*'s residencies. Among the oblatos the few worker-priests of Opus Dei is recruited. The mobility between oblatos and numerarios is rare and difficult; the two categories are carefully separated.[...]

c) The 'supernumerarios' (supernumerarii) only give vows compatible with their position and rank; in this category we find the married members of Opus Dei. But the supernumerarios are no less integrated part of the *Obra* and seem to be subjugated, as the numerarios and the oblatos, to the meditations and spiritual practices of Opus Dei.[...]

d) The 'cooperadores' (cooperatores), on the contrary, [...] do not adopt any definitive situation, as *modus stabilis vivendi*. The proof of this is that they do not have to give any vows. They dedicate only part of their activities in support of the *Obra*, take part in their charity arrangements and are, in fact, obliged to have an Opus Dei priest as their spiritual guide.[...] The cooperadores are the only who are not fully committed to the *Obra*, who only maintain an external and reversible connection. They do not even have to be Catholics.